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Abstract
Nowadays model-based techniques are widely used in system design and development, es-
pecially for safety-critical systems such as train control systems. Given a design model, ex-
ecutable codes could be generated automatically from the model following certain transfor-
mation rules. A high-quality model of a system provides a good understanding, a favourable
structure, a reasonable scale and abstraction level as well as realistic behaviours with respect
to the concurrent operation of independent subsystems. Motivated by this principle, a first
Coloured Petri Net (CPN) model of a satellite-based train control system (SatZB) with the
capability of continuous simulation is developed employing the BASYSNET method which
adopts Petri nets as the means of description during the whole development process.
After establishing the system model, the verification tasks are identified based on the hazard
analysis of the train control system. To verify the identified tasks for quality assurance, verifi-
cation by means of simulation, formal analysis and testing is carried out considering the four
representing system properties: function, state, structure and behaviour. For structural anal-
ysis, the concept of open nets is proposed to check the reproducibility of empty markings of
scenario nets, the existence of dead transitions in the scenario nets, and the terminating states
of the scenario nets. The system behaviour, in which states are involved, is investigated by
reachability analysis. Unlike the conventional method of reachability analysis by calculating
the state space of the Petri net, techniques based on Petri net unfoldings are introduced in
this thesis. As to the functional verification, two model-based test generation techniques, i.e.,
CPN-based and SPENAT (Safe Place Transition Nets with Attributes)-based techniques, are
presented.
In this thesis, the proposed methods are exemplified by the application to the on-board mod-
ule of SatZB model. According to the verification results, no errors were found in the mod-
ule. Therefore, the confidence in the quality of the on-board module has been significantly
increased.
vii

Kurzfassung
Heutzutage werden in zahlreichen Anwendungen modellbasierte Techniken zur Systemen-
twicklung, insbesondere fu¨r sicherheitskritische Systeme wie Eisenbahnleit- und -sicherungs-
systeme, verwendet. Aus einem Design Modell kann dabei ausfu¨hrbarer Code automa-
tisch nach bestimmten Transformationsregeln generiert werden. Ein hochwertiges Modell
des Systems bietet fu¨r die Entwicklung ein gutes Versta¨ndnis, eine gu¨nstige Struktur, eine
angemessene Gro¨ßenordnung und Abstraktionsebene als auch realistische Verhaltensweisen
in Bezug auf den gleichzeitigen Betrieb von unabha¨ngigen Subsystemen. Motiviert von
dieses Prinzip wird ein erstes Farbige Petri-Netz (CPN)-Modell eines satellitenbasierten Zug-
sicherungssystem (SatZB) unter Verwendung der BASYSNET Methode entwickelt, der Petri-
Netze als Beschreibungsmittel wa¨hrend des gesamten Entwicklungsprozesses nutzt. Dieses
Modell bietet die Mo¨glichkeit zur kontinuierlichen Simulation des Systemverhaltens.
Nach der Erstellung des Systemmodells werden die Verifikationsaufgaben auf der Grundlage
der Gefa¨hrdungsanalyse des Zugsicherungssystems identifiziert. Die abgeleiteten Bedin-
gungen werden zur Qualita¨tssicherung durch Simulation, formale Analysen und Tests unter
Beru¨cksichtigung der vier Systemeigenschaften (Funktion, Zustand, Struktur und Verhalten)
verifiziert. Fu¨r die Strukturanalyse wird das Konzept der offenen Netzen vorgeschlagen,
um die Reproduzierbarkeit der leeren Markierungen der Szenario-Netze, die Existenz der
Toten Transitionen in den Szenario-Netze, und die Abschluss Zusta¨nde der Szenario-Netze
zu pru¨fen. Das Systemverhalten wird dabei durch Zusta¨nde beschrieben und durch eine
Erreichbarkeitsanalyse untersucht. Im Gegensatz zu der konventionellen Methode, welche
die Erreichbarkeit durch die Berechnung des Zustandsraums des Petri-Netzes analysiert,
werden in dieser Arbeit Techniken auf Basis von Petri-Netz-Entfaltung eingefu¨hrt. Fu¨r die
funktionale Verifikation werden zwei modellbasierte Testgenerierungstechniken, eine CPN-
basierte und eine SPENAT (Sicheres Petrinetz mit Attributen)basierte, vorgestellt.
In dieser Arbeit werden die vorgeschlagenen Methoden durch die Anwendung auf das On-
Board-Modul des SatZB-Modells veranschaulicht. Dabei wurden nach dem Abschluss der
Pru¨fungen keine Fehler im Modul gefunden, wodurch das Vertrauen in die Qualita¨t des On-
Board-Moduls deutlich erho¨ht wurde.
ix
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter, first the state of the art of train control systems and some relevant projects
as well as design and development approaches for train control systems are discussed. Sec-
ond, the challenges of the automated system development, a model-based, tool supported
and automated code generation process, are posed. Third, the objectives of this thesis and
approaches proposed in this thesis are introduced. Finally, the structure of the thesis is out-
lined.
1.1 Train Control Systems
Applying the classical model of information chain to a train control system involves two
distinct processes between the dispatcher staff/system and the railway vehicles: the trans-
mission of signalling information to the driver in the cab, and the automated influence on the
movement of the vehicles in the form of (usually emergency) breaking [1]. Up to 1990, there
were more than 20 different train control systems on service across Europe, e.g., LZB (Lin-
ienfo¨rmige Zugbeeinflussung), INDUSI/PZB (Induktive Zugsicherung/Punktfo¨rmige Zug-
beeinflussung), TVM [1], [2]. In fact, these systems were developed based on three common
ancestors: the French CROCODILE, the American Continuous Cab Signals and the German
INDUSI [1]. To standardise the train control systems in a European level, the European Train
Control System (ETCS) was promoted by the European Commission, and it is specified for
the compliance with the high speed and conventional interoperability directives [3]. After
the introduction of high-speed railways in Japan and Europe, China has established its own
railway system, the Chinese Train Control System (CTCS) in 2002 [4].
Apart from introducing new train control systems for high-speed railways, a variety of train
control systems for low density traffic lines (or secondary lines) have been brought up in
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recent years targeting at reducing the considerable cost due to the employment of massive
track-side equipments. The ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System) Regional
project, whose pilot line locates in Borlange, Sweden, is basically a track-side development by
means of a centralised control using the GSM-R system to operate the relevant objects (points,
level crossings, key locks, shunting areas, etc.) in the infrastructure [5]. Therefore, the ERTMS
Regional provides a solution which allows a significant reduction of track-side investments
for the secondary lines. According to the cost study (e.g. in the ERTMS Regional project) and
the investigation of the GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System)-based solutions (e.g. in
the EU project LOCOPROL [6]) for low density traffic lines, the cost of the on-board and track-
side of a train control system for low density traffic lines will alleviate massively when using
the GNSS technology. As a consequence, a number of advanced satellite-based train control
systems haven been proposed in Europe, such as RZL (Rechnergestu¨tztes Zugleitsystem)
[7], [8], SatZB (Satellitengestu¨tzter Zugleitbetrib) [9], SATLOC (Satellite Based Operation and
Management of Local Low Traffics Lines) [10].
Table 1.1 summaries some train control systems mentioned above.
TABLE 1.1: Train control systems
Line type High-speed lines
Low density traffic lines
(Secondary lines)
Train control
system
ETCS CTCS
ERTMS
Regional
Advanced satellite-based
train control system
RZL SatZB SATLOC
Country/
Region/
Pilot line
Europe China Sweden Austria Germany Romania
SatZB. As the system studied in the thesis, the SatZB system is further introduced as follows.
The general architecture of SatZB is shown in Figure 1.1. There are two main components:
the on-board subsystem and the traffic control centre (TCC). The TCC manages a list of block
sections and gives movement authorities (MA) to the train to drive into defined sections. The
on-board subsystem uses GNSS to locate the train and sends location reports to the TCC.
When the train approaches the border of its current section, the on-board subsystem sends
a request to the TCC for driving into the next section. The communication between the on-
board subsystem and the TCC is carried out by mobile radio. Notice that SatZB exploits fixes
block sections (see Figure 1.2). Generally, the track between two stations is defined as a block
section.
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FIGURE 1.1: The general architecture of SatZB [9]
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To get a better understanding and a closer investigation of SatZB from both the perspective of
software and hardware, the architectures of the on-board subsystem and the TCC presented
in [11] are shown in Figure 1.3.
1.2 Design and Development of Train Control Systems
Over the years, numerous methods have been proposed to design and develop various train
control systems. In the following, some cases are introduced.
ETCS. Due to the usage of different incompatible train control systems in different countries
or companies in Europe, a train that runs through different countries has to be equipped with
several systems or the train traction units and drivers have to be changed at each border.
The first solution incurs great expense, while the second one is time consuming. To avoid
this situation, the ETCS project was issued by the International Union of Railways (Union
Internationale des Chemins de Fer, UIC). ETCS is a standard requirement for European train
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FIGURE 1.3: The architectures of the on-board subsystem and the traffic control centre [11]
control systems and provides a uniform and language-independent signalling information
for the Man Machine Interface (MMI). It is mainly dedicated to train interoperability, i.e., it
allows an international train running from one country to another without changing either
locomotives or drivers [12], [13].
To reflect the architecture of the real system, modelling ETCS in a modularised manner has
been introduced in the Institute for Traffic Safety and Automation Engineering (iVA), TU
Braunschweig [12], [14]. In [12], the modelling of ETCS starts from three different mod-
elling paradigms: components, scenarios and functions. A train control system model can
be divided into different modules (component models) (e.g., the ETCS consists of two main
components: the on-board subsystem and the Radio Block Center (RBC)). For structuring the
component models of the on-board subsystem and the RBC, the layered approach proposed
by [13] is adopted. A component modelled with Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs or CP-nets) [15],
in vertical, can be decomposed into scenario nets, function nets and additional nets for the
purpose of independent simulation (see Figure 3.5 in chapter 3). In [14] a similar approach
is used to model the ETCS. However, the author presented more detailed nets for the con-
text level (system level), process level (component level), scenario level, and functional level
with respect to the interfaces of each component and the data exchanged between different
components.
openETCS. The release of the ETCS System Requirements Specification 3.0.0 (SRS 3.0.0) (also
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called “baseline 3”) by the European Railway Agency (ERA) makes the SRS a “public do-
main” document. It means that everyone in Europe is legally entitled to use the SRS to
develop ETCS equipments [16]. With the access to the ETCS SRS, different manufacturers
design their own systems according to their own understanding of the textual specification
resulting in different versions of ETCS implementations which maybe not fully interopera-
ble. This would make the major goal of unrestricted interoperability of the ETCS be missed.
Based on these realities, a currently ongoing project called “openETCS” has been proposed
by a group led by DB (Deutsche Bahn AG, Germany) to the ITEA 2 (Information Technology
for European Advancement) program in 2012. The purpose of the openETCS project is to
develop a framework integrating modelling, development, validation and testing for lever-
aging the cost-efficient and reliable implementation of ETCS [17]. This framework should be
managed by applying the “open proofs” methodology via providing formal system require-
ments and use case specifications, embedded control software, interfaces, architectures, tools
and safety case documents all under an open source license [18]. The framework will pro-
vide a holistic tool chain across the whole development process of ETCS software. The tool
chain will support the formal specification and verification of the ETCS system requirements,
the automatic and ETCS compliant code generation and validation, and the model-based test
case generation and execution [17].
Within the application of the methodology of open proofs, the formalisation of the SRS of the
on-board subsystem (defined in SUBSET-026 [19]) into a high-level, simulable, semi-formal
and formal model using a part of a tool chain is one of the goals of the project [20]. The semi-
formal and simulable (but not in real time) model describes all the requirements considered
in the scope of system design, covering as many features as possible of the on-board unit. For
the chosen parts of the system, the semi-formal models will be completed with strictly formal
models, with which complementary elements are provided for the verification and validation
using formal proofs. Another goal of the openETCS project is to define the tool chain for
developing the on-board software that can fulfil the EN 50128 [21] software development
requirements [20]. The executable codes (SIL 4 [22]) of the on-board software are generated
from the strictly formal software model. For the tool chain, at present, three proposals have
been made by the project: SCADE-based primary tool chain, ERTMS Formal Specs (EFS) [23],
[24] based primary tool chain and B [25]. In particular, the SysML/SCADE [26] has been
chosen as an already available tool chain for the on-board unit modelling [27].
Satellite-based Train Control Systems. In Europe, a large part of the railway network con-
sists of single track lines most of which are local lines. These lines tend to have relatively low
traffic density, and often have obsolete signalling systems or none at all. Consequently, the
operational maintenance of these systems becomes more and more difficult and costly and
the personnel involvement for normal operations purpose is intensive. This may easily incur
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unsatisfactory operation services and even safety issues due to the intensive involvement of
personnel. An effective and inexpensive solution for reducing the cost and improving the
safety of low traffic density and regional lines is therefore urgently needed. Using GNSS-
based localisation for train control is one of such solutions. The already known satellite-
based train control systems in operation including Incremental Train Control System (ITCS)
in United States of America, Integrated Train Protection System (Klub-U) in Russia and RZL
in Austria. The ongoing EU project SATLOC, applied in Romania, is using the GNSS-based
localisation technology as well.
The RZL system, developed at the Upper Austrian University of Applied Sciences in Wels,
was first equipped in the narrow gauge line from Gmunden to Vorchdorf in the Austrian
federal state of Upper Austria in 2003 [8]. In [8], a systematic design based on UML [28] is
raised for the development of the RZL system. Based on the system requirements, use cases
are used for all operational input/output sequences. For each use case, a sequence diagram
and a textual description with a formalised structure is specified. To design and verify the
software tasks that have a cyclic behaviour, activity diagrams are adopted. Additionally, state
machines are used to describe the states of the steps in the activity diagrams. The last step of
this UML-based design is the design of the class diagrams which document all methods (but
not all attributes). However, automatic code generation was not employed for implementing
the designed system. For the SATLOC project, the system design is based on the RZL system.
Before these projects, another satellite-based train control system, SatZB, has been studied
(see [9], [11]) for a period of time. The modelling of SatZB with Petri nets in [11] serves as a
case study for the automated system development, whereas in [9] the authors concentrated
on distributed simulation for multiple trains.
1.3 Automated System Development–BASYSNET
Conventionally, a train control system is developed step by step as following: in each phase
specific means of descriptions and methods are used and the output of each phase is a bunch
of textual documents. Due to the possibility that different responsible parties or work teams
work for different phases, the responsible parties or work teams for a latter phase have to un-
derstand the output from the previous phase first, and take it as the input of the latter phase.
Furthermore, transformation from the output of the previous phase to the input of the latter
phase is needed if different means of descriptions are used in different phases. This transfor-
mation process consumes a lot of effort, and more importantly, could provide errors for the
reason of misunderstanding, manual transformation or the utilisation of different techniques.
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The conventional developments of ETCS and the developments of the RZL and SATLOC ex-
ploit the conventional approaches.
To overcome the inconsistency of the developed system to its requirements specification by
conventional approaches, automated system development (e.g., the openETCS project which
provides a tool chain to support the system development from system requirements to the
executable code generation as well as the verification and validation of the developed sys-
tem) is promising. The automated system development, in fact, is a model-based system
development process, within which executable codes could be generated from the model
automatically. Figure 1.4 shows the processes of conventional system development and au-
tomated system development. The quality of the system developed with automated system
development approach has a huge advantage over the quality of those developed by con-
ventional approaches when formal methods (e.g., methods based on Petri nets, B, VDM [29],
[30] or UML/SysML,) are applied to the development process. Formal methods offer a po-
tential to obtain an early integration of verification in the design process as well as to provide
more effective verification techniques. Roughly speaking, two branches of formal verification
techniques can be distinguished: deductive and model-based methods [31]. With deductive
methods, the correctness of the system is determined by properties in a mathematical the-
ory and these properties are proven using tools such as theorem provers and proof checkers.
Model-based techniques are based on models describing the system behavior in a mathe-
matical precise and unambiguous manner. The system model with algorithms systematically
suggests all states of the system model. This provides the basis for a whole range of verifica-
tion techniques ranging from an exhaustive exploration (model checking/formal analysis) to
experiments with a restrictive set of scenarios in the model (simulation), or in reality (testing).
The BASYSNET (The Braunschweig Description, Analysis and SYnthesiS Method based on
Petri NETs) [32], [11], developed at iVA, is a formal method for automated system develop-
ment. It is a universal method for the design and development of discrete or hybrid discrete-
continuous control systems. The BASYSNET method uses Petri nets [33], [15] as a universal
means of description during the whole process of different phases, by which the output of
the previous phase can be used directly as the input for the succeeding phase. The process is
a iterative loop cascade which comprises the entire development process of the specification
and implementation of the system, and the model-based quality assurance by means of sim-
ulation, testing and formal analysis. Figure 1.5 shows the process of the BASYSNET method.
The squares represent activities which are to be carried out, circles represent inputs and re-
sults. Two aspects, specification and implementation of the system and quality assurance
for the developed system are taken into consideration in the loop cascade. The upper part
of the loop cascade model refers to the aspect of quality assurance. Within each phase, the
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results are checked for the compliance to the results of the previous one. If there exists any
difference, returning to an earlier phase is needed.
1.4 Challenges of Verifiable Design of Train Control Systems
Nowadays system development is shifting from using informal textual specification and
manual coding techniques to a model-based and tool-supported automated code generation
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process. Nevertheless, this automated system development process faces many challenges,
especially for the safety-critical systems such as train control systems.
1.4.1 Challenges of the Design
The design of train control systems with formal means of descriptions for the purpose of auto-
matic code generation needs to provide high-quality system models. The quality of a system
model in general takes two aspects into account: completeness and the representing system prop-
erties (i.e., state, function, structure and behaviour [34]). Therefore, to improve and ensure the
quality of the train control system model, more information should be included in the model
for completeness purpose on one hand, and the verification of the system properties should
be carried out on the other hand. Yet the more information is added to the system model,
the larger the model will be, and consequently the harder the verification of the system prop-
erties becomes. A trade-off between the completeness and the verification complexity of the
system model in the phase of system design therefore has to be considered. This is a question
of how to properly model a real train control system. In addition, the model is required to
have a realistic behaviour of the train control system.
1.4.2 Challenges of the Quality Assurance
According to the BASYSNET method, quality assurance for the design model by verification
could be implemented via simulation, testing and formal analysis. For the development of
a specific system of train control system, the first challenge of the quality assurance is the
identification of system-specific verification tasks. To verify the identified tasks, concrete methods
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are needed for each manner of the quality assurance. The application of these methods may
encounter the challenges of the state explosion problem, structural and behavioural analysis for
large-scale systems, automatic test generation and high test coverage, etc.
1.5 Objectives and Approaches
Objectives. How to improve and ensure the correctness and safety of the system? This is one of
the major questions to be answered when one develops a safety-critical system. Answer-
ing this question, the following objectives are set in this thesis based on the state-of-the-art
developments of train control systems and the presented challenges of model-based and tool-
supported automated system development (i.e., the BASYSNET method):
1. Establish the design model of a satellite-based train control system that is appropriate for sys-
tem implementation. Namely, the system model has a reasonable scale as well as a well
structure satisfying the readability.
2. Identify the verification tasks for the design model in consideration of being a safety-critical
system. Hazardous conditions of the design model should be excluded, and functions
for safety and normal operations should be verified.
3. Explore methodologies for carrying out the verification of the system model by means of testing
and formal analysis with respect to the identified verification tasks. For testing, automatic
test generation techniques with adequate test coverages are of interest, and for formal
analysis, methods of structural analysis within the consideration of large-scale system
models and methods of the reachability analysis avoiding the state explosion problem
are desired.
Approaches. To cope with the contradiction between the completeness and the verification
complexity of a system model, intuitively, two solutions are available. One is to build rel-
atively abstract models by sacrificing the completeness. This kind of abstract models how-
ever are not detailed enough for generating executable codes in automated system devel-
opment. The other solution is to develop a more detailed system model by the manner of
modularisation. Different modules or submodules are interconnected by specified interfaces.
This is easy to be implemented with CPNs which support the specification of hierarchically
structured models. Apparently, the second solution is more suitable for the automated sys-
tem development. Therefore, a hierarchically modelling approach is employed to model the
satellite-based train control system as follows.
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• On the top level of the system model, the object-oriented approach is used in order to
reflect the architecture of the real system. On the second level of the on-board and the
TCC module, the state-oriented approach is applied based on the concept of scenario.
Each scenario of the system, defined from the view of system operators, associates with
a scenario nets in the on-board and TCC module. On the third level of the scenario nets,
the process-oriented approach is exploited to deal with the incoming and outgoing data.
On the bottom level, function blocks are specified with the function-oriented approach.
A function block could be called by different scenario nets. To enable the implemen-
tation of the verification by model execution, a synchronisation method is raised using
reference variables [35].
Given a system model of a train control system, the verification tasks must be identified
before conducting the verification activities. Thus, a hazard analysis based approach for the
identification of verification tasks is presented.
• On the basis of the hazard analysis of the satellite-based train control system, hazardous
conditions of the system model, functions of the real system for both safety and normal
operation as well as their allocations in the system model are identified, from which the
verification tasks of the system model are specified.
To verify the specified tasks of the system model, approaches from both static and dynamic
perspectives are proposed.
• For the structural verification, the notion of open nets [36], [37] is used to investigate
the structural properties of the system model based on the theories of structural prop-
erties of Petri nets and reproducibility of empty markings of Petri nets introduced by
Lautenbach [38].
• For investigating the behavioural properties of the (hierarchical) CP-nets, the unfolding-
based techniques are employed. To unfold a (hierarchical) CP-net directly without
transforming into a intermediate low-level Petri net, an extension of [39] is accom-
plished. The reachability analysis for the CP-nets are discussed on the basis of the
concepts of linearisation and configuration [40] of unfoldings.
• For the functional verification, two model-based test generation techniques based on
CPNs and SPENAT (Safe Place Transition Nets with Attributes) [41] are exemplified by
generating test cases for the on-board module of the system model. The test model of
the CPN-based technique includes a behavioural module of the test object and mod-
ules of the environments of the test object. These modules form a closed system. The
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SPENAT-based technique only model the intended behaviour of the test object, i.e., no
environment of the test object has to be modelled because of the possible input/out-
put modelling with a SPENAT. Thereby a SPENAT is an open system. By applying two
test generation techniques, systematic errors could be avoided, which is vital to safety-
critical systems.
1.6 Outline
After this introduction, in the second chapter, Petri nets, both low-level Petri nets including
timed Petri nets and CP-nets (high-level Petri nets), are formally introduced as Petri nets
are chosen as the means of description for the system design in this thesis. Besides, Petri
net tools, e.g., pi-Tool [42], Poseidon [43] and CPN-Tools [35], are compared with respect to
different features.
In the third chapter, the approach of modelling a satellite-based train control system, in par-
ticular, the on-board subsystem with CPNs is elaborated.
In the fourth chapter, the verification tasks of the system model (developed in chapter 3) are
specified in consideration of the requirements of a safety-critical system.
In the fifth chapter, Petri net analysing techniques that are used for quality assurance are
discussed. These techniques include behavioural analysis, structural analysis and coverage-
based test generation.
In the sixth chapter, the structural properties of consistency and controllability (introduced
in chapter 5) are verified using the notion of open nets and it is applied to the scenario nets
of the on-board subsystem model (developed in chapter 3) according to the verification tasks
(specified in chapter 4).
In the seventh chapter, reachability analysis based on Petri net unfoldings is investigated to
verify the dynamic behaviour of the system model (introduced in chapter 5) and an applica-
tion example (derived from chapter 3) is given according to the verification tasks (specified
in chapter 4).
In the eighth chapter, two model-based test generation techniques are proposed for testing the
functionality (specified in chapter 4) of the on-board subsystem model (developed in chapter
3). The first technique uses CP-nets to establish the test model and generates test cases with
the “all state sequences” criterion (introduced in chapter 5). The second technique adopts
SPENAT to develop the test model and derives test cases from its unfolding also with the “all
path” criterion.
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In the last chapter, the conclusions and outlook are provided.
In summary, the process of this thesis starts with two parallel aspects (i.e., theory and applica-
tion) as depicted in Figure 1.6. The first one is the theory of automated/model-based system
development. The second one is the explicit system design of a train control system. At last,
the theory is applied to the design of the satellite-based train control system.
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Chapter 2
Petri Nets and Tools
The techniques of formal methods are suggested in EN 50128 [21] for software requirements
specification, software design and implementation as well as modelling in the area of railway
applications. Formal methods provide a means of developing a description of a system at
some stage in the phases of requirements specification, design or coding. The resulting de-
scription takes a mathematical form and can be subjected to mathematical analysis to detect
various classes of inconsistency or incorrectness. A formal method will generally offer a no-
tation (formal language), a technique for deriving a description in that notation, and various
forms of analysis for checking a description for different correctness properties. A modelling
language is considered as formal if its syntax and semantics are expressed mathematically
[44]. Petri nets, named after Carl A. Petri who created in 1962 a net-like mathematical means
of description for the study of communication with automata [45], is one of such formal lan-
guages.
In this chapter, the formal definitions of Petri nets and Coloured Petri Nets, an overview of
timed Petri nets and a survey of some existing Petri net tools are introduced.
2.1 Petri Nets
Petri nets are graphical and mathematical means of descriptions that provide a uniform envi-
ronment for modelling, formal analysis and design of discrete-event systems [46], [45]. Petri
nets are well-known in describing the systems that characterised as being concurrent, asyn-
chronous and distributed. As graphical means of descriptions, Petri nets support graphical
representations of the system model, which makes it better to understand the requirements
specification of the system comparing with the using of textual descriptions. As mathematical
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means of descriptions, it is possible to describe a Petri net model by a set of linear algebraic
equations, or other mathematical models reflecting the behaviour of the system. This allows
one to check some properties of the underlying system by formal analysis independent of
simulation which can only show the presence of errors in the model instead of asserting the
absence of errors. The ability of Petri nets to verify the model formally is especially important
for safety-critical systems such as railway application systems.
Petri nets have been successfully applied on the field of modelling and analysis of communi-
cation protocols [47], [48], [49], [50], [15], distributed systems [51], [52], [53], [54], concurrent
and parallel programs [49], [55], [56], [57], [58], [59], and other areas.
In this section, Petri nets are formally introduced based on [33], [38], [60], [61], [62], [46].
2.1.1 Basic Definitions
A (Petri) net [33] is a triple N = (P, T, F ), where P and T are set of places and transitions,
respectively, and P ∩ T = ∅; F is a flow relation F ⊆ (P × T ) ∪ (T × P ) for the set of arcs.
Places and transitions are generally called nodes. The preset of a node x, denoted by •x is the set
{y ∈ P∪T |(y, x) ∈ F}. The postset of a node x, denoted by x• is the set {y ∈ P∪T |(x, y) ∈ F}. It
is possible to extend this definition to hold for a setH ⊆ P∪T by •H := {y|∃x ∈ H, (y, x) ∈ F}
and H• := {y|∃x ∈ H, (x, y) ∈ F}.
A Place/Transition net (P/T net) [33], [38], [60], [61] is a quadruple N = (P, T, F,W ), where
(P, T, F ) is a net and W is a function F → N \ {0}, where N denotes the natural numbers
including 0. If W : F → {1}, we write in short N = (P, T, F ). In this case, we call the net
ordinary. A marking of a P/T net N is a mapping P → N. We identify a marking M with
the multiset containing M(p) copies of p for every p ∈ P , where M(p) indicates the number
of tokens on p under M . For instance, if P = {p1, p2} and M(p1) = 1, M(p2) = 2, we write
M = {p1, p2, p2}. A transition t ∈ T is enabled under M , if ∀p ∈• t : M(p) = W (p, t). If t is
enabled under M , then the transition may fire, thus transform the marking M into a follower
marking M ′ represented by M [t〉M ′, where
M ′(p) :=

M(p), p 6∈• t ∪ t•
M(p)−W (p, t), p ∈• t \ t•
M(p) +W (t, p), p ∈ t• \• t
M(p)−W (p, t) +W (t, p), p ∈• t ∩ t•.
The set of all reachable markings [M0〉 from a marking M0 is defined by M0 ∈ [M0〉 and M ∈
[M0〉 ∧M [t〉M ′ =⇒ M ′ ∈ [M0〉. For t1, t2, · · · , tn ∈ T , σ = t1t2 · · · tn is a firing or occurrence
sequence ⇐⇒ ∃M0,M1, · · · ,Mn : M0[t1〉M1[t2〉 · · · [tn〉Mn. We denote the firing frequency of
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t ∈ T in σ as σ(t), the vector σ of all firing frequencies is called Parikh vector. The incidence
matrix [N(p, t)] of a P/T net is defined by
N(p, t) :=

W (t, p)−W (p, t), (p, t) ∈ F ∧ (t, p) ∈ F
−W (p, t), (p, t) ∈ F ∧ (t, p) 6∈ F
W (t, p), (p, t) 6∈ F ∧ (t, p) ∈ F
0, others.
Given a P/T net N = (P, T, F,W ) and a marking M0 of N , we call the pair (N,M0) as a
Place/Transiton system (P/T system) or marked P/T net, M0 as the initial marking. The system
(N,M0) can be presented as a matrix [[N ]M0].
2.1.2 Invariants and Net Representation
Let [N ] be the incidence matrix of a P/T net N = (P, T, F,W ). We denote each place vector
i 6= 0 ∈ N|P |, which is a solution of the linear equation iT · [N ] = 0T where 0 ∈ N|T | as an
S-invariant of N . We denote each transition vector j 6= 0 ∈ N|T |, which is a solution of the
linear equation [N ] · j = 0 where 0 ∈ N|P | as a T-invariant of N . Note that |P | represents the
number of places in the set P .
An S-invariant is a vector i , whose j th entry represents a weight i(j) associated with the
j th place, j = 1, 2, · · · ,m, such that the weighted sum of tokens remains the same for all
the markings reachable from an initial marking. A T-invariant (if it is realizable) is a vector
σ for a firing sequence σ which leads the marking from M0 to M0. In other words, given a
T-invariant σ, there exist a marking M0 and a firing sequence σ leading from M0 back to M0.
In addition, the i th entry of σ is the number of times that the i th transition fires in the firing
sequence σ, i = 1, 2, · · · , n.
Let j be a transition vector and i a place vector of the net N . We define ‖j‖ = {t ∈ T |j(t) 6= 0}
and ‖i‖ = {p ∈ P |i(p) 6= 0} the support of j and i, respectively. We say that N is covered by j
and i respectively, if ‖j‖ = T and ‖i‖ = P .
Let i be an S-invariant and j a T-invariant of a P/T net N = (P, T, F,W ). We define i is non-
negative if ∀p ∈ P : i(p) ≥ 0; i is positive if ∀p ∈ P : i(p) > 0; i is canonical if the greatest
common divisor of the components is 1; i is minimal (elementary) if i is canonical and has
minimal support. j is non-negative if ∀t ∈ T : j(t) ≥ 0; j is positive if ∀t ∈ T : j(t) > 0; j is
canonical if the greatest common divisor of the components is 1; j is minimal (elementary) if j
is canonical and has minimal support.
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Let N = (P, T, F,W ) be a P/T net, i be an S-invariant of N and j be a T-invariant of N . The
net representation Ni = (Pi, Ti, Fi,Wi) of an S-invariant i is defined by Pi := ‖i‖; Ti :=• Pi ∪ Pi•;
Fi := F ∩ ((Pi × Ti) ∪ (Ti × Pi)); Wi is the restriction of W to Fi. The net representation Nj =
(Pj, Tj, Fj,Wj) of a T-invariant j is defined by Tj := ‖j‖; Pj :=• Tj ∪ Tj•; Fj := F ∩ ((Pj × Tj) ∪
(Tj × Pj)); Wj is the restriction of W to Fj .
2.1.3 Traps and Co-traps
Let N = (P, T, F,W ) be a P/T net and H ⊆ P , then H is a co-trap iff •H ⊆ H•; H is a trap
iff H• ⊆• H . A trap (co-trap) H is minimal iff no trap (co-trap) H ′, with H ′ $ H exists. In
literature, co-trap is often called deadlock, also the term siphon is used. Once a trap is marked,
it remains marked, and once a co-trap is unmarked, it remains unmarked. The supports ‖i‖
of all non-negative S-invariants i are traps and co-traps.
2.2 Timed Petri Nets
Adding timing constraints into the Petri net models has gained a wide acceptance in the in
the area of performance and reliability evaluation. These Petri nets are known as timed Petri nets
(TPN) [63]. In [64] the firing time are assigned to the transitions of the Petri nets, whereas the
time are assigned to the places of the Petri nets in [65].
In this section, we briefly introduce some timed Petri nets that associate firing time with
the transitions in the net. Different types of timed Petri nets can be classified depending on
the type of firing time. The timed Petri nets in which the firing time delays of the transi-
tions are associated with probability (exponential) distributions are called stochastic Petri nets
(SPN) [66], [46]. Molloy [47], [67] defined stochastic Petri nets by assigning an exponentially
distributed firing rate to each transition for continuous time systems or a geometrically dis-
tributed firing rate to each transition for discrete time systems, resulting in continuous time
stochastic Petri nets (ctSPN) or discrete time stochastic Petri nets (dtSPN) and these stochastic
Petri nets are isomorphic to homogeneous Markov processes. A normal TPN model asso-
ciates a fixed (deterministic) time delay with each transition; a normal SPN model associates
an exponentially distributed firing time delay with each transition. To bridge the gap be-
tween the normal TPN and normal SPN models, Marsan [68] introduced a class of generalized
stochastic Petri Nets (GSPN) which are derived from standard Petri nets by partitioning the
set of transitions into two subsets comprising timed and immediate transitions. An expo-
nentially distributed random firing time is associated with each timed transition, whereas
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immediate transitions fire in zero time. Besides, Holliday [69] presented a GSPN model al-
lowing the firing duration to be an arbitrary real number. In [70], Marsan defined deterministic
and stochastic Petri nets (DSPN) in which transitions can fire after either a deterministic or a
random, exponentially distributed firing delay. In [71], Zijal provided a class of discrete time
deterministic and stochastic Petri nets (dtDSPN), in which transitions fire either without time
(immediate transitions) or after a geometrically distributed time and transitions with a deter-
ministic firing delay are a special case.
TABLE 2.1: Classes of timed Petri nets
Firing time of transitions in the nets
Deterministic
(Fixed/con-
stant time)
Exponential
distribution
Geometrical
distribution
Zero time
(Immediate
transitions)
Ti
m
ed
Pe
tr
in
et
s
normal TPN x
normal SPN x
GSPN x x
ctSPN x
dtSPN x
DSPN x x
dtDSPN x x x
2.3 Coloured Petri Nets
The classes of modelling formalisms based on Petri nets are differed in the amount of infor-
mation represented by the markings of places. The Petri nets that places have boolean mark-
ings meaning that a place is either empty, or contains a single token with no value, or holds
an integer number of tokens that are anonymous, i.e., one token is not distinguishable from
another, are often referred to as low-level Petri nets, whereas Petri nets that tokens have values
of primitive or complex data types, e.g., integers, strings and records, are as high-level Petri
nets [44]. The previously presented Petri nets and Place/Transition nets in this chapter are
low-level Petri nets while Coloured Petri Nets (CP-nets or CPNs) [15] belongs to high-level
Petri nets. Other high-level Petri nets include M-nets [72], [73], [74], and predicate/transition
nets [46], etc.
CPNs is a discrete-event modelling language combining Petri nets and the functional pro-
gramming language CPN ML [15] which is based on Standard ML [75]. It applies the mod-
elling concepts of time, hierarchy and inscription language[44].
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CP-nets add timing specification that makes it possible to describe the duration of the execu-
tion of activities in the system. This is represented by the addition of integer time stamps to
individual tokens. Intuitively, the time stamp in a token can be seen as a model time at which
the token is available for consumption from a place. The time concept also means that CP-
nets can be applied for simulation-based performance analysis, investigating performance
measures such as delays, throughput,and queue lengths in the system, and for modelling
and validation of real-time systems [49].
CP-nets support the specification of hierarchically structured models, which makes it possible
to work with different levels of detail and abstraction. This is in particular useful for large-
scale systems. Constructing hierarchically structured models is realised by using substitution
transitions and fusion places[15]. A substitution transition is a special transition that represents
an instance of another CPN module. A fusion place is a member of a fusion set which allows
places in different modules to be glued together into one compound place across the hierar-
chical structure of the model. The fusion places that are members of a fusion set represent a
single compound place. CP-nets with substitution transitions are nets with multiple layers of
detail. Each substitution transition is related to a more detailed page representing a module
or submodule. With substitution transitions, one can have a somewhat simplified net that
gives a broad overview (e.g., the top level) of the system you are modelling. By substituting
transitions in a specific level net with more detailed pages, more and more details can be
brought into the model. This is so-called hierarchical structuring mechanism [15], which allows
a module to have submodules, a set of modules to be composed to form a new module, and
reuse of submodules in different parts of the model.
CP-nets use the CPN ML language to specify declarations and net inscriptions. The inscrip-
tions are used for data manipulation, function definition, and so on. The CPN ML language
is an extension of the functional programming language of Standard ML.
In the following, the formal definitions of non-hierarchical and hierarchical CP-nets are adopted
from [15].
A non-hierarchical Coloured Petri Net is a nine-tuple CPN = (P, T,A,Σ, V, C,G,E, I), where:
1. P is a finite set of places.
2. T is a finite set of transitions such that P ∩ T = ∅.
3. A ⊆ P × T ∪ T × P is a set of directed arcs.
4. Σ is a finite set of non-empty colour sets.
5. V is a finite set of typed variables such that Type[v] ∈ Σ for all variables v ∈ V .
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6. C : P → Σ is a colour set function that assigns a colour set to each place.
7. G : T → EXPRV is a guard function that assigns a guard to each transition t such that
Type[G(t)] = Bool.
8. E : A → EXPRV is an arc expression function that assigns an arc expression to each
arc a such that Type[E(a)] = C(p)MS1, where p is the place connected to the arc a.
9. I : P → EXPR∅ is an initialisation function that assigns an initialisation expression to
each place p such that Type[I(p)] = C(p)MS .
A hierarchical Coloured Petri Net is a four-tuple CPNH = (S, SM,PS, FS) where:
1. S is a finite set of modules. Each module is a Coloured Petri Net Module s = ((P s, T s, As,Σs,
V s, Cs, Gs, Es, Is), T ssub, P
s
port, PT
s). It is required that (P s1 ∪ T s1)∩ (P s2 ∪ T s2) = ∅ for all
s1, s2 ∈ S such that s1 6= s2.
2. SM : Tsub → Sis a submodule function that assigns a submodule to each substitution
transition. It is required that the module hierarchy 2 is acyclic.
3. PS is a portsocket relation function that assigns a portsocket relation PS(t) ⊆ Psock(t) ×
P
SM(t)
port to each substitution transition t. It is required that ST (p) = PT (p′), C(p) = C(p′)
and I(p)〈〉 for all (p, p′) ∈ PS(t) and all t ∈ Tsub.
4. FS ⊆ 2P is set of non-empty fusion sets such that C(p) = C(p′) and I(p)〈〉 = I(p′)〈〉 for
all p, p′ ∈ fs and all fs ∈ FS.
2.4 Tools
In practical, the use of computer-aided tools is a necessity for the application of Petri nets.
There are a variety of Petri net tools in the market and research groups. The “Petri Nets
World: Online Services for the International Petri Nets Community” [76], maintained by the
TGI group at the University of Hamburg (Germany), has conducted a survey of Petri net
tools. Based on this survey and the usage of this thesis, some of the tools are given in Table
2.2. The features of the Petri net tools are defined as follows:
1MS refers to “multiset”. A multiset m over a non-empty set S can be viewed as a function from S into the
set of non-negative numbers N. The function maps each element s into the number of appearances, m(s), of the
element s in the multiset m [15].
2A module hierarchy illustrates the relationship between modules in a hierarchical model can be represented
as a directed graph which has a node for each module and an labelled arc for each substitution transition [15].
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• Graphical editor : the tool has a graphical user interface which supports editing of nets
in a graphical representation.
• Token game animation: the tool supports simulation with animation of the flow of
tokens.
• Simulation: the tool supports simulation without graphics to allow maximum simula-
tion performance.
• State spaces: the tool supports the generation of state spaces (also known as reachability
graphs/trees and occurrence graphs).
• S-invariants: the tool supports S-invariants identification.
• T-invariants: the tool supports T-invariants identification.
• Performance analysis: the tool supports performance analysis such as simulation with
time.
• Unfolding: the tool supports the generation of unfoldings (or finite complete prefixes).
2.5 Summary
This chapter first introduces Petri nets from the viewpoint of formal methods, and then gives
an overview of the advantages of Petri nets as graphical and mathematical means of de-
scriptions in describing the systems characterised as being concurrent, asynchronous and
distributed. Literatures referring to the application of Petri nets are presented afterwords.
Followed by this, the definitions of Petri nets including Place/Transition nets and Coloured
Petri Nets as well as their behavioural properties are formally introduced. Additionally, an
overview of timed Petri nets, i.e., various classes of timed Petri nets has been provided. Con-
sidering the fact that computer-aided tools are needed for the application of Petri nets, a
comparison of some existing Petri net tools has been conducted in the end.
2.5 Summary 23
TABLE 2.2: Petri net tools
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CPN Tools
[35]
Aarhus Univer-
sity (DK)
x x x x x x x
pi-Tool [42] Institute for
Quality, Safety
and Transporta-
tion (iQST)
(DE)
x x x x x x x x
Poseidon
[43]
Universita¨t
in Koblenz-
Landau (DE)
x x x x x
PIPE2 [77] Imperial Col-
lege London
(UK)
x x x x x x x x
TimeNET
[78]
Technische
Universita¨t
llmenau (DE)
x x x x x x x x x
AlPiNA
[79]
University of
Geneva (CH)
x x x x x
CPN-AMI
[80]
Universite´
Pierre & Marie
Curie (FR)
x x x x x x x
INA [81] Humboldt-
Universita¨t zu
Berlin (DE)
x x x x x x x
GreatSPN
[82]
Universita` di
Torino (IT)
x x x x x x x x x x
Cunf [83] Ce´sar
Rodrı´guez
(FR)
x x x
VIP Tool
[84]
FernUniversita¨t
in Hagen (DE)
x x x x x

Chapter 3
Modelling with Coloured Petri Nets
Modelling is a vital activity in automated system development. The quality of the model
has a significant impact on the developed system. A high-quality model provides a good
understanding, a favourable structure, a reasonable scale and abstraction as well as realis-
tic behaviours according to the concurrent operation of independent subsystems. For this
purpose, a hierarchically modelling approach is employed to model the SatZB system.
In this chapter, first the “BMW” principle is discussed. Second, the approach for realistic
modelling of the SatZB system is presented. Last, the CPN model of the on-board subsystem
is elaborated for illustrating the proposed approach.
3.1 BMW Principle
In railway domain, a variety of modelling languages, including formal and semi-formal lan-
guages have been applied to describe railway application systems, e.g., B in [85], UML in [86],
VDM in [87] and Petri nets in [14]. In accordance with each modelling language, appropriate
methods and computer-aided tools are employed. For each of theses modelling approaches,
based on the so-called “BMW” (in German “Beschreibungsmittel, Methoden, Werkzeuge”)
principle [32], [88], [34]: means of description; methods for design and analysis; tools for advanced
system engineering to support methods and description, verification for the design model by dif-
ferent manners can be carried out. These verification manners include formal proof, struc-
tural analysis, simulation, testing, etc. Formal proof uses theoretical and mathematical models
and rules to prove the correctness of a system model or program without executing it; struc-
tural analysis verifies the structural properties of the system model that are independent of
the states of the system; simulation imitates the operation of a real-world process or system
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over time with the help of the system model; testing aims at demonstrating the compliance of
the actual and intended behaviours of the system by executing the test suites on the system
model. Table 3.1 shows some examples of modelling the railway application systems based
on the BMW principle. More formal methods such as CCS, CSP, HOL, LOTOS, OBJ, Temporal
Logic, VDM and Z are suggested and described in EN50128 [21].
TABLE 3.1: BMW principle applied on railway application systems (VDM: Vienna Devel-
opment Method; OO: Object-oriented; SADT: Structured Analysis and Design Technique;
BASYSNET: Braunschweig Description, Analysis and SYnthesiS Method based on Petri NETs;
UML:Unified Modelling Language; VDM-SL: VDM Specification Language.)
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In this chapter, the BASYSNET method (see subchapter 1.3) is adopted to develop the SatZB
model in general since Petri nets are used as the means of descriptions during the whole de-
velopment process. The relationship between the elements of a Petri net system and the four
representing properties of its underlying system can be illustrated by the UML class diagram
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shown in Figure 3.1. The concept of system can be described by the notation of Petri nets [46],
[33]. A Petri net model (P/T system) basically comprises four elements: place, transition, arc
and marking. The states (marked or not marked by tokens) of the places represent the state of
the underlying system; a function of the underlying system is realised by firing certain tran-
sitions in the Petri net model; seeing the Petri net itself as a system, the structure of the Petri
net model is illustrated by the constructing with places, transitions and arcs; the behaviour of
the underlying system in the Petri net model relates to the markings of the model and the
transitions of markings that are triggered by transition firings.
System
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*
1
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FIGURE 3.1: Petri nets and the underlying systems
With the BASYSNET method, the system model in each phase is executable with the help
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of certain Petri net tools such as CPN Tools. Simulation by executing the model is appropri-
ate for validation, especially in the early stages of the system model. Testing for the system
model is also accomplished by model execution, and further, the test suites can be applied
to the implementation of the system if specific refinements of the test suites are performed.
Verification by means of formal analysis is initiated to prove specific properties (e.g., structural
and reachability properties) of the system model, which have close relations to the system be-
haviours. The relationship between the representing system properties of a Petri net model
and the methods for system verification is depicted in Figure 3.2.
Verification
Testing
Formal analysis
Simulation Structural analysis Reachability analysis
Petri net model
Function StructureState Behaviour
1
*
1
* 1* 1 1
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
System System Properties
Methods
*
*
FIGURE 3.2: Methods for system verification with respect to the corresponding properties of
a Petri net model
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3.2 Modelling Approach
The behaviour of a system can be modelled from different views for different purposes. For
the purpose of system design and development on one hand, the system model of a train
control system should have the ability to offer the expected operations which consist of a
number of scenarios from the view of an operator (customer); on the other hand, a system
(model) has four basic representing properties: function, state, behaviour and structure, from
the view of an analyst (system engineer). There exists relations between the abstract model
that from the view of an analyst and the operation model that from the view of an operator,
which is illustrated in Figure 3.3 using the description of UML class diagrams. It is shown
that a scenario has a few system functions, comprises a series of system states and is a spe-
cific system behaviour indicating by the transitions of system states. A scenario may also
relate with other scenarios. As a system itself and being a component of a larger system, a
subsystem also has the mentioned four properties.
The definitions of the representing properties of a system, given in [98], are defined as follows.
State. The state of a system is the condition of the system at a given instant that determines
the potential future sequences of actions that the system may be involved in.
Structure. A system has a structure. It consists of a set of parts which have reciprocal rela-
tionships to each other as well as to the environment.
Function. A system has a function, which can be seen as a specified purpose of the system
or its inherent physical state transitions. Following the principle of decomposition, a
function can be further divided. Each of those subordinate functions contributes to the
overall purpose of the system.
Behaviour. The behaviour of a system is a collection of actions that the system may take part
in, together with the set of constraints on when those actions can occur. Following the
ideas of decomposition and encapsulation, the actions can be either interactions of the
system with its environment or internal actions of the system.
3.2.1 Modelling Paradigms
To develop a system model with realistic behaviours of its underlying system, following mod-
elling paradigms are used to model the satellite-based train control system.
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FIGURE 3.3: Diagram of the abstract and operation model of train control systems
Subsystem. The decomposition of a railway system usually turns out to be several different
subsystems. Generally speaking, a subsystem is a relatively independent component of
a system. From the viewpoint of this level, the communication and interaction between
the different subsystems are of interest.
Scenario. Scenarios define operational situations and processes with respect to the environ-
ment of a system. They show the behaviour how the system and its components (sub-
systems) interact with each other and the environment. A scenario is a description of
the behaviour of a system or a collection of components embedded in a comprehensive
operational process. It is determined in an unambiguous way by specific starting con-
ditions and a sequence of states and environment events of the system or components
in focus [37].
Function. From the perspective of model hierarchy, functions are represented in a lower level
in comparison with scenarios. Functions are specifically associated with the process
aspect of a component. Functional modules can be called by different scenarios and
are hence called “functional blocks” [12] which have standard interfaces of input and
output.
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3.2.2 Model Architecture
In order to reflect the architecture of the real system, the two main subsystems, the on-board
subsystem and the traffic control centre are modelled with two modules represented by two
substitution transitions 1 on the top level of the CPN model. Beside the two main subsystems,
the communication system between the on-board subsystem and the traffic control center is
modelled with an independent module. Additionally, the localisation unit, an on board unit
that localise the train using the GNSS data, has been considered as a subsystem independent
of the on-board subsystem in the model, by which it is easier to manage the system model and
it is possible to develop the model of the localisation unit and the on-board subsystem sepa-
rately. Moreover, the module Train Movement is developed to imitate the movement of the
train so as to generate dummy GNSS data. However, for convenience sake, the connection
between the module On-board Subsystem and the module Train Movement represent-
ing by the dot lines has not been established in first model of this work. Instead, we assume
that the train moves as time goes on, which is realised by setting a clock inside the Train
Movement module. The communication channel from the module On-board Subsystem
to the module Localisation Unit only sends a start signal. Figure 3.4 depicts the top level
of the CPN model. A substitution transition represents a relatively independent subsystem
or component. Places are interfaces of the subsystems or components and the tokens on the
places represent the messages or data transmitted between the subsystems or components.
The arrows of the arcs indicate the type of the interfaces: input, output or input/output. For
simplification purpose, we only use input and output interfaces on the top level of the CPN
model.
Localisation Unit On-board Subsystem Traffic Control CentreCommunication System
place
substitution transition
Train Movement
GNSS Data
FIGURE 3.4: Architecture of the system model
1A substitution transition is a special transition that represents an instance of another CPN module.
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3.2.3 Vertical Decomposition of the Main Subsystem Models
In general, the functionalities of the on-board subsystem and the traffic control centre of the
satellite-based train control system are similar to the on-board subsystem and Radio Block
Centre (RBC) of the ETCS except that the on-board subsystem of the satellite-based train
control system uses GNSS data to localise the train and the on-board subsystem of ETCS
employs balises instead. Therefore, the approach of establishing a hierarchical model of ETCS
with Design/CPN, introduced by Jansen [12] is exploited for vertical decomposition of the
main subsystem models (i.e., the on-board subsystem model and the model of the traffic
control centre) here.
The decomposition of the main subsystem models is depicted in Figure 3.5. There exists a top
level net (net I) for each subsystem model. It is an interface net showing the interfaces of the
subsystem. On the second level, an application net A is established for each subsystem, nets
Pk and P ′k represent the functions of preprocessing the incoming messages and postprocess-
ing the outgoing messages, respectively. On the third level, the net D is used to distinguish
the function decomposition net DF from the scenario decomposition net DS , through which
the function net Fj is coordinated to the scenarios net Si on the bottom level. A scenario net
Si can call the function net Fj by applying fusion places, and different scenario nets can call
the same function net. Coloured Petri Nets support a method for defining sets of places so
that anything that happens to each place in a set also happens to all the other places in the
set. The places are then functionally identical. Such places are called fusion places, and a set of
fusion places is a fusion set. These places serve as internal message channels for the calling of
function nets and returning results to scenario nets. Nets T0 and Tk are added for the prelimi-
nary simulation purpose. By adding these nets, the subsystem model can simulate separately,
which fulfils the needs of the development of distributed systems. If the nets like Tk are sub-
stituted by the application nets for other subsystem models, then the net I also shows the
connections of this subsystem to other subsystems and the corresponding communication
channels on an abstract level.
3.2.4 Switchovers of Scenario Nets
In the functional requirements specification of SatZB, scenarios are usually used to describe
a number of operational processes, in which sets of functions are involved. For instance, fol-
lowing text selected from the specification describes the scenario that releases a block section
for the train’s running. We call this scenario RUNNING.
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FIGURE 3.5: Decomposition of the main subsystem models [12]
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“The train that in a train station or on a free block section has received a movement
authority for the next block section and has/hasn’t entered this block section. A
release for the following block section is/isn’t required.”
To illustrate the scenario, UML sequence diagrams can be adopted. A sequence diagram
is a kind of interaction diagram that shows the interaction between objects over time. The
requirement (scenario RUNNING) presented above can be mapped into the sequence diagram
shown in Figure 3.6. There are three objects: LocUnit, Onboard and TCC representing the
localisation unit, the on-board subsystem and the traffic control centre, respectively. The
diagram illustrates that when the on-board subsystem receives a location data (loc) from
the localisation unit, a location report will be sent to the traffic control centre immediately. If
the value of the location data is equal to a MA point stored by means of the on-board map in
advance, then a movement request (message mb1) will be sent to the traffic control centre. A
MA point is a point that when the train passes over, a movement request should be sent to
the traffic control centre. Consequently, if the train wants to enter the following block section,
a MA for the block section is required.
LocUnit Onboard TCC
location report (loc)
[loc=MA point] movement request
location data (loc)
movement authority
FIGURE 3.6: Sequence diagram for the scenario RUNNING
However, the distinction between the “scenario nets” in the system model and “scenarios”
in describing the operational process of the system should be clarified. A scenario net Si of a
subsystem model is a page 2 that describes a specific process of internal data processing with
respect to the incoming data from the environment of the subsystem model. For example,
the scenario net OB SN Running defined in the on-board subsystem model, is a page that
shows the process of internal data processing, which is the consequence of the reception
of a MA. Nonetheless, in the CPN model of the train control system, the scenarios such as
described in Figure 3.6 are realised by exchanging tokens between different scenario nets in
different subsystem or component models. Therefore, to apply the generic structure shown
2A page is a part of a CP-net that links to other pages through shared places and thereby enables to exchange
tokens between pages in different layers.
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in Figure 3.5 to a specific system, the method of realising the switching from one scenario
net to the others is inevitable. For this purpose, two approaches are proposed to enable the
switchovers.
In the first approach (see Figure 3.7), the net DS shows all the scenario nets that are related
to this subsystem and the possible paths of switching the subsystem from one scenario net
to the others. In Figure 3.7, the scenario nets related to this subsystem are S1, S2, and S3
represented by substitution transitions. Places IN and OUT are the input and output ports that
are connected to its environment, i.e., the communication subsystem which represents the
communication channels between the on-board subsystem and traffic control centre. Places
Flag1, Flag2, and Flag3 are the preconditions for the activation of each scenario net. For
instance, if Flag3 is marked, then the scenario net S3 is activate. Since the subsystem can
only stay in one specific scenario net at a certain moment, in other words, the marking of the
places Flag1, Flag2, and Flag3 is exclusive, the token on the place Flag3 will be taken
when the activated scenario net of the subsystem model switches from S3 to S1 or S2.
DS
S1
S3
S2
IN OUT
Flag2
Flag1
Flag3
S3
IN
OUT
Flag1
Flag2Flag3
substitution transition
place
net
elementary transition
FIGURE 3.7: First approach of switchover of scenario nets
The main idea of the second approach (see Figure 3.8) is that we add an additional net C
represented by the substitution transition C in net DS to determine which scenario net is
about to be activated. The input of the net C is the received telegrams and the outputs are the
preconditions for activating scenario nets. Obviously, only one of the three places Flag1,
Flag2, and Flag3 can be marked at one time. It is easy to observe that the second net
DS is much more straightforward than the net DS in the first approach. Nevertheless, the
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first approach is able to show the possible paths of switching the scenario net from one to
the others. In the second approach, only the received telegrams can determine the activated
scenario net in the next period of time, so in our case, the first approach is preferred. For
instance, if a none-defined (unknown) message is received, then there will be such a period
of time that no scenario net is activated.
DS
S1
S3
S2
IN OUT
Flag1
Flag3
Flag2
C
IN
Flag2
Flag3
C
Flag1
S3
OUTFlag3
substitution transition
place
net
elementary transition
FIGURE 3.8: Second approach of switchover of scenario nets
3.2.5 Module Synchronisation for Quality Assurance
The operation of a concurrent train control system are modelled with CPNs in this work. In
addition, the CPN model of the system is also concurrent with regard to the firing of tran-
sitions. As mentioned, with the BASYSNET method, the quality assurance for the system
model could be carried out by simulation, testing and formal analysis. In general, both the
simulation and testing of a Petri net model are realised by model execution and thus share cer-
tain common effects on verification of the system model. For formal analysis (model check-
ing), the reachability graph of the Petri net model is usually required to check the reachability
property of the model. The simulation of a Petri net model on the computer is in a serial
way, that is to say, a model execution corresponds to a firing sequence of transitions. In other
words, a simulation process is a path in the reachability graph starting from the initial mark-
ing. If there exist circles in the reachability graph, it implies that the firing sequence could be
infinite. Figure 3.9 highlights the contradiction between the characteristics of simulation and
real system, system model and reachability graph.
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FIGURE 3.9: Four-layer illustration for real system, system model, simulation and analysis
For a system (or an relatively independent subsystem) model, the reachability graph depends
on the initialisation of the model. Therefore, the reachability graph of a system model is
constant assuming that the initialised data is invariable. When we animate a system model,
the input data from the outside environments could be seen as the initialised data of the
model. If the model has received an input data, then the model is regarded as having been
finished the intended initialisation. However, if a second input data has been received by the
model while the previous one is still being processed on the model, then undesired activities
and behaviours of the model that may cause difficulties in model verification could occur.
The second input data could be seen as a new initialisation of the model, which is out of our
intention because this will make the simulation inefficient and non-effective for improving
the quality of the model. Hence, controlling the time interval of the inputs of a system model
is necessary for continuous simulation. This is done by module synchronisation.
Synchronisation of Transitions. In CPN models, the synchronisation of two modules can
be realised by synchronising the key transitions in these two modules. For synchronisation
purpose, reference variables defined as the type of globref are introduced. A reference vari-
able is similar to a pointer in C language. The scope of a reference variable is the entire CPN
[35]. In Figure 3.10, pages i and j are two pages (modules) of a CPN model. If there exists
a requirement that only the transition tj in page j has fired, the transition ti2 in page i can
fire, then a solution is to introduce the reference variable gTimer. The definition of gTimer
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(globref gTimer = 0:INT;) shows that gTimer is a type of integer and its initial value
is 0. The operation !gTimer indicates the contents of the reference variable gTimer. The
action of transition tj (gTimer := !gTimer+1) means that the value of the integer refer-
ence variable gTimer will plus one if the transition tj fires. In addition, fusion places are also
used in these pages. Assuming that the transition tj has never fired in the initial state, then
the markings of the places PF and Pi1 are both 0 and the transition ti1 cannot fire under the
firing condition of nGT ’> nGT . Thus the transition ti2 is not fireable. Once tj has fired, the
markings of places PF and Pi1 will be 1 and 0, respectively. Consequently, transitions ti1 and
ti2 are fireable in succession, and so on.
ti1
ti2
Page i
tj
Page j
!gTimer
nGT
!gTimer
action
gTimer := !gTimer+1
globref gTimer = 0 : INT;
nGT’
[ nGT’ > nGT ]
place
elementary transition
fusion place
Pi1
PF
PF
Pi2 Pi3
Pj1 Pj2
FIGURE 3.10: Synchronisation of two transitions
Synchronisation of the On-board Module and the Module of Localisation Unit. For a
satellite-based train control system, the localisation unit is a crucial part of the entire sys-
tem since there is no other track-side equipment that is used to determine the location of the
train. The calculation of the location of the train depends on the localisation unit completely.
For the system model, the localisation unit will send location data to the on-board subsystem
continuously no matter whether the on-board subsystem has already accomplished process-
ing of the previous ones. We assume that a real-time train control system needs barely no
time to process a message, in other words, the system will always had finished processing
the previous message when a second one has been received. To imitate this behaviour of
the real-time system, continuous simulation needs to synchronise the module of the locali-
sation unit and the on-board subsystem. This is illustrated in Figure 3.11. The scenario net
Si deals with the received location data represented by the place Location Data with two
processing processes. One is for generating the telegrams that are sent to the traffic control
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centre. The other is to generate location reports which are also delivered to the traffic control
centre. Both the generated telegrams and the location reports are transmitted by the same
communication channel through the interface of place OUT. According to the introduction
of synchronisation of transitions above, only if both the generated telegram and the location
report are delivered to the place OUT successfully, then the localisation unit can send a next
location data to the on-board subsystem.
IN OUT
Location Data
Digital Map
Telegram
Location 
ReportLocation Data1
Location Data2
Location Report 
Generation
Telegram 
Generation
( globref gTimer = 0 : INT; )
!gTimer
!gTimer
action
gTimer := !gTimer+1
action
gTimer := !gTimer+1
Counter
GPS Data
Location Data
Counter
Counter
Digital Map
nn’
[ n’ > n+1 ]
!gTimer
place
net
elementary transition
fusion place
Localisation Unit
SiLocation Data 
Generation
FIGURE 3.11: Synchronisation of the on-board module and the module of the localisation unit
3.3 Application Example: the On-board Module of SatZB Model
Following the modelling approach presented forwards, a first CPN model of SatZB has been
developed according to the functional requirements specification. The system model has two
major modules ON BOARD and CENTRE corresponding to the on-board subsystem and the
traffic control centre, respectively. For the purpose of separate development, the localisa-
tion unit (LOCALISATION UNIT) is developed as an independent subsystem instead of an
unit of the on-board subsystem. The communication system between the on-board subsys-
tem and the traffic control centre is also seen as an independent subsystem. The module
TRAIN MOVEMENT imitates the movement of the train so as to generate dummy GNSS data.
The architecture (top level) of the CPN model is shown in Figure 3.12. Tokens on the places
represent the data or messages exchanged between the subsystems. Since the on-board sub-
system and the traffic control centre are the two main subsystems of SatZB and the modelling
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approach, i.e, the vertical decompositions of the subsystem models, are the same, the on-
board module of SatZB model is presented in this section as the application example.
GNSS_DATA
INTxGPSDATA
LOCATION
LOCATION
OB_MAP
MAPDATA
1`{sequence = 1, ID1=1,LAT1="3599679.5513",LONG1="5797738.8174",HEIGHT1="78.4",LAT2="3599702.1687",LONG2="5797719.8690",HEIGHT2="78.4",MILEAGE1="0",LENGTH12="29"}++
1`{sequence = 2, ID1=0,LAT1="3599702.1687",LONG1="5797719.8690",HEIGHT1="78.4",LAT2="3599734.9683",LONG2="5797687.2684",HEIGHT2="77.5",MILEAGE1="29",LENGTH12="46"}++
1`{sequence = 3, ID1=0,LAT1="3599734.9683",LONG1="5797687.2684",HEIGHT1="77.5",LAT2="3599766.9168",LONG2="5797659.6596",HEIGHT2="76.7",MILEAGE1="75",LENGTH12="42"}++
1`{sequence = 4, ID1=2,LAT1="3599766.9168",LONG1="5797659.6596",HEIGHT1="76.7",LAT2="3599797.6459",LONG2="5797634.4381",HEIGHT2="76.5",MILEAGE1="117",LENGTH12="39"}++
1`{sequence = 5, ID1=0,LAT1="3599797.6459",LONG1="5797634.4381",HEIGHT1="76.5",LAT2="3599824.5652",LONG2="5797610.9022",HEIGHT2="76.4",MILEAGE1="157",LENGTH12="35"}++
1`{sequence = 6, ID1=3,LAT1="3599824.5652",LONG1="5797610.9022",HEIGHT1="76.4",LAT2="3599858.0133",LONG2="5797582.3040",HEIGHT2="76.5",MILEAGE1="193",LENGTH12="44"}++
1`{sequence = 7, ID1=0,LAT1="3599858.0133",LONG1="5797582.3040",HEIGHT1="76.5",LAT2="3599887.8692",LONG2="5797555.8781",HEIGHT2="76.7",MILEAGE1="237",LENGTH12="39"}++
1`{sequence = 8, ID1=4,LAT1="3599887.8692",LONG1="5797555.8781",HEIGHT1="76.7",LAT2="3599920.0571",LONG2="5797530.5756",HEIGHT2="76.7",MILEAGE1="277",LENGTH12="40"}++
1`{sequence = 9, ID1=0,LAT1="3599920.0571",LONG1="5797530.5756",HEIGHT1="76.7",LAT2="3599946.0076",LONG2="5797507.7627",HEIGHT2="77.2",MILEAGE1="318",LENGTH12="34"}++
1`{sequence = 10, ID1=5,LAT1="3599946.0076",LONG1="5797507.7627",HEIGHT1="77.2",LAT2="3599946.0076",LONG2="5797507.7627",HEIGHT2="77.2",MILEAGE1="352",LENGTH12="0"}
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MMI_DATA
MMIDATA
OB_SEND_MSG
SEQTEL
OB_REV_MSG
TELEGRAM
TCC_REV_MSG
SEQTEL
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TELEGRAM
TCC_MAP
MAPDATA
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Operation
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TRAIN_MOVEMENT
MOVEMENT
LOCALISATION_UNIT
LOCALISATION
FIGURE 3.12: The top level of the CPN model of SatZB
3.3.1 Declarations
The declarations of colour sets and variables that associated with the on-board subsystem
model are presented as following:
colset INT = int; (*integer data*)
colset STRING = string; (*string data*)
colset BOOL = bool; (*boolean data*)
colset LOCPOWER = BOOL;
colset MAPDATA = record sequence:INT*
ID1:INT*
LAT1:STRING*
LONG1:STRING*
HEIGHT1:STRING*
LAT2:STRING*
LONG2:STRING*
HEIGHT2:STRING*
MILEAGE1:STRING*
LENGTH12:STRING; (*map data*)
colset DIRECTION = with UP | DOWN | UNKNOW; (*train direction*)
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colset POS = STRING; (*position offset (modified)*)
colset DIR = DIRECTION;
colset LOCATION = product POS * DIR; (*train location*)
colset MMIDATA = STRING; (*MMI data*)
colset BRAKEACT = STRING; (*brake*)
colset TELEGRAM = record TRAINID:TRAINIDNUMBER* (*train ID*)
MSGID:MSGIDNUMBER* (*message ID*)
TSTAMP:TIMESTAMP* (*time stamp*)
DATA:STRING; (*message content*)
colset SEQTEL = product INT * TELEGRAM;
colset BLOCKPOINT = product INT * STRING; (*block point*)
colset BLOCKPOINTLIST = list BLOCKPOINT;
colset STRINGLIST = list STRING;
var msg,msg’:TELEGRAM;
var map:MAPDATA;
var seqtel:SEQTEL;
var listBlockPoint:BLOCKPOINTLIST;
var sList,sList1,sList2:STRINGLIST;
var n,n’,t,t’,num,seq:INT;
var p,p’,m,m’,r,ir,brk,str,str’:STRING;
var loc,loc’:LOCATION;
var fmmi,tmmi:MMIDATA;
var b,mapvr,be,bl,breg:BOOL;
var d,d’:DIRECTION;
fun check(x,l) = (mem l x); (*check if x is a member of the list l*)
globref gTime = 0:INT; (*reference variable*)
Note that check(x, l) is a function that checks whether x is member of the list l and gT ime is a
reference variable initialising by 0.
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3.3.2 Submodules
According to the functional requirements specification of SatZB, seven scenarios are spec-
ified: INITIALISATION, REGISTRATION, RUNNING, CONDITIONAL RUNNING, BAN OF EN-
TRY, EMERGENCY STOP and LOGOUT (note that another scenario SHUNTING is not con-
sidered in this work). Accordingly, seven corresponding scenario nets (i.e., submodules
OB SN Initialisation, OB SN Registration, OB SN Running, OB SN Conditi-
onal Running, OB SN Ban Of Entry, OB SN Emergency Stop and OB SN Logout) are
defined in the on-board module of SatZB model shown in Figure 3.13, which is the sub-
module of the substitution transition ON BOARD in Figure 3.12. This module refers to the
combination of the nets DF and DS in Figure 3.26 so that reduces the net D. Submodules
OB FN EBrake Activation and OB FN NBbrake Activation are two function nets.
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FIGURE 3.13: The on-board module
Places LOCATION and OB REV MSG are input channels and the markings (tokens) of these
places represent messages that can be received by the on-board subsystem but not yet re-
ceived. Places OB SEND MSG, LOC POWER and BRAKE ACT are output channels and the mark-
ings of these places represent messages or signals that are about to be sent out by the on-
board subsystem but not yet sent out. Places OB MAP and MMI DATA are input/output chan-
nels that can both receive and send data. Places EBrake and NBrake are fusion places
that as the inputs of the function nets which outputs are directly delivered to the output
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TABLE 3.2: Messages transmitted from train to TCC
Message Name Remarks
mb1 movement request
mb2 notification of entry
mb3 notification of leaving
mb4 emergency stop demand
mb5 request to cancel the state of emergency stop
mb6 request for shunting operation out of consideration
mb7 request to end of shunting operation out of consideration
mb8 registration request
mb9 logout request
TABLE 3.3: Messages transmitted from TCC to train
Message Name Remarks
mt1 movement authority
mt2 deny of movement
mt3 conditional movement authority
mt4 command for emergency stop
mt5 release of emergency stop
mt6 authority for shunting operation out of consideration
mt7 authority to end of shunting operation out of consideration
mt8 registration data
mt9 logout authority
channel BRAKE ACT. Transition Add SeqNum with a high firing priority is added to convert
the sending messages to message sequences by adding a sequence number for each mes-
sage. Places Switch On, Register Flag, Run Flag, CondRun Flag, BoE Flag, ES
Flag, and Logout Flag are the preconditions for activating the corresponding scenario
nets. From the Figure 3.13 it is easy to observe that the switchovers of scenario nets can be
illustrated by Figure 3.14. The messages transmitted between the on-board module and the
model of the traffic control centre are listed in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3.
Submodule OB SN Initialisation. Figure 3.15 shows the submodule of the scenario net
OB SN Initialisation. The main task of this net is to identify the MA (movement au-
thority) points, section points, and logout points according to the on-board map. A MA point is
a point of the rail track that when the train reaches it, a movement request for the next block
section should be sent to the traffic control centre; section points are the borders of the block
sections; logout points are the points that the train is allowed to log out and switch off. After
identifying these points, places LOC POWER and Register Flag will be marked by firing
the transition Output Data which has a low firing priority.
Submodule OB SN Registration. Figure 3.16 shows the submodule of the scenario net OB S-
N Registration. When the on-board module is successfully initialised (the place Register
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OB_SN_Registration
OB_SN_Running
OB_SN_Emergency_Stop
OB_SN_Conditional_Running OB_SN_Ban_Of_Entry
receive a message "mt4" / send a message "mb5"
receive a message "mt8" 
receive a message "mt4" / send a message "mb5" receive a message "mt4" / send a message "mb5"
receive a message "mt2" 
receive a message "mt1" 
receive a message "mt3" 
receive a message "mt2" 
receive a message "mt1" 
receive a message "mt1" 
OB_SN_Logout
OB_SN_Initialisation
/ send a message "mb8"
receive a message “mt5”
FIGURE 3.14: State diagram for the transitions of scenario nets
Flag is marked), it means that the underlying system, the on-board subsystem has turned
into the scenario REGISTRATION. And then a registration request whose message ID is “mb8”
(For convenience, the request is called message mb8, so do other messages.), will be sent to
the traffic control centre and related texts will be displayed on the MMI (Man Machine Inter-
face). If a message mt8 is received afterwards, then the token on the place Register Flag
will be removed and the place Run Flag will be marked by firing the transition Running,
which indicates that the on-board subsystem has switched to the scenario RUNNING.
Submodule OB SN Running. Figure 3.17 shows the submodule of the scenario net OB SN
Running. When a location data is received by the net, it is compared with the MA points,
section points and logout points. If the location data matches a MA point, then a movement
request mb1 along with a location report, will be sent to the traffic control centre; if the location
data matches a section point, then two consecutive notification messages mb2 (the train has
entered the block section.) and mb3 (the train has left the block section.) along with a location
report will be sent to the traffic control centre sequentially; if the location data matches a
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FIGURE 3.15: Submodule OB SN Initialisation
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FIGURE 3.16: Submodule OB SN Registration
logout point, then a logout request mb9 along with a location report, will be sent to the control
centre; otherwise, only a location report will be sent to the traffic control centre. Location
reports are generated through the submodule (see Figure 3.18) represented by the substitution
transition Location report.
if #DATA(msg)="REQ_LOGOUT"
then "logout request has been sent"
else "movement request for section"^ #DATA(msg) ^"has been sent"
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andalso p=str
input (p,d,b,num,str,sList2,msg);
output (msg',p',d');
action
let
val msg'={TRAINID=(#TRAINID(msg)),
                 MSGID=(#MSGID(msg)),
                 TSTAMP=(#TSTAMP(msg)),
                 DATA=
                           if (d=UP)
                           then (Int.toString(num+1))
                           else if (d=DOWN)
                           then (Int.toString(num-1))
                           else
                           Int.toString(0)
                }
val p'=p
val d'=d
in
(msg',p',d')
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FIGURE 3.17: Submodule OB SN Running
In Figure 3.18, when a location data is received by the place LocReport, it is compared
with the section points, MA points and logout points. If it matches a section point as well
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as a MA point or a logout point, and a movement authority for running has been received
previously (if so, place Movement Authority will be marked), then a message mb2 will be
sent to the traffic control centre following by a message mb3. The fusion place gTime is used
to synchronise the modules ON BOARD and LOCALISATION UNIT. It is observed that only
the message mb3 has been sent out or the transition Discard LocReport has been fired,
the reference variable gTime will plus one, which makes the module LOCALISATION UNIT
send a next location data to the on-board module.
if #MSGID(msg)="mb2"
then "train has entered section" ^ #DATA(msg)
else if #MSGID(msg)="mb3"
then "train has left section" ^ #DATA(msg)
else "error"
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FIGURE 3.18: Submodule Location Report
When a message from the traffic control centre is received by the net OB SN Running, it
is checked with the submodule (see Figure 3.19) represented by the substitution transition
Scenario Determination. In Figure 3.19, when the message received from the traffic
control centre is mt2, mt3, mt4 or mt9, the token on the place Run Flag will be taken
and one of the places BoE Flag, CondRun Flag, ES Flag or Logout Flag will be
marked. Which one to be marked is determined by the ID of the received message. Be-
sides, if the received message is mt2 or mt4, then the fusion place NBrake or EBrake will
be marked, which indicates the calling for the function nets OB FN NBrake Activation
(normal brake, see Figure 3.20) and OB FN EBrake Activation (emergency brake, see Fig-
ure 3.20), respectively.
When a message from the traffic control centre and a location data from the localisation unit
are simultaneously received by the input channels of the places OB REV MSG and LOCATION,
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FIGURE 3.19: Submodule Scenario determination
the processing of the message from the traffic control centre has a higher priority. There-
fore, the transition State Check and the transitions in Figure 3.19 are designated as having
a higher firing priority (inscribed with the P HIGH). The declarations of firing priorities of
transitions are defined as follows.
val P_HIGH = 100;
val P_NORMAL = 1000;
val P_LOW = 10000;
Transitions without any inscription of firing priorities have normal priority. When two transi-
tions, one is inscribed with the P HIGH and the other one is inscribed with the P LOW or is not
inscribed with any firing priority, are enabled at the same time, then the transition inscribed
with the P HIGH will fire first.
brkb NBrake
Activation
input (b);
output (brk);
action
let
val str=Bool.toString(b)
in
str
end;
BRAKE_ACT
Out
BRAKEACT
NBrake
Signal
In
BOOL
FIGURE 3.20: Function net NBrake Activation
Submodule OB SN Conditional Running. Figure 3.22 shows the submodule of the scenario
net OB SN Conditional Running. When the activated scenario net of the on-board module
is switched into this net, a text “conditional running” will be repeatedly delivered to the MMI
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let
val str=Bool.toString(b)
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FIGURE 3.21: Function net EBrake Activation
until a message mt1, mt2 or mt4 is received. If the message mt2 is received, then the fusion
place Current Sectionwill be marked and the token colour (natural number) on this place
indicates the current section of the train.
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FIGURE 3.22: Submodule OB SN Conditional Running
Submodule OB SN Ban Of Entry. Figure 3.23 shows the submodule of the scenario net
OB SN Ban Of Entry. When the activated scenario net of the on-board module is witched
into this net, a text “Ban of Entry for section i” will be repeatedly delivered to the MMI until
a message mt1 or mt4 is received, where i is the identifier of the block section.
Submodule OB SN Emergency Stop. Figure 3.24 shows the submodule of the scenario
net OB SN Emergency Stop. When the activated scenario net of the on-board module is
switched into this net, a request for cancelling emergency stop will be repeatedly sent to the
traffic control centre if the conditions for the cancellation, represented by the place Cancella-
tion Ack, is fulfilled. When a message mt5 is received, the on-board module will inactivate
this net, i.e., the token on the place ES Flag will be taken.
Submodule OB SN Logout Figure 3.25 shows the submodule of the scenario net OB SN Log-
out. When the activated scenario net of the on-board module is switched into this net, a text
“logout” will be delivered to the MMI and a notification message will be sent to the traffic
control centre.
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FIGURE 3.23: Submodule OB SN Ban Of Entry
"train is stopped and ES cancellation request has benn sent"
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FIGURE 3.24: Submodule OB SN Emergency Stop
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FIGURE 3.25: Submodule OB SN Logout
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3.3.3 Module Composition
The relationship between modules in a hierarchical model can be represented as a directed
graph which has a node for each module and an arc for each substitution transition. For the
CPN model in Figures 3.12 - 3.25, the module hierarchy is shown in Figure 3.26. The names
of the modules have been written inside the nodes, and the arcs have been labelled with the
names of the substitution transitions. The node has no incoming arcs is a root of the module
hierarchy and is called a prime module. Node SatZB has five outgoing arcs, corresponding
to the three substitution transitions in the SatZB module (see Figure 3.12). For instance, the
arc from SatZB to ONBOARD, labelled ON BOARD, specifies that the substitution transition
ON BOARD in the SatZB module has the module ONBOARD as its related module. Note that
this chapter focus on the ONBOARD module in the SatZB module.
SatZB
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FIGURE 3.26: Module hierarchy for the hierarchical CPN model of SatZB
3.4 Summary
This chapter proposes the approach for realistic modelling of a satellite-based train control
system (SatZB). Based on the model architecture presented in [12], a first CPN model of the
on-board subsystem is elaborated. In particular, the implementation of switchovers of sce-
nario nets and module synchronisation are emphasised.
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In future, the time constrains could be added to the existing model and further refinement
could be carried out according to the system requirements specification.
Chapter 4
Identification of Verification Tasks
After establishing a system model, it is important to know what kinds of functions, be-
haviours or properties need to be verified. This is especially vital for a safety-critical system.
Therefore, the verification tasks of the SatZB model developed in chapter 3 will be identified
in this chapter.
In this chapter, first the hazard analysis for SatZB system is carried out and the hazardous
conditions of SatZB model are identified. And then the functions of SatZB both for safety and
normal operation and their allocations in the SatZB model are presented. Last, the verification
tasks for the on-board module of the SatZB model are specified.
4.1 Hazard Analysis
In railway domain, risk analysis for a safety-critical system may need to be repeated at several
stages of the life-cycle according to the standard EN 50126 [22]. For instance, risk analysis
following the phases of concept, and system definition and application conditions aims at
identifying hazards associated with the system, and determining the risk associated with the
hazards as well as establishing a process for ongoing risk management. Followed by the risk
analysis phase, the system requirements including safety requirements are specified. In the
design and implementation phase, hazard analysis and risk assessment need to be performed
for implementing safety plan. No matter in which phase the hazard analysis is performed,
an identification of hazards is required as the basis. In this section, we conduct the hazard
analysis with Generic Hazard List (GHL) [99], [100], [101].
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4.1.1 Hazard Definition
In standard EN 50126, hazard is defined as “a physical situation with a potential for human
injury”. This definition expresses a state from which damage or loss may be suffered due
to, for example, an accident, but it does not consider the causes of leading the system into
this state. In order to include the causes of the physical situation in the definition of hazard,
a hazard can be defined by a Petri net model depicted in Figure 4.1 according to [100] and
[101]. The Petri net model in Figure 4.1 shows the causal dependencies between human
injury (harm), the physical situation (hazardous state) and the causes leading to this situation
(hazardous conditions). Therefore, the hazard can be defined as:
Definition 4.1 (Hazard). The defined hazardous conditions and the state transition leading to
a hazardous state with a potential of human injury (harm) due to an accident (harmful event)
[99].
Safe state
Hazardous envent 
(hazard occurence)
Hazardous state
Harmful event 
(accident occurence)
Harm 
(human injury)
Hazardous conditions
(potential source of harm) 
Protection measure
(safety function)
HAZARD
FIGURE 4.1: Definition of hazard described with Petri nets
4.1.2 Hazard Identification
Accident Classification. As it is shown in Figure 4.1, the hazardous state has a close rela-
tionship to the accident that may occur. Depending on the defined accident characteristics,
hazards can be identified based on the functionality analysis of the system. A classification
of accident characteristics in railway from the view of a train control system are illustrated in
Figure 4.2 according to [88], [99] and [100]. In Figure 4.2, accidents are classified as two cat-
egories: internal accidents that are caused by internal faults of the train control system and
external accidents that are resulted from external influences. The external influences cannot
be eliminated by doing something about the train control system, but must be identified or
detected by the train control system and appropriate reactions have to be made by the sys-
tem in time. The internal accidents however can be controlled by the train control system
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directly. For example, by controlling the speed of the train, some hazardous situations could
be prevented from occurring directly.
Accident characteristics
Internal accident External accident
Collision Derailment
Collision of two trains Collision of a train with an object
Collision of a train with an object on the
track
Collision of a train with an object on the
level crossing
Accident of the train Environmental impact
Fire Electricity problem Flood
Avalanches
Landslide
Rear-end collision Head-on collision
FIGURE 4.2: Classification of accidents [88], [99], [100]
System Structure Analysis. Using the hazard identification approach proposed in [100], [101]
and [99], an analysis of the system structure and the system functionality is required. The
structure of the SatZB system and its CPN model have been shown in Figure 1.1 and Fig-
ure 3.4, respectively.
System Functional Analysis. For the functional analysis of SatZB, an operational process (see
Figure 4.3) consisting of functional blocks of the system is considered as the basis. The process
shows the data flow of the system and the functions of the system components as well as their
causal dependencies. In the sense of hazard analysis, each function of the system components
has a potential of being failed, which leads to hazardous states.
Hazard Table. In practice, hazard tables are usually used to describe hazards. In Table 4.1,
there are four main areas: functionality area is filled with the functions defined in the op-
erational process (Figure 4.3), accident characteristics area describes the considered classes
of accidents (Figure 4.2), resources area is specified on the basis of the system structure and
identified hazards area indicates the possible accidents due to false functions of the resources.
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Localisation
(location determination)
Location report & movement 
request generation
(telegram generation)
Train to TCC message 
transmission
(message transmission)
Movement authority 
generation 
(telegram generation)
TCC to train message 
transmission 
(message transmission)
Rules
Train TCCMobile communication
Command execution
(speed supervision & control)
Rules
FIGURE 4.3: Operational process of the SatZB system
Since the derailment of a train is often caused by the exceeding of its allowed speed, only the
accident characteristics of collision is considered in this work.
Identified Hazards:
A1: Possible collision of two trains due to the generation of incorrect location data by the train.
A2: Possible collision of a train with an object due to the generation of incorrect location data
by the train.
B1: Possible collision of two trains due to the incorrect execution of commands by the train.
B2: Possible collision of a train with an object due to the incorrect execution of commands by
the train.
C1: Possible collision of two trains due to the generation of an incorrect location report by the
train.
C2: Possible collision of a train with an object due to the generation of an incorrect location
report by the train.
D1: Possible collision of two trains due to the generation of an incorrect movement request by
the train.
D2: Possible collision of a train with an object due to the generation of an incorrect movement
request by the train.
E1: Possible collision of two trains due to the incorrect transmission of a message from train to
TCC by the mobile communication system.
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TABLE 4.1: Hazard table for SatZB
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E2: Possible collision of a train with an object due to the incorrect transmission of a message
from train to TCC by the mobile communication system.
F1: Possible collision of two trains due to the incorrect transmission of a message from TCC to
train by the mobile communication system.
F2: Possible collision of a train with an object due to the incorrect transmission of a message
from TCC to train by the mobile communication system.
G1: Possible collision of two trains due to the generation of an incorrect MA by the TCC.
G2: Possible collision of a train with an object due to the generation of an incorrect MA by
the TCC.
4.1.3 Hazardous Conditions of SatZB Model
In [102], the concept of generic safety implementation is discussed for the purpose of min-
imizing the probability and severity of damage via applying safety measures. One of the
promising implementation approaches associates with the control of the safety strategy which
could have different characteristics, e.g., hazard avoidance, hazard prevention and effect/-
consequence minimization. According to Figure 4.1, hazard avoidance is implemented by
presenting evidences that all the hazardous conditions are eliminated or there are no haz-
ardous conditions at all, and hazard prevention is realised by the protection measures, e.g.,
safety functions. Therefore, the hazardous conditions of SatZB model is identified in this
subsection. Assuming that the message transmission by the communication system is fully
reliable, the hazardous conditions of SatZB model considering the functions presented in Ta-
ble 4.1 can be shown in Table 4.2. Beside algorithm errors and Petri net structure errors, there
might be other hazardous conditions such as configuration errors. Further analysis would be
conducted along with the refinement of the system model.
4.2 Function Identification and Allocation
The main task of a train control system is to avoid accidents and hazardous situations. There-
fore, all train control systems, including satellite-based train control system such as the SatZB
system, have some similar (generic) functions, e.g., assurance of the safety of the routes, su-
pervision and controlling of the train speed. In general, theses functions can be categorised
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TABLE 4.2: Hazardous conditions of SatZB model
False function
Possible causes (hazardous conditions)
On-board module TCC module Localisation unit
Localisation Algorithm errors,
Petri net structure
errors, etc.
Command execu-
tion
Algorithm errors,
Petri net structure
errors, etc.
Location report gen-
eration
Algorithm errors,
scenario net struc-
ture errors, etc.
Movement request
generation
Algorithm errors,
scenario net struc-
ture errors, etc.
MA generation Algorithm errors,
scenario net struc-
ture errors, etc.
into two classes: functions for safety and functions for normal operation. Note that we as-
sume the communication system is ideally dependable and safe, therefore it will not be in-
vestigated in this work.
4.2.1 Functions for Safety and Their Allocations
As depicted in Figure 4.1, by implementing safety functions (protection measures), the system
can be transformed from hazardous states into safe states. In other words, safety functions
can prevent accidents from happening when the system is in hazardous states. Safety func-
tions, in general, are defined according to the safety requirements of the system. Based on
Figure 4.2, following safety requirements of train control systems could be specified:
- A defined block section can only be reserved by one train at the same time and every
invasion of other trains, persons or objects must be detected.
- The train must be prevented from exceeding its permitted speed. Otherwise, a service
brake or emergency brake should be issued.
- The train must be prevented form exceeding its permitted moving distance. Otherwise,
a service brake or emergency brake should be issued.
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With the safety requirements, functions of a system for safety purpose can be identified. In
the specific system model of SatZB, the functions and related reactions for safety need to
be allocated to each subsystem models, which is shown in Table 4.3. As the SatZB model
presented in this thesis is a relatively high level of abstraction model focusing on operation
scenarios, the allocation of functions is only deep to the level of scenario nets.
4.2.2 Functions for Normal Operations and Their Allocations
A train control system on the operative level (other three higher levels in the top-down ori-
entation are: strategic level, dispositive level and tactic level [88]) has four generic functions:
route control, train control, localisation and data collection. In SatZB, these functions are im-
plemented by the functions listed in the column Concrete in SatZB of Table 4.4 based on
the functional requirements specification. Table 4.4 also shows the allocation of these func-
tions to the subsystem models of SatZB. Different from Figure 4.3, function identification in
this subsection is not based on the system requirements specification, but the functional re-
quirements specification.
4.3 Verification Tasks for the On-board Module of SatZB Model
Based on the hazard analysis, the identification of functions for safety and normal operation
as well as their allocations in system model, the verification for the system model should be
carried out to demonstrate that no identified hazardous conditions are contained and identi-
fied functions for safety and normal operation are functioning as expected. In particular, the
verification tasks for the on-board module are specified as follows:
Hazardous conditions:
• The on-board module contains algorithm errors.
• The scenario nets of the on-board module contain structure errors.
Safety functions:
• The on-board module can switch its activated scenario net to the net OB SN Emergency
Stop from any other nets (except for the nets OB SN Initialisation, OB SN Regist-
ration and OB SN Logout).
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TABLE 4.3: Functions for safety and their allocations in SatZB model (Note: (1) X(I) means if
necessary; (2) the prefix “OB SN ” of the name of a scenario net is omitted)
Accident
characteristics
Speed supervision &
control
SatZB model
Emergency
brake
Speed re-
duction
On-board module TCC module Localisation
unit
Rear-end colli-
sion
X Switch to (ac-
tivates) the
scenario net
Emergency Stop
and issue an
emergency brake
Issue an emer-
gency stop com-
mand
Head-on colli-
sion
X(I) X Switch to the
scenario net
Ban Of Entry or
Emergency Stop
and issue an
emergency brake
Issue a com-
mand of ban
of entry or
emergency stop
Collision of a
train with an
object on the
track
X Switch to the
scenario net
Emergency Stop
and issue an
emergency brake
Issue an emer-
gency stop com-
mand
Collision of a
train with an
object on the
level crossing
X Switch to the
scenario net
Emergency Stop
and issue an
emergency brake
Issue an emer-
gency stop com-
mand
Fire/ electric-
ity problem
X(I) X Switch to the
scenario net
Conditional
Running or
Emergency Stop
and issue an
emergency brake
Issue a com-
mand of condi-
tional running
or emergency
stop
Flood/
avalanch-
es/ landslide
X(I) X Switch to the
scenario net
Conditional
Running or
Emergency Stop
and issue an
emergency brake
Issue a com-
mand of condi-
tional running
or emergency
stop
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TABLE 4.4: Functions for normal operation and their allocations in SatZB model (Note: the
prefix “OB SN ” of the name of a scenario net is omitted)
Function Concrete in SatZB
SatZB model
On-board module TCC module Localisation
unit
Route control
(MA genera-
tion)
Route establish-
ment
Assign block sections
from “free” to “re-
served”
Route maintenance Assign block sections
from “free” to “re-
served”, “reserved” to
“occupied”, and “oc-
cupied” to “free”
Movement author-
ity issuing
Send the message
“mt1” to the train
Level crossing pro-
tection
Train control
(Command
execution)
Expected speed
calculation
Service braking
curve calculation
and service brake
issuing
Switch the activated sce-
nario net from Running
to Ban Of Entry
Emergency brak-
ing curve cal-
culation and
emergency brake
issuing
Switch the acti-
vated scenario net
to Emergency Stop
Standby state su-
pervision
Scenario nets
Initialisation
and Registration
Running state su-
pervision
Scenario net Running
Conditional run-
ning state supervi-
sion
Scenario net
Conditional Running
Ban of entry state
supervision
Scenario net
Ban Of Entry
Emergency stop
state supervision
Scenario net
Emergency Stop
Localisation
Determination of
the train location
Location
generation
Calculation of the
train speed
Supervision of the
train integrity
Data collec-
tion
JRU (Juridical
Recorder Unit)
Places representing
the MMI and the error
recorder
Places representing
the MMI and the error
recorder
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• The on-board module can switch its activated scenario net to the net OB SN Ban Of En-
try from other nets (i.e., OB SN Running and OB SN Conditional Running).
• The on-board module can switch its activated scenario net to the net OB SN Condition-
al Running from other nets (i.e., OB SN Running).
Normal operation functions:
• The on-board module has the possibility to activate every scenario net at least one time.
• The on-board module switches its activated scenario net from one to another as Fig-
ure 3.7 depicted.
• The on-board module can not activate two or more than two scenario nets at the same
time.
4.4 Summary
This chapter identifies the verification tasks for the on-board module of the SatZB model with
respect to system functionalities. These verification tasks will guide the verification work of
chapter 6, 7 and 8. The verification tasks specified in this chapter are distinguished into three
aspects: hazardous conditions, safety functions and normal operation functions.

Chapter 5
Quality Assurance by Petri Net Analysing
Techniques
The employment of the BASYSNET method for developing the SatZB system makes it possi-
ble to ensure the quality of the system model by simulation, testing and formal analysis. In
this chapter, the quality assurance by Petri net analysing techniques in general is discussed.
First, the behavioural properties of Petri nets are formally introduced and represented by
an attribute hierarchy model. The interpretation of Petri net behavioural properties as sys-
tem behaviours are also presented. Second, similar to the introduction of the behavioural
properties, the structural properties of Petri nets are introduced and interpreted as system
behaviours. Last, coverage-based test generation techniques are discussed. To satisfy the test
coverage criterion of all state sequences, one of the many introduced test coverage criteria,
reachability tree based and unfolding based methods are proposed to generate the test suites.
5.1 Behavioural Analysis
To analyse a Petri net model, two types of properties can be investigated: those which de-
pend on the initial marking, and those which depend on the topological structure of the
Petri net. The former type of properties is referred to as marking-dependent or behavioural
properties, whereas the latter one is called structural properties [46]. In this section, we dis-
cuss the behaviour properties and the structural properties will be discussed in next section.
Nevertheless, both behavioural properties and structural properties will be illustrated by an
attribute hierarchy formation described with UML-based notation [103], [104] for a better
comprehension of these properties.
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The concept model of the attribute hierarchy consists of four levels of abstraction and uses
different hierarchical attributes at different levels of abstraction as following:
Property. Properties result from the abstraction of characteristics, or rather unite a number of
subordinate characteristics. Properties are in general not directly or objectively measur-
able (e.g. “beauty”). In the sense of UML, it deals with abstract concepts (e.g. classes)
which can not be directly instantiated.
Characteristic. Characteristics are objectively quantifiable. They are essential for the identifi-
cation and description of objects. Properties are characterised by characteristics.
Quantity. Quantities are special cases of characteristic instantiations. The determination of
quantity is restrict to relation scaled characteristics so that there are no ordinal quanti-
ties, but ordinal characteristics.
Value. Values are the results of measurements, estimations or calculations. A numerical value
quantifies the quantity by numerical values.
5.1.1 Behavioural Properties
Boundedness. A P/T system (N,M0) is k-bounded or simply bounded if the number of tokens
in each place does not exceed a finite number k for any marking reachable from M0, i.e.,
∀p ∈ P,M ∈ [M0〉,M(p) ≤ k, k ∈ N. A P/T system (N,M0) is said to be safe if it is 1-bounded.
A place is said to be bounded if the maximum number of tokens a place may contain is finite.
A P/T system (N,M0) is bounded if each place is bounded.
Liveness. A P/T system (N,M0) is (strongly) live (or equivalently M0 is a live marking of N )
if no matter what marking has been reached from M0, it is possible to ultimately fire any
transition of the net by running some further firing sequences, i.e., ∀t ∈ T,M ∈ [M0〉,∃M ′ ∈
[M〉 : M ′[t〉. A P/T system (N,M0) is weakly live (deadlock-free) if no matter what marking
has been reached from M0, it is possible to ultimately fire at least one transition of the net by
running some further firing sequences, i.e., ∀M ∈ [M0〉,∃t ∈ T : M [t〉. A transition is live if it
is potentially firable in all reachable markings. A P/T system (N,M0) is live if all transitions
are live.
Reversibility and Home State. A P/T system (N,M0) is reversible if, for each marking M
reachable from M0, M0 is reachable from M , i.e., ∀M ∈ [M0〉,M0 ∈ [M〉. In other words, a
reversible P/T system can always go back to the initial marking or state. However, in many
cases, the system is not necessary to go back to the initial state but to some (home) state. A
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marking M ′ is a home state if, for each marking M reachable from M0, M ′ is reachable from
M , i.e., ∀M ∈ [M0〉,M ′ ∈ [M〉.
Reachability. A marking M is reachable from a marking M0 if there exists a firing sequence
σ such that M0[σ〉M . The reachability graph RG((N,M0)) = (V,E) of a P/T system (N,M0) is
a directed graph, where V = [M0〉 is the set of vertexes, and E = {(M, t,M ′)|M [t〉M ′} is set
of labelled edges. The labels (M, t,M ′) are mostly written as t by the labelling L(E) = {t ∈
T |∃(M, t,M ′) ∈ E}.
Figure 5.1 is the concept model of Petri nets in the behavioural properties perspective. It is
observed that a Petri net system has varies structural properties, e.g., boundedness, liveness,
reversibility, home state and reachability. Each of the properties has specific characteristics
that are quantified with finite numerical values.
LivenessBoundedness Reversibility
k-bounded 
The number of tokens 
in each place for any 
marking reachable 
from M0 
Strongly live Reversible
The number of reachable 
markings that are able to 
lead the marking of the 
system back to  M0
Property
Characteristic
Quantity
Value
Concept
Home state Reachability
The number of reachable 
markings that are able to 
lead the marking of the 
system to such states
Reachable from any 
marking reachable 
from M0 
The number of firing 
sequences that transform 
the marking of the system 
from M0 to such markings
Reachable markings 
All reachable markings
Does not exceed a 
finite number k
All reachable markings >=1
...
Petri net system 
(N, M0)
The number of 
transitions that are 
possible to be 
ultimately fired 
Weakly live 
(deadlock-free)
All transitions
The number of 
transitions that are 
possible to be 
ultimately fired 
Some transitions
FIGURE 5.1: Concept model of Petri net systems in the behavioural properties perspective
5.1.2 Interpretation of Petri Net Behavioural Properties as System Behaviours
In practice, a Petri net model represents its underlying system which is a real world system.
Thus, it is necessary to interpret the behavioural properties of the Petri net model into the
behaviours of the underlying system. The interpreting bridges the understanding of the sys-
tem between the engineers and the customers. Table 5.1 shows the interpretation of Petri net
behavioural properties as system behaviours.
68 5 Quality Assurance by Petri Net Analysing Techniques
TABLE 5.1: Interpretation of Petri net behavioural properties
PN behavioural properties System behaviours
Boundedness Whether there are no overflows in the system
with respect to a certain initial state
Liveness Whether the system can always progress with re-
spect to a certain initial state
Reversibility Whether the system can go back to its initial state
at any time
Home states The system can always turn into these states
starting from its initial state
Reachability Whether the system can turn into certain states
starting from its initial state
5.2 Structural Analysis
In this section, we discuss the structural properties of Petri nets. These properties can often be
characterised in terms of the incidence matrix of the Petri net and its associated homogeneous
equations or inequalities [46]. This mathematical foundation allows one to verify the absence
of errors in the model by checking some structural properties of the underlying system.
5.2.1 Structural Properties of Petri Nets
Structurally Boundedness. A Petri net N is structurally bounded if it is bounded for any finite
initial marking M0, i.e., ∀M0 ∈ N|P |,M ∈ [M0〉 : M is bounded.
Structurally Liveness. A Petri net N is structurally live if there exists a live initial marking M0
for N , i.e., ∃M0 ∈ N|P |,∀t ∈ T,M ∈ [M0〉,∃M ′ ∈ [M〉 : M ′[t〉.
Conservativeness. A Petri net N is (partially) conservative if there exists a positive integer for
every (some) place such that the weighted sum of tokens is a constant for every marking M
reachable from the initial marking M0 and for any fixed initial marking M0, i.e., ∃y ∈ N|P | :∑
M(pk) · y(k) =
∑
M0(pk) · y(k) = CONT where y is a vector, k ∈ [1, |P |] and CONT
represents a constant.
Repetitiveness. A Petri net N is (partially) repetitive if there exists a marking M0 and a firing
sequence σ from M0 such that every (some) transition occurs infinitely often in σ.
Consistency. A Petri net N is (partially) consistent if there exists a marking M0 and a firing
sequence σ from M0 back to M0 such that every (some) transition occurs at least once in σ.
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Controllability. A Petri net N is completely controllable if any marking is reachable from any
other marking [46]. In addition, we say a Petri net N is partially controllable if there exists a
marking that is reachable from any other marking.
As in subchapter 4.1.1, the concept model of Petri nets in the structural properties perspective
could be illustrated in Figure 5.2. It is shown that Petri nets have a variety of structural prop-
erties, e.g., structurally boundedness, structurally liveness, conservativeness, repetitiveness,
consistency and controllability. Each of the properties depends on specific characteristics
some of which are quantified by either vectors or numerical values.
Structurally 
Liveness
Structurally 
Boundedness
Conservativeness
Boundedness for 
any finite initial 
marking M0 
The number of tokens in 
each place for any marking 
reachable from M0 
Existence of live 
initial marking M0 
Existence of 
transitions occurring 
infinite often
The number of firing 
times of transitions 
in a firing sequence
Property
Characteristic
Quantity
Value
Concept
Repetitiveness Consistency
S-invariant
Constancy of weighted 
sum of tokens
T-invariant
Existence of a firing 
sequence which leads the 
marking from M0 to M0 
[0,+∞ )
Does or does not 
exceed a finite number
Vector Vector
Controllability
Reachbility of any 
marking from any 
other marking
...
Petri nets 
The number of 
transistions that 
could be fired 
Integer
FIGURE 5.2: Concept model of Petri nets in the structural property aspect
5.2.2 Interpretation of Petri Net Structural Properties as System Behaviours
Not only the behavioural properties, but also the structural properties of a Petri net model
need to be interpreted into the system behaviours of its underlying system in practice. Ta-
ble 6.2 shows the interpretation of the structural properties of Petri nets as the behaviours of
real systems.
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TABLE 5.2: Interpretation of Petri net structural properties
PN structural properties System behaviours
Structurally Boundedness Whether there are no overflows in the system
Structurally Liveness Whether the system can always progress
Conservativeness Whether the number of items which could be
stored/processed/transferred is constant
Repetitiveness Whether there are processing loops in the system
Consistency Whether the system can go back to its certain ini-
tial states
Controllability Whether the system will always reach certain
states
5.3 Coverage-based Test Generation
Petri nets as formal means of descriptions are usually used as formal specifications of (concur-
rent) systems, which can be seen as test models in testing the systems. Test cases are derived
from the Petri nets and implemented on the systems. On the other hand, Petri nets can be
considered as executable models (design models) of (concurrent) systems and transformed
into source codes of the system software. In this case, the Petri nets are treated as test objects
(SUT, system under test). Generally speaking, testing methods can be classified into program-
based, which select test cases according to the information contained in the program, and
specification-based, which derive test cases from the requirements specification [105]. When
Petri nets are used as test models, formal specifications of systems, the Petri net testing meth-
ods belong to specification-based testing. If Petri nets are considered as executable models of
systems, they can also be tested against other specifications. In this sense, the Petri net test-
ing methods have the features of program-based testing. In testing, no matter what kinds of
testing, program-based or specification-based, a well-defined testing method should be defined.
In [105] and [106], the authors argued that a well-defined testing method should contain at
least two components, a criterion for selecting test cases and determining when the testing
can stop, and a method of observing the dynamic behaviour of a system during the test exe-
cution. Considering this requirement, [105] defines three test selection criteria, i.e. transition
coverage, state coverage and flow coverage, concerning with the structure of PrT nets (pred-
icate transition nets [107], [108], high-level Petri nets) which are taken as the test objects by
the authors. These criteria are used as adequacy criteria to analyse the test adequacy of the
testing. In [109], three coverage criteria, i.e. transition coverage, place coverage and marking
coverage, are also defined to select test cases. In contrast to [105], [109] applies these criteria to
the test model (LPrTPN, Labeled Prioritized Time Petri Nets) of the SUT for test generation.
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In [110] and [111], three entity-based classes of CPN coverage criteria, i.e. transition-based cov-
erage criteria, event-based coverage criteria and state-based coverage criteria, are proposed
to derive test cases for testing cooperating robotic systems. In addition, the transition-based
coverage criteria are distinguished between all transitions, all transition pairs and all transi-
tion sequences. The even-based coverage criteria take all events, all event pairs and all event
sequences into account. The state-based coverage criteria cover all states, all state pairs and all
state sequences. In [112], the criteria of reachability graph coverage, transition coverage, state
coverage, depth coverage and goal coverage are introduced to generate test sequences from
PrT nets in the tool ISTA (Integration and System Test Automation). However, these works
only succeeded to bring up coverage criteria for selecting test cases, either for the coverage
of the Petri nets of SUT or for the coverage of the Petri nets of test models. They haven’t pro-
posed techniques on how to generate test cases satisfying the criteria, and to our knowledge,
few works have tackled this issue.
In [113], a technique called cause-effect-net-concept, derived from a program code testing con-
cept cause-effect graphing, is proposed to generate test cases for the simulation of high-level
Petri nets (PrT nets) in a systematic way. The test cases are derived from process nets, which
are defined as: a process net describes one single behaviour of a system or of a Petri net. In
[114], two CPN based test suite generation methods for conformance tests, Coloured Petri
net Tree (CPT) method and Coloured Petri net Graph (CPG) method, are proposed. The
CPT method makes use of the CP-trees (reachability trees) of CP-nets which are reduced by
equivalent markings introduced in [115]. The CPG method regards the CP-graphs (reach-
ability graphs) as finite state machines (FSM) and test suites are generated by applying ex-
isting methods based on FSM. The CP-graphs in this method are constructed directly from
the CP-trees that have been reduced by equivalent markings. Recently, Krause [116], [41] has
proposed a test generation technique based on the unfoldings [117], [118], [119] of SPENAT
(Safe Place Transition Nets with Attributes) specifications. Nevertheless, these works failed
to discuss the Petri net based test coverage criteria in a systematic manner.
In this section, we introduce some coverage criteria for selecting test cases as well as test
generation techniques for the strongest coverage criterion of all state sequences. Note that
the coverage criteria discussed here refer to the coverage adequacy of test models of the SUT.
5.3.1 Test Coverage Criteria
A Petri net based test case is defined as a pair consisting of an initial state and a finite firing
sequence, the term test sequence could be used to describe such a test case. Normally, with a
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common initial state, a Petri net will generate a set of test sequences. We call this set of test
sequences a test suite.
Transition-based coverage criteria. Following transition-based coverage criteria may be con-
sidered:
- All transitions: each transition in the Petri net (test model) is covered by at least one test
sequence;
- All transition sequences: each possible transition sequence is covered by at least one test
sequence.
Transition-instance-based coverage criteria (High-level Petri Nets). Following transition-
instance-based coverage criteria may be considered:
- All transition instances: each transition and transition instance (binding element) is cov-
ered by at least one test sequence;
- All transition instances sequences: each possible sequence of transitions and transition
instances is covered by at least one test sequence.
State-based coverage criteria. Following state-based coverage criteria may be considered:
- All states: each state (marking) reachable from the initial state is covered by at least one
test sequence;
- All state sequences: each possible sequence of states is covered by at least one test se-
quence.
Interested-state-based coverage criteria. Following interested-state-based coverage criteria
may be considered:
- All interested states: each interested state (marking) reachable from the initial state is
covered by at least one test sequence;
- All interested state sequences: each possible sequence of interested states is covered by at
least one test sequence.
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In order to illustrate the subsumption relations of the presented coverage criteria, the sub-
sumption hierarchy of the coverage criteria is shown in Figure 5.3. It is easy to observed
that the criterion of all state sequences subsumes the criteria all states and all interested state
sequences. In fact, a transition instance is mapped to an arc in the reachability graph, so
the criterion all state sequences also subsumes the criterion all transition instance sequences.
Since a transition in a high-level Petri net (e.g. CPN) could have different instances accord-
ing to different token colours, the criterion all transition instance sequences subsumes the
criterion of all transition sequences and the criterion of all transition instances subsumes the
criterion of all transitions. The interested states are parts of the state space, hence the criterion
of all states subsumes the criterion of all interested states.
All state 
sequences
All transition 
instance sequences
All interested 
state sequences
All transition 
instances
All transition 
sequences
All transitions
All states
All interested 
states
FIGURE 5.3: Subsumption hierarchy of coverage criteria
5.3.2 Modelling the System and Its Environment
Test generation based on Petri nets needs to model the intended behaviour of the SUT first.
To imitate the operation of the system in its real operating environment, it is necessary to
establish a model of the environment. This environment model encodes the environment
assumptions for the purpose of verifying and validating the system by least effort. Otherwise
the environment model is a model that allows all possible interaction sequences.
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5.3.3 Test Suite Generation
Once a test model is developed with Petri nets, a test suit could be generated with respect
to a specific initial marking. In order to generate test suites satisfying the strongest coverage
criterion of all state sequences, reachability tree (RT) based and unfolding based methods are
proposed in this section.
5.3.3.1 RT-based Method
In general, the state space of a Petri net could be represented by the reachability graph of the
net. Intuitively, a test sequence can be derived from a path of the graph starting from the
initial marking. A test suite consists of all the test sequences derived from all the paths of the
graph. Nevertheless, this is only practicable for the nets that the reachability graphs of which
are relatively small and straightforward. If the reachability graph of a Petri net is rather big
and sophisticated, e.g., it contains many circles and branching paths, deriving test sequences
from the reachability graph is very difficult. For this reason, the RT-based method could be
adopted.
A reachability tree consists of a tree whose nodes represent markings of the Petri net and whose
arcs represent the possible changes in state resulting from the firing of transitions. In fact, a
reachability tree is equivalent to the reachability graph of the Petri net in the sense that it
contains all reachable markings and all possible firing sequences. A reachability tree will be
infinite if there exists circles in the reachability graph or if the state space is infinite. Therefore,
it is necessary to reduce it to a finite size for practical uses.
Reachability Tree of Low-level Petri Nets. For low-level Petri nets, the reduction of reacha-
bility tree could be done by using a special symbol ω for the number of tokens in the places
which could have arbitrarily large number of tokens [120]. ω satisfies ω + α = ω, ω − α = ω
and α < ω for any natural number α. In the reachability tree, each node is labelled with a
marking and each arc is labelled with a transition. The initial node (root of the reachabil-
ity tree) is labelled with the initial marking. Inspired by [120], a finite reachability tree can be
constructed as follows:
1. Given a node x in the tree, “new” nodes are added to the tree for all markings that are
directly reachable from the marking of the node x. The arc from the node x to each
“new” node is labelled with the transition, by firing which the marking is transformed
from the marking of the node x to the marking of the “new” node.
2. Repeat the process of step 1.
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2.1. If the marking of a “new” node is equal to the marking of an existing node on the
path from the root node to the “new” node, the “new” (duplicate) node becomes a
terminal (dead) node.
2.2. If the marking of a “new” node x is grater than the marking of a node y on the path
from the root node to the node x, then those components (number of tokens in a
corresponding place) of the marking of the node x which are strictly greater than
the corresponding components of the marking of the node y are replaced by the
symbol ω. In general, we say a marking M1 of a Petri net is greater that another
marking M2 of the net if at least one component of marking in M1 is greater than
it is in M2 and the each of the rest components of marking in M1 is no less than it
is in M2. For example, M1 and M2 are two markings of the Petri net N = (P, T, F )
where P = (p1, p2, p3). If M2(p1) = 1 > M1(p1) = 0 and M2(p2) = M1(p2) = 1 and
M2(p3) = M1(p3) = 0, then the marking M2 is greater than M1. In this case, the first
component of the marking M2 is replaced by ω and thus M2 = (ω, 1, 0).
The reason for reducing the reachability tree by step 2.1 is because all markings reachable
from this node have already been added to the tree by the “old” node with the identical
marking. For step 2.2, since the marking of node x is greater than the marking of node y, any
possible firing sequences from node y is also possible from node x. In particular, the firing
sequence that transforms the marking from node y into node x can be repeated infinitely, and
each time increasing the number of tokens in those places corresponding to the ω compo-
nents. Therefore, the number of tokens in these places can become arbitrarily large.
Apart from using the symbol ω, [121] presents a modified reachability tree for Petri nets follow-
ing the suggestion of [122] to use the expression a + bni rather than ω to represent the value
of the components of a marking. More details can be found in [121].
Reachability Tree of High-level Petri Nets. For high-level Petri nets, the reachability tree can
be reduced by equivalent markings [123] which is a generalization of duplicate markings. In or-
der to have an easy entry for the readers, [123] and [115] used the “five dining philosophers”
example to introduce the notion of equivalent markings. For example, the marking that rep-
resents philosopher number one is eating with the both folks next to him (left and right hand
side folks) is said to be equivalent to the marking that represents philosopher number two
is eating with the both folks next to him, but not equivalent to the marking that represents
philosopher number two is eating with the folks that not both are next to him. The explana-
tion is that all philosophers should “behave in the same way” ignoring the identity of eating
philosophers. For the reduced reachability tree by equivalent markings, only one element
of each class of equivalent markings is developed further, and when a marking has several
direct successors which are equivalent, only one of them is included in the tree. [123] pointed
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out that the relation of equivalent markings is determined by the persons who analyse the
system, and it must respect the inherent nature of the system. Formal definitions of reacha-
bility tree for high-level Petri nets and for CP-nets as well as the algorithms of producing the
reachability tree can be seen in [123] and [115], respectively. Moreover, the reachability tree of
high-level Petri nets can be further reduced with the reduction methods presented previously
for the low-level Petri nets.
Test Suite Generation.
1. Generate the finite reachability tree of the Petri net.
2. Identify the initial node and leaf nodes (dead nodes) of the tree. Each path from the
initial node to a leaf node is a test sequence and all the test sequences comprise the test
suite.
5.3.3.2 Unfolding-based Method
The RT-based method, in essence, makes use of reachability graphs which are unfolded into
reachability trees representing all the reachable markings and firing sequences of Petri nets.
This makes it possible to alleviate the state explosion problem in analysing Petri nets with their
state sates (reachability graphs) because finite reachability trees are possible with appropriate
reduction methods. To avoid the state explosion problem, another technique using the notion
of unfolding was proposed by McMillan [117], [118]. The unfolding of a Petri net is a partially
ordered net [119] containing the information of all the reachable markings and preserving the
information of concurrency of the original Petri net. It is a labelled net [124] whose places are
labelled with places of the original Petri net and whose transitions are labelled with transi-
tions of the original Petri net. The unfolding of a Petri net is usually an infinite net, which
give rise to problems of analysing the Petri net. For this reason, McMillan also proposed an
algorithm to construct a truncated unfolding (called finite complete prefix in most of the later
literature, e.g. [119], [40] and [125]), a finite fragment of the unfolding, which is sufficient
to represent all the reachable markings. The formal introduction of unfoldings and the algo-
rithm of constructing the finite complete prefixes of unfoldings will be presented in chapter
7.
Test Suite Generation.
1. Construct the finite complete prefix of the unfolding of the Petri net.
2. Identify all the local configurations (see chapter 7) of the events of the finite complete
prefix which have no successor events. Every linearisation (see chapter 7) of a local
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configuration corresponds to a test sequence. All the test sequences comprise the test
suite.
5.4 Summary
This chapter discusses the quality assurance by Petri net analysing techniques. The be-
havioural analysis techniques and structural analysis techniques rely on the behavioural
properties and structural properties of Petri nets and their interpretations as system behaviours,
respectively. The behavioural properties and structural properties of Petri nets are illus-
trated by attribute hierarchy models for a better comprehension. Model-based testing with
Petri nets needs to specify the test coverage criteria and develop the test generation meth-
ods. For this purpose, four classes of test coverage criteria have been discussed on one
hand: transition-based coverage criteria, transition-instance-based coverage criteria, state-
based coverage criteria and interested-state-based coverage criteria. On the other hand, two
test suite generation methods satisfying the coverage criterion of all state sequences have
been presented: reachability tree based and unfolding based method.
Notice that this chapter discusses the Petri net analysing techniques in a general way. When
these techniques are applied to a specific system, specific refinements for each technique are
required. Examples of applying these techniques to the SatZB model will be presented in
chapter 6, 7 and 8.

Chapter 6
Structural Verification Using Open Nets
Once we have established a Petri net model for system development, the properties of the net
that are independent of the initial marking, but depend on its topological structure need to be
investigated to make sure that no undesired properties, e.g., traps and co-traps are included
in the model. These types of properties are structural properties of Petri nets. Prior to verify
the Petri net model against its underlying system’s requirements specification, the structure
errors should be eliminated. This is done by structural verification of the net.
In this chapter, first open nets are formally defined and several application contexts (environ-
ments) are specified. Second, the reproducibility of empty markings of open nets is discussed
based on Lautenbach’s theory. Third, the identification of dead transitions in open nets is
presented. Fourth, open nets’ ability of terminating in empty markings is investigated. Fi-
nally, an example of verifying the structural properties of consistency and controllability for
the generic scenario net of the on-board module of SatZB model is provided to illustrate the
presented theory.
6.1 Open Nets for Structural Analysis
In this work, our solution for modelling large-scale systems is the approach of modularisation
which decomposes the system model into smaller modules (component models) and these
modules are interacted via interfaces. This is realised in chapter 3 by hierarchically model
(top-down approach) the system with CP-nets. Each of these modules, in fact, is an open
system which interacts with the surrounding environment (e.g., other modules). To analyse
such a large-scale system model that consists of smaller modules, in particular, if the system
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model is developed by different persons or work groups, it is necessary to analyse each mod-
ule independently by the respective developers. For this purpose, the notion of open nets are
suitable to describe the modules of a system model.
According to the survey of literatures (e.g., [37], [126], [127], [128]), most applications of the
notion of open nets are dedicated to compose systems or process models (bottom-up ap-
proach). In [37], open high-level Petri nets are defined to model the scenarios of a railway
level crossing control system, based on which the cooperability of system components is en-
sured by adequate integration and composition techniques for open nets. In [126], the author
exploited open Petri nets for the modelling of workflows across organisational boundaries.
In [127], open Petri nets are introduced in order to model the behaviours of open concurrent
systems by means of Petri nets. In [128], a framework based on open Petri nets is proposed
for the specification of behaviour-preserving reconfigurations of systems modelled as Petri
nets. In contrast to the presented works, we use open nets to decompose the system model
and focus on the structural analysis of the open nets.
6.1.1 Open Nets
An open net is a Petri net (ordinary P/T net) with a distinguished set of open places, through
which the net interacts with the surrounding environment. As a consequence, tokens can
freely appear or disappear on open places. An open place can be either an input (boundary)
place where the environment can put tokens, or an output (boundary) place whose tokens can
be removed by the environment.
Definition 6.1 (Open nets). Let N = (P, T, F ) be a Petri net. A place p is an input (output)
boundary place iff •p = ∅(p• = ∅). A transition t is an input (output) boundary transition iff
•t = ∅(t• = ∅). An open net is a Petri net defined as a 5-tuple NO = (PI , PO, P, T, F ), where
(P, T, F ) is a Petri net, PI is the set of input boundary places and PI 6= ∅, PO is the set of output
boundary places and PO 6= ∅, PI ∩ PO = ∅, PI ⊆ P , PO ⊆ P .
6.1.2 Open Nets in Environmental Contexts
An open net with a fixed structure, interacts with different types of environments might lead
to different behaviours including undesired ones. Therefore, when we consider the struc-
tural properties of an open net, it is necessary to extend the open net with its application
environment. For open nets, different types of environments are distinguished depending on
the number of tokens that an environment can produce for each input boundary place and
consume from each output boundary place. Table 6.1 specifies three types of environments.
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TABLE 6.1: Environment types
Name of the environment Number of tokens that
can be fed to each in-
put boundary place
Number of tokens that can
be consumed from each
output boundary place
Normal environment infinite infinite
1-configured environment 1 infinite
Absorbing environment 0 infinite
In the following, we formally define the open nets in different environmental contexts. Note
that when we discuss open nets in environmental contexts (definition 6.2, 6.3, 6.4), the nec-
essary conditions of •PI = ∅ and PO• = ∅ of open nets are assumed to be neglected, which
allows the open nets to be extended by adding additional nets to their boundary places. This
is valid if the environment nets are added only for analysis purposes and however can ex-
change information (tokens) with the open nets.
Definition 6.2 (Open nets in normal-environment contexts). Let NO = (PI , PO, P, T, F ) be an
open net, then we define the normal-environment of NO as E = TI ∪ TO, where TI =• PI , TO =
PO
•, TI ∩ T = ∅, TO ∩ T = ∅ and TI ∩ TO = ∅. We denote an open net in normal-environment
context asNE = (TI , TO, PI , PO, FE, P, T, F ), whereNE is a Petri net, (PI , PO, P, T, F ) is an open
net, and FE ⊆ (TI × PI) ∪ (PO × TO)→ {0, 1}.
Definition 6.3 (Open nets in 1-configured-environment contexts). Let NE =
(TI , TO, PI , PO, FE, P, T, F ) be an open net in normal-environment context, then we define
(NE,M01) = (PE1 , FE1 , TI , TO, PI , PO, P, T, F,M01) as an open net in 1-configured-environment
context, where PE1 =• TI , FE1 ⊆ PE1 × TI → {0, 1}, ∀p ∈ PE1 ,M01(p) = 1.
Definition 6.4 (Open nets in absorbing-environment contexts). Let NO = (PI , PO, P, T, F )
be an open net, then we define the absorbing-environment of NO as EO = TI ∪ TO, where
TI =
• PI = ∅, TO = PO• and TO∩T = ∅. We denote an open net in absorbing-environment context
as NEO = (TO, PI , PO, FEO , P, T, F ), where NEO is a Petri net, (PI , PO, P, T, F ) is an open net,
and FEO ⊆ (PO × TO)→ {0, 1}.
6.2 Reproducibility of Empty Markings of Open Nets
The reactions (behaviours) of an open net for two identical inputs from its surrounding en-
vironment often need to be the same no matter when the inputs appear. This means that at
both moments before getting the inputs, the states of the net should be identical. Normally,
these two identical states (usually initial states) can be regarded as empty if the components
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(places) of the net that are severed as invariable resources are omitted. Consequently, we say
that the open net should be capable of reproducing its empty (initial) marking. For instance,
for a scenario net of the on-board module, it is required to have the ability to return to its
initial state (omit those places that will not affect the data processing, e.g., places used to
record specific data) after some specific data processing processes. Ignoring the places used
to record data and places served as resources that are connected with double directed (test)
arcs in Petri net models, the initial marking of a scenario net is empty. As a consequence, the
scenario nets are required to be able to reproduce their empty markings under the assumption
given forwards.
Definition 6.5 (Reproducibility [38]). Let N = (P, T, F ) be a Petri net and M0 a marking of N .
Then a marking M (M ∈ [M0〉) is reproducible iff there exists a marking M ′ ∈ [M〉 ,M ′ 6= M s.t.
M ∈ [M ′〉.
Theorem 6.6. Let N = (P, T, F ) be a Petri net, j be a non-negative T-invariant of N , then the empty
marking ∅ of N is reproducible by realising (k · j) for k ∈ N iff the net representation Nj of j does
neither contain a trap nor a co-trap [38].
Proof. Proof can be seen in [38].
6.2.1 Reproducibility of Empty Markings of Open Nets in Normal-environ-
ment Contexts
The reproducibility of the empty (initial) marking of an open netNO in the normal-environment
context can be directly investigated by using Theorem 6.6 since NE is a normal Petri net.
6.2.2 Reproducibility of Empty Markings of Open Nets in 1-configured-
environment Contexts
For an open net in the 1-configured-environment context, Theorem 6.6 provides a necessary
but not sufficient condition for the reproducibility of the empty marking of the open net,
because the entry corresponding to an input boundary place of the support of a non-negative
T-invariant could be greater than one. It means that the input boundary place can be marked
more than one time, which is in conflict with the specification of open nets in 1-configured-
environment contexts.
For example, Figure 6.1 shows an open net NO where p1 is an input boundary place and
p3 is an output boundary place. The net NE (open net in normal-environment context) is
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FIGURE 6.2: A T-invariant of NE
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FIGURE 6.3: Open net in 1-configured-environment context (NE ,M01)
depicted in Figure 6.2, where t3 is an input boundary transition and t4 an output boundary
transition. Vector j is a T-invariant, where jT = [2 1 1 1] shown in Figure 6.2. According to
the definition of net representation, NE is also the net representation Nj of j which contains
neither a trap nor a co-trap. Note that the checking of traps and co-traps can be easily carried
out by computer-supported tools such as Poseidon 2.0 [43]. So the empty marking ∅ of
NO in the normal-environment context is reproducible by realising k · j for k ∈ N according to
Theorem 6.6. However, the empty marking ∅ of NO in the 1-configured-environment context
depicted in Figure 6.3 is unreproducible even though NE does not contain a co-trap or a trap.
It is easy to find out that t2 is a dead transition in Figure 6.3.
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Proposition 6.7. Let NO = (PI , PO, P, T, F ) be an open net, j be a realisable T-invariant 1 of
NE , where NE = (TI , TO, PI , PO, FE, P, T, F ). The empty marking ∅ of NO in the 1-configured-
environment context is reproducible by realising j iff the net representationNj of j does neither contain
a trap nor a co-trap and ∀ti ∈ TI , 0 ≤ j(ti) ≤ 1.
Proof. (Necessity) The value of the i th entry of j indicates the firing times of the correspond-
ing transition in the firing sequence that realise j. ∀ti ∈ TI , 0 ≤ j(ti) ≤ 1 means each input
boundary transition can fire at most once. In other words, each input boundary place can
be filled with at most one token. According to Theorem 6.6, if the net representation Nj of j
does neither contain a trap nor a co-trap, then the empty marking ∅ ofNO in the 1-configured-
environment context is reproducible by realising j.
(Sufficiency) Assuming that the empty marking ∅ of NO is reproducible, then there exists a
T-invariant j ofNE and the net representationNj of j does neither contain a trap nor a co-trap
according to Theorem 6.6. Since an open net in the 1-configured-environment context implies
that each input boundary transition can fire at most once, namely ∀ti ∈ TI , 0 ≤ j(ti) ≤ 1.
Remark 6.8. Proposition 6.7 provides a sufficient as well as a necessary condition for repro-
ducing the empty marking of an open net in 1-configured-environment context.
6.3 Dead Transitions in Open Nets
As stated, once a co-trap is unmarked, it remains unmarked. We have an intuitive conclusion
that if the initial marking of an open net is empty and there exists a co-trap, then the open
net contains dead transitions but still has the possibility to reproduce the empty marking by
firing other transitions. Therefore, it is important to make sure that the empty marking of an
open net is reproducible as well as no dead transition is contained in the open net.
Definition 6.9 (Dead transition). A transition t is dead in (N,M0) iff ∀M ∈ [M0〉 : t is not
enabled.
Theorem 6.10. LetN = (P, T, F ) be a Petri net, there exists a dead transition in (N, ∅) iffN contains
a co-trap [38].
Proof. Proof can be seen in [38].
1A T-invariant of a Petri net might be not realisable, namely the i th entry of a T-invariant j does indicate the
firing times of the corresponding transition in a firing sequence only if such a firing sequence does exist at all.
Examples and related theory can be seen in [38]. Idiotically, one can run the Petri net to verify the realisation of
a T-invariant.
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6.3.1 Dead Transitions in Open Nets in Normal-environment Contexts
Corollary 6.11. Let NO = (PI , PO, P, T, F ) be an open net, there exists a dead transition tdead in
(NE, ∅) such that NE = (TI , TO, PI , PO, FE, P, T, F ) and tdead ∈ T ∧ tdead 6∈ (TI ∪ TO) iff NE
contains a co-trap.
Proof. NE is a normal Petri net, then the conclusion of Corollary 6.11 is obvious according to
Theorem 6.10.
6.3.2 Dead Transitions in Open Nets in 1-configured-environment Con-
texts
If the net NE of an open net in normal-environment context contains a co-trap, then there
exists dead transitions in (NE, ∅) according to Corollary 6.11. However, for an open net in the
1-configured-environment context, even if there is no co-trap in NE , a dead transition could
be contained in (NE,M01).
Definition 6.12 (Path). Let N = (P, T, F ) be a Petri net and w = (u0, u1, · · · , un) a sequence
where n ≥ 1 and ui ∈ P ∪ T for i = 0, 1, · · ·n. Then w is a (directed) path [129] from u0 to un iff
{(u0, u1), (u1, u2), · · · , (un−1, un)} ⊆ F ∧ ui 6= uj for i 6= j.
Definition 6.13 (Converging Transitions). Let NO = (PI , PO, P, T, F ) be an open net. ∀t ∈ T ,
we define ↑ t as the converging transitions of t, which is a set of transitions of NO such that
↑ t ⊆ T and ∀t′′ ∈↑ t, t′′ lies on at least one (directed) path which is from an input boundary
place to the transition t.
Proposition 6.14. Let NO = (PI , PO, P, T, F ) be an open net, |PI | the amount of input boundary
places. ∀t ∈ T , the number of input places of t is |•t|. t is a dead transition in (NE,M01) if (|PI | <
|•t|) ∧ (∀t′ ∈↑ t, |•t′| ≥ |t′•|).
Proof. If ∀t ∈ T,∀t′ ∈↑ t, |•t′| ≥ |t′•|, then the amount of tokens on the net will never increase
after firing a transition t′(t′ ∈↑ t), which means that the number of tokens on the net is at
most |PI |. If |PI | < |•t|, then there will be at least one input place of t cannot be filled, namely,
∃p ∈• t,M(p) = 0. Therefore, t is a dead transition.
Remark 6.15. Proposition 6.14 only provides a sufficient condition for the determination of a
dead transition in an open net in the 1-configured-environment context.
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6.4 Open Nets’ Ability of Terminating in Empty Markings
Following the system requirements, a scenario net is not only required to have the possibility
to go back to its empty (initial) state, but also needed to be assured that it will always termi-
nate in an empty state. In this case, the specification of open nets in absorbing-environment
contexts is applicable.
Definition 6.16 (Termination). An open net is said to be terminated iff no transition is enabled
after processing the input tokens produced by the environment.
Proposition 6.17. Let NO = (PI , PO, P, T, F ) be an open net, NEO =
(TO, PI , PO, FEO , P, T, F ) the open net in absorbing-environment context and M0 a non-empty mark-
ing of NEO . Suppose that an enabled transition in (NEO ,M0) will fire eventually. Then the net NEO
will terminate in an empty marking (in other words, NEO will reach an empty marking eventually
from a non-empty marking), i.e., ∀M ∈ [M0〉, ∅ ∈ [M〉 and the empty marking ∅ is a dead marking iff
NEO contains no trap.
Proof. (Sufficiency) If the net NEO can always terminate in the state of empty marking from
any non-empty marking, i.e., ∀M ∈ [M0〉, ∅ ∈ [M〉, then all tokens on the places of the netNEO
can be removed through the output boundary transitions. This, however, is impossible ifNEO
contains a trap because once a trap is marked, it remains marked. If the empty marking ∅ is
not dead, then there exists at least one transition t, t ∈ T ∪TO is enabled in the empty marking
∅. This is in contrast to ∀t ∈ T ∪ TO,• t 6= ∅. Therefore, the empty marking ∅ is dead.
(Necessity) Assuming that NEO contains no trap, then there are no output boundary places
because every such place is a minimal trap. Let H , where H 6= ∅, be the set of marked places
of (NEO ,M0). Then H
• 6= ∅ since H contains no output boundary places. Let t ∈ H•, then t
is enabled. Suppose that an enabled transition t will fire eventually over time. Then if there
exists such a enabled transition t at all, the set of marked places H is still non-empty. In other
words, If there is not a enabled transition t any more, then H = ∅, which indicates that the
net NEO is in an empty marking and no transition is enabled, namely, the empty marking
∅ ∈ [M0〉 and it is dead.
6.5 Application Example
In this section, we provide an application example using open net theory to verify some
structural properties (i.e., consistency and controllability) of the scenario nets of the on-board
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module. First of all, the interpretations of structural properties as the behaviours of the on-
board module (or scenario nets) are necessary and presented in Table 6.2. Additionally, the
column “Verification tasks” indicates the related verification tasks identified in chapter 4.
TABLE 6.2: Interpretation of structural properties
PN structural properties Behaviours of On-board module Verification tasks
Structurally Bounded-
ness
Whether there are no overflows
in the model
Structurally Liveness Whether there always exists at
least one transition in the model
that is enabled
Conservativeness Whether there is no overflow of
information to be stored
Repetitiveness Whether there are loops in the
process of switching scenario
nets
Consistency Whether the empty marking of
the scenario nets is reproducible
The scenario nets con-
tain no structure errors
Controllability Whether the scenario nets will
always terminate in empty
marking
The scenario nets con-
tain no structure errors
6.5.1 Scenario Nets as the Semantics of Open Nets
Observing the scenario nets of the on-board module presented in chapter 3, we can find that
different scenario nets have a similar structure and mechanism which could be abstracted as
the generic structure of the scenario nets (see Figure 6.4).
In Figure 6.4, tokens on the places Message IN and Location IN represent the messages
sent by the traffic control centre and the localisation unit, respectively. Place Flag IN is
the precondition of activating the scenario net. Once the place Flag IN is marked, the sce-
nario net is activated. Otherwise, it is “dead” (the messages on places Message IN and
Location INwill/can not be received by firing the transition Receiving MSG and Recei-
ving LOC). The message received by the place Flag IN is used for determining the next ac-
tivated scenario net. For example, if the transition Switch to Other Scenarios fires,
then token on the place Flag IN will be taken and added to the place Flag OUT. The sce-
nario net that takes the place Flag OUT as the precondition of activation will be activated
as soon as the place Flag OUT is marked. If the transition Stay in Current Scenario
fires, then the token remains on the place Flag IN, namely, the current scenario net keeps
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Flag_IN
Received Message Switch to Other Scenarios
Receiving LOC
Received Location
Generation of Location Report and MA request
Generation of Location Report
Message_OUT
Flag_OUT
Stay in Current Scenario
MMI_OUT
Message_IN Receiving MSG
Location_IN
1
1
1
stNet
FIGURE 6.4: Open net: the generic structure of scenario nets
in activated state and ready to receive the next messages. The message received by the place
Location IN is taken for generating location reports and/or MA requests that are sent out
by the place Message OUT. Place MMI OUT indicates the location reports and MA requests to
the driver.
According to the definition of open nets, the generic scenario net depicted in Figure 6.4 is
an open net in which places Message IN, Location IN and Flag IN are input boundary
places and places Flag OUT, MMI OUT and Message OUT are output boundary places.
6.5.2 Consistency: Reproducibility of Empty Markings of Scenario Nets
The net NE of the scenario net (Figure 6.4) in normal-environment context is shown in Fig-
ure 6.5. Transitions t1,t2,t3,t4,t5 and t6 represent the environment of the scenario net.
To be exact, transitions t1,t2 and t3 are input boundary transitions, and transitions t4,t5
and t6 are output boundary transitions. An input boundary transition can fire arbitrarily. Us-
ing computer-supported tools such as Poseidon 2.0 [43], we obtain all the T-invariants of
the net NE . One of the T-invariants j1 (realisable) is shown in Figure 6.5 where the set of tran-
sitions which are filled with black (and green) colour is the support of j1, and the integer “1”
on a blacked transition is the number of times that this transition fires in the firing sequence
which leads the marking fromM0 toM0. The net representation ofNj1 of j1 is depicted in Fig-
ure 6.6. With the tool Poseidon, it is easy to check that neither a trap nor a co-trap is contained
in Nj1 . Therefore, the empty marking of the scenario net in the normal-environment context
is reproducible according to Theorem 6.6. For example, in the case shown in Figure 6.5,
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the empty marking of the scenario net will be reproduced after firing each of the transitions
t1,t2,Receiving MSG,Switch to Other Scenarios and t4 once in a proper order
(e.g., t2→ t1→ Receiving MSG→ Switch to Other Scenarios→ t4). Besides, the
corresponding entry of the support of j1 is 1, so the empty marking of the scenario net in
1-configured-environment context is also reproducible according to Proposition 6.7. Further-
more, no co-trap is contained in NE , thus no dead transition is existing in (NE, ∅) according
to Corollary 6.11.
Similarly, other T-invariants ofNE are obtained as in Table 6.3. The amount of input boundary
places |PI | in this case is 3, ∀t ∈ T , |•t| ≤ 2 < |PI |, thus no dead transitions were found in
the scenario net in 1-configured-environment context ((NE,M01)) according to Proposition
6.14. However, this does not mean that there are no dead transitions in the scenario net in 1-
configured-environment context ((NE,M01)) since Proposition 6.14 only provides a sufficient
condition for determining dead transitions.
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FIGURE 6.5: A T-invariant of the scenario net in normal-environment context
Flag_IN
Received Message Switch to Other Scenarios Flag_OUTMessage_IN Receiving MSGt1
t2
t4
1
stNet
FIGURE 6.6: Net representation of the T-invariant j1
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TABLE 6.3: T-invariants of the net NE
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j1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
j2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
j3 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
j4 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
6.5.3 Controllability: Scenario Nets’ Ability of Terminating in Empty Mark-
ings
In order to demonstrate that the scenario net will terminate in the empty marking, the net
in Figure 6.5 can be adapted into an open net in absorbing-environment context shown in
Figure 6.7, since the scenario net can only receive messages or location data from the out-
side environment when the scenario net is activated, i.e., the place Flag IN is marked. It is
easy to observe that if no token is on the place Flag In, neither t1 nor t3 can fire. There-
fore, once the scenario net is terminated, no more tokens on the places Message IN and
Location INwill be generated. Besides, it is not difficult to find out that no trap is contained
in the open net in absorbing-environment context with the help of the tool, so the scenario net
will terminate in the empty state according to Proposition 6.17. In this case, the interfaces of
places Message IN, Location IN, Flag IN, Flag OUT, MMI OUT and Message OUT
are taken as internal places of the net.
6.5.4 Verification Results
Based on the structural analysis, following conclusions could be drawn:
1. the empty state (marking) of a scenario net of the on-board module is reproducible after
processing some incoming data sent by the traffic control centre and the localisation
unit;
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FIGURE 6.7: Scenario net in the absorbing-environment context
2. the empty state of a scenario net is reproducible after processing exactly one set of in-
coming data. A set of incoming data refers to the set of all input boundary places of an
open net that each input boundary place is either marked with one token or none;
3. a scenario net will always terminate in the empty state;
4. no dead transition is contained in the scenario nets. In other words, every transition has
the possibility to fire.
6.5.5 Discussion
In many cases such as in this thesis, the system model is developed with high-level Petri nets.
Structural verifications for high-level models should be careful since they might need to be
mapped into the corresponding low-level Petri nets first. An attempt for mapping a CPN
module to an open net has been made as follows.
In CPN models, a marking is a function M that maps each place p into a multiset 2 of to-
kens. Considering the multiset of tokens on a place as one abstract token without colour, the
mapping ψ from a CPN module ΩM to an open net NO is defined as following:
ΩM = (Ω, Tsub, Pport, PT ) where:
1. Ω = (P, T,A,Σ, V, C,G,E, I) is a non-hierarchical Coloured Petri Net.
2A multiset m over a non-empty set S can be viewed as a function from S into the set of non-negative
numbers N. The function maps each element s into the number of appearances, m(s), of the element s in the
multiset m. The non-negative integer m(s) is also called the coefficient of s in m[15].
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2. Tsub ⊆ T is a set of substitution transitions.
3. Pport ⊆ P is a set of port places.
4. PT : Pport → {IN,OUT, I/O} is a port type function that assigns a port type to each
port place.
NO = (PI , PO, P
′, T ′, F ) is an open net.
ψ:
1. (P \ Pport) ∪ PportI/O → P ′′;
2. T → T ′′;
3. A→ F ′′;
4. ∀p ∈ PportIN , p→ pi ∪ taddi where pi ∈ PI ,• taddi = pi, t•addi ⊂ P ′′;
5. ∀p ∈ PportOUT , p→ po ∪ taddo where po ∈ PO,• taddo ⊂ P ′′, t•addo = po;
6. T ′ = T ′′ ∪ P •I ∪• PO;
7. P ′ = P ′′ ∪ PI ∪ PO;
8. F = F ′′ ∪ (⋃(pi × taddi)) ∪ (⋃(taddo × po)).
6.6 Summary
This chapter verifies a Petri net model from the perspective of system structure which might
affect the behaviour of the system using the notion of open nets. Open nets extend the normal
Petri nets with open places (input/output boundary places) which serve as interfaces to their
environments. The tokens on the open places represent messages that can be received but
not yet received, or messages that are about to be sent out but not yet be sent out. Therefore,
open places are given in terms of communication channels. Taking the environments of the
open nets in into consideration, three kinds of application contexts are defined, i.e., normal-
environment contexts, 1-configured-environment contexts and absorbing-environment con-
texts. Based on the theory of structural properties of Petri nets, the reproducibility of empty
markings of open nets in different environmental contexts is discussed. In order to investigate
the consistency of the scenario nets of the on-board subsystem model, a generic scenario net
is constructed for applying the theory introduced in this chapter. For verifying the property
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of controllability of the scenario nets, the generic scenario net is adapted and the verification
is performed by checking that whether the open nets in absorbing-environment contexts will
always end up with empty markings.

Chapter 7
Reachability Analysis Based on Net
Unfoldings
For the behavioural analysis of a CPN model, state space based methods can be applied ini-
tially, e.g., in the CPN Tools [35], standard behavioural properties such as reachability prop-
erty, boundedness property, home property, liveness property and fairness property can be
investigated by asking for a state space report or using query functions. Reachability prop-
erty, which is the major aspect in system behaviour analysis, investigated by using query
functions can only gain the reachability properties of a single marking that is concerned. One
cannot have an overview of the reachability property of all the reachable markings when
the sequences of transitions of reachable markings are of interest. Instead of using query
functions, reachability graphs provide all reachable markings if the state space is finite. Nev-
ertheless, the state space of a large-scale system, especially a concurrent system, could be too
large to generate the reachability graph. In addition, the state space of a system might be infi-
nite when the system is unbounded [46]. This is known as the state explosion problem. To avoid
the state explosion problem, McMillan presented a specific technique in [118]. This technique
uses the notion of unfolding, a partial order [130], [119] semantics of Petri nets, introduced in
[131]. He proposed an algorithm to construct a truncated unfolding, a finite fragment of the
unfolding, which is sufficient to represent all the reachable markings.
In this chapter, the reachability property of the on-board module of the SatZB model estab-
lished in chapter 3 is discussed based on Petri net unfoldings. First, various techniques for
investigating the reachability properties of Petri net models are briefly introduced. Second,
based on the formal introduction of Petri net unfoldings, reachability analysis for both 1-safe
Petri nets and CP-nets is explored. Last, an application example of the on-board module is
provided.
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7.1 Introduction
Reachability is a fundamental basis for studying the dynamic properties of any system [46].
Reachability of states is one of the key problems in the area of automatic verification, and
most safety properties of systems can be reduced to simple reachability properties [132]. For
a safety-critical system such as a train control system, the risk analysis should be carried
out at the very beginning of the system life-cycle according to EN50126, which results in
a list of hazardous states of the system. Methods of hazard analysis for railway systems
have been studied e.g. in [99], [100] and [101]. Given a Petri net model (specification) of a
system, the hazardous states can be interpreted into hazardous markings of the model. If
the state space (reachability graph) of the system model is generated, then the reachability of
hazardous states can be verified. Intuitively, the hazardous markings should be unreachable
from any other markings. Apart from verifying the safety aspect of the system, functional
verification can also be performed. Each function is mapped into a firing sequence in the Petri
net model and each firing sequence corresponds to a path in the reachability graph. Therefore,
the functional verification is done by verifying the existence of specific firing sequences in
the reachability graph. The processes of safety verification and functional verification by
reachability analysis are shown in Figure 7.1.
System 
requirements
specification
Petri net 
model
Hazardous 
markings
Firing 
sequences
Verdicts
Verdicts
State space 
(Reachability 
graph)
Modelling
Interpretation
Interpretation
Calculation
Verifying
Verifying
Functional
analysis
Hazard 
analysis
Hazardous 
states
System 
functions
Modification
Modification
FIGURE 7.1: Reachability analysis for system models
The reachability properties of Petri net models are concerned with determining whether a
marking M ′ is reachable from another marking M , i.e., whether there exists an occurrence
sequence starting from M which leads to the marking M ′. The main problem of reachability
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investigation by using reachability graphs is that it suffers from the state explosion problem.
Even a relatively small system model can yield a very large state space, which is mainly
caused by the system concurrency. To alleviate this problem, a number of techniques have
been proposed. They can be roughly be classified as avoiding generating a single reachability
graph for the system model as a whole, or aiming at an explicit generation of a reduced (though suf-
ficient for a given verification task) representation (e.g., abstraction and partial order reduction tech-
niques) [133]. Some of these techniques are briefly introduced in the following subsections.
7.1.1 Hierarchical Reachability Graph Techniques
To cope with the state explosion problem, the authors of [134] proposed a divide-conquer
method. In this method, a Petri net is regarded as a collection of subnets communicating or
synchronising with each other only through transitions. First, the reachability graphs (called
R-graphs here) of subnets, which are the lowest level in the hierarchical representation of
the state space, are generated. These reachability graphs are compressed by aggregating I-O
similar equivalence states, and combined by synchronising transitions to obtain higher level
reachability graphs. This compress-combine operation is repeated until the state space is
combined and condensed into one R-graph, which is the highest level in the hierarchy.
The reachability property of a Petri net consisting of n subnets, could be investigated by
analysing the hierarchical reachability graph (HRG, a tree with n leaf nodes). If a marking M
is reachable from the initial marking M0, then M is mapped to a state (corresponding vertex)
of the root node.
However, the HRG method has restrictions. It is only applicable to safe or any bounded nets con-
sisting of subnets synchronised only through transitions, which means that only the reachability
graph of a Petri net is able to be constructed, can this method be applied. It can not ensure the
improvement of the reachability analysis comparing to conventional methods. The amount
of reduction that can be obtained in the HRG or the efficiency of the HRG depends on the
structure of the net.
7.1.2 Modular State Space Techniques
For the purpose of state space analysis of industrial size systems that consist of a set of mod-
ules, avoiding the construction of a single state space of the entire system, a Modular State
Space method is proposed in [135]. The behaviour of the total system is captured by the state
spaces of modules combined with a Synchronisation Graph. A Synchronisation Graph is con-
structed by the state spaces of modules that share only transitions composing the entire system.
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For the system constructed with modules sharing places, a transformation from a modular
CP-net using place fusion to a modular CP-net using only transition fusion is defined by the
authors.
The modular construction of the occurrence graph allows either to gain time or space, and
the efficiency gained depends a lot on the modular structure chosen. The properties of the
system can be checked directly on the Modular State Space.
7.1.3 Reachability Investigation by Standard Queries
For CP-nets, state spaces, also called occurrence graphs, reachability graphs or reachability
trees [95], calculate all reachable states (markings) and state changes (occurring binding el-
ements) of the CPN model and represent these in a directed graph where the nodes corre-
spond to the set of reachable markings and the arcs correspond to occurring binding ele-
ments. Therefore a state space is a directed graph where we have a node for each reachable
marking and an arc for each occurring binding element. State spaces can become very large,
so they need to be calculated and analysed by means of a computer-aided tool such as CPN
Tools with which the State Space Tool (SS tool) [95] is integrated. However, in some cases, a
state space is still too big to calculate by a tool due to the state explosion problem or even if
the state space is calculable, it will take too much time.
In [15], simple reachability properties are investigated by using the standard query function
Reachable. The function Reachable takes a pair (n, n′) of integers as an argument and
checks whether there exist a path in the state space leading from node n to node n′. For ex-
ample, the query Reachable (1,5) checks whether the marking represented by node 5 is
reachable from the marking represented by node 1. If it does, then the function returns true.
The function also has the chatty version Reachable’ [95], which returns the same result
together with an explanation of an occurrence sequence (directed path) of minimal length.
Additionally, the function SccReachable returns the same result as Reachable, but it uses
the SCC graph (Strongly-Connected-Component graph). The function AllReachable de-
termines whether all the reachable markings are reachable form each other.
Beside checking whether there exist a path in the state space leading from node n repre-
sented by an integer to node n′ represented by another integer, it is also possible to check
whether there exist a path in the state space leading from a specified marking to another
specified marking. First we implement a predicate DesiredTerminal, which given a node
n, returns true if the marking represented by n corresponds to the desired terminal state.
And then we can obtain a list of nodes containing those markings that satisfy the predicate
DesiredTerminal by using the standard query function PredAllNodes, which takes a
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predicate as an argument. The query is as following: PredAllNodes DesiredTerminal.
Last we can choose the nodes from the lists returned by the functions PredAllNodes as the
arguments of the functions Reachable or Reachable’.
7.1.4 Unfolding-based Techniques
The authors of [132] studied four unfolding-based techniques to the reachability problem for
1-safe Petri nets. The authors define the reachability problem as follows: given a set of places of
the net, determine if some reachable marking put a token in all of them.
The first method introduced by Melzer [136] is a method for checking the reachability of a
marking based on linear programming. The basic concept of this method is the so-called
marking equation that can be used as an algebraic representation of the set of reachable mark-
ings of an acyclic net (e.g. unfolding). The second method introduced by Heljanko [137] is a
method for reachability checking of complete finite prefixes using logic programs with stable
model semantics. The main idea of this approach is to translate the problem into a rule based
logic program and to check if there exists a stable model. The third method introduced by
the authors is a new graph theoretic algorithm, which uses the co-relation defined on the set
of conditions of a prefix. Based on a theorem in [136] to checking the reachability of a partial
marking, the solution of reachability problem is transformed to finding a k-clique in a k-partite
graph. To make the method also work for the partial marking that includes places which
should not carry a token, complementary place is introduced. The last method is the on-the-fly
verification introduction by McMillan [117]. The main idea of this method is to insert a new
transition tnew into the original net such that its preset is the partial marking to be checked. If
there exists an event in the prefix that labelled with tnew, then the partial marking is reachable.
7.2 Reachability Analysis Based on Net Unfoldings
According to the introduction of the techniques proposed to alleviate the sate space explo-
sion problem, either the hierarchical reachability graph techniques or the modular state space
techniques requires that the subnets only share transitions composing the entire system. If
a Petri net model constructed with modules sharing places, a transformation from a modu-
lar Petri net using place fusion to a modular Petri net model using only transition fusion is
needed. The CPN model of SatZB established in this thesis is composed by sharing places, so
a transformation to a transition shared system is inevitable if we apply these two techniques.
This is however an effort-consuming process, and more importantly, an error-prone process,
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in particular, for a complex system since the transformation is done by hand and there is no
implementation of algorithms known by now according to the author’s knowledge. Reach-
ability investigation by standard queries only works for simple reachability properties. It is
not able to provide all the occurrence sequences leading the marking from one to the other.
As a result, we choose unfolding-based techniques to analyse the reachability property of
the SatZB model. In [132], linear programming, logic programs with stable model semantics
or co-relation is explored to check the reachability of a marking, while in this chapter, the
concept of configuration is used.
7.2.1 Unfoldings of Low-level Petri Nets
On the basis of the basic definitions and notations of Petri nets introduced in chapter 2, we
present the notation and basic definitions on unfoldings as follows relying on [15], [33], [118],
[119], [74], [39], [40], [124], [130].
7.2.1.1 Labelled Nets
Let Γ be an alphabet. A labelled net is a pair (N, `), where N = (P, T, F ) is a Petri net and `:
P ∪T → Γ is a labelling function. Note that different nodes (places and transitions) of the net
can carry the same label.
7.2.1.2 Occurrence Nets
Given two nodes x and y of a Petri net. x is causally related to y, denoted by x < y, if there is a
(possibly empty) path of arrows from x to y; x and y are in conflict, denoted by x#y, if there
is a place z, different from x and y, from which one can reach x and y, exiting z by different
arrows; x and y are concurrent, denoted by x co y, if neither x < y nor y < x nor x#y hold. A
co-set is a set of nodes X such that x co y for very x, y ∈ X .
An occurrence net is an Petri net ON = (B,E, F ) where B is the set of conditions (places), E is
the set of events (transitions) and F is a flow relation, satisfying the following three properties:
• ∀b ∈ B, |•b| ≤ 1, i.e., a condition has only one or none input event;
• F is acyclic, i.e., the net seen as a directed graph, has no cycles;
• ∀x ∈ B ∪ E,¬(x#x), i.e., no node is in self-conflict.
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A place b (b ∈ B) of an occurrence net is minimal if •b = ∅, i.e. it has no input transitions. The
default initial marking of an occurrence net puts one token on each minimal place. Min(ON)
denotes the set of minimal elements of B ∪ E.
7.2.1.3 Branching Processes
A homomorphism from an occurrence netON = (B,E, F ) to a Petri net system Σ = (P, T, F,M0)
is a mapping h : B ∪ E → P ∪ T such that
• h(B) ⊆ P and h(E) ⊆ T , i.e., conditions are mapped to places, and events to transitions;
• ∀e ∈ E, the restriction of h to •e is a bijection between •e and •h(t), and similarly for t•
and h(t)•, i.e., transition environments are preserved;
• The restriction of h to Min(ON) is a bijection between Min(ON) and M0, i.e., minimal
conditions are mapped to the initial marking;
• ∀e1, e2 ∈ E, if •e1 = •e2 and h(e1) = h(e2), then e1 = e2, i.e., there is no redundancy.
A branching process of a Petri net system Σ = (P, T, F,M0) is a pair β = (ON, h) such that ON
is an occurrence net and h is a homomorphism fromON to Σ. As a matter of fact, a branching
process is a labelled net.
7.2.1.4 Unfoldings and Prefixes
Two branching processes β1 = (ON1, h1) and β2 = (ON2, h2) of a Petri net system Σ are isomor-
phic if there is a bijective homomorphism h fromON1 toON2 such that h2 ◦h = h1. Intuitively,
two isomorphic branching processes differ only the names of conditions and events.
There exists a unique maximal branching process up to isomorphism for a Petri net system
Σ, called the unfolding of Σ. Loosely speaking, the unfolding of a Petri net system is a labelled
Petri net, more precisely a Petri net whose places and transitions are labelled with places and
transitions of the original net.
Let β = (ON, h) and β′ = (ON ′, h′) be two branching process of a Petri net system Σ. β is a
prefix of β′ if ON is a subnet of ON ′ satisfying:
• if a condition belongs to ON , then its input event in ON ′ also belongs to ON ;
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• if an event belongs to ON , then its input and output conditions in ON ′ also belong to
ON .
and h is the restriction of h′ to ON .
The unfolding of a Petri net system Σ is the union of all branching process of Σ. Every branch-
ing process is a prefix of the unfolding.
7.2.1.5 Configurations and Cuts
A configuration of an occurrence net is a set of events C satisfying the following to properties:
• ∀e ∈ C : e′ < e⇒ e′ ∈ C, i.e., C is causally closed;
• ∀e, e′ ∈ C : ¬(e#e′), i.e., C is conflict-free.
Given an event e ∈ E, the configuration [e] = {e′ ∈ E|e′ ≤ e} is called the local configuration of
e, and 〈e〉 = [e] \ {e} denotes the set of causal predecessors of e.
A maximal co-set B′ ⊆ B with respect to set inclusion is called a cut. Let C be a finite config-
uration of a branching process β = (ON, h), then the co-set Cut(C), defined as following, is a
cut: Cut(C) = (Min(ON) ∪ C•) \• C. In particular, the set of place h(Cut(C)) is a reachable
marking, denoted by Mark(C), namely Mark(C) = h(Cut(C)).
7.2.1.6 Possible Extensions and Cut-off Events
A branching process β of a Petri net system Σ is complete if for every reachable marking M
there exists a configuration C in β such that:
• Mark(C) = M , i.e., M is represented in β;
• ∀t ∈ T in Σ enabled by M , there exists a configuration C ∪ {e} in β such that e 6∈ C and
e is labelled by t.
The unfolding of a Petri net system is always complete. A complete prefix of the unfolding
contains as much information as the unfolding, in the sense that one can construct the un-
folding from it. However, the unfolding of a Petri net system, as well as its complete prefix
could be infinite whenever the Petri net system has infinite runs, i.e., there exist cycles in the
reachability graph of the Petri net system. To deal with this problem, finite complete prefixes
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of the unfolding of a Petri net system that are sufficient to represent certain information, e.g.,
all reachable markings, or decide a certain behavioural property, e.g., deadlock freeness, are
defined by truncating the unfolding. For this purpose, possible extensions and cut-off events
should be declared first.
Given a configuration C, the fact that C ∪ E is a configuration such that C ∩ E = ∅, denoted
by C⊕E, is an extension of C, and E is a suffix to C. A possible extension of a branching process
β of a Petri net system Σ is a pair (t,X), where t ∈ T in Σ, and X ⊆ B is a co-set in ON of β
such that:
• h(X) = •t;
• (t,X) is not a part of β.
A partial order ≺ on the finite configurations of the unfolding of a Petri net system is an ade-
quate order if:
• ≺ is well-founded, i.e., it has no infinite descending chains;
• C1 ⊂ C2 implies C1 ≺ C2;
• ≺ is preserved by finite extensions, i.e., if C1 ≺ C2 and Mark(C1) = Mark(C2), then the
isomorphism f 1 satisfies C1 ⊕ E ≺ C2 ⊕ f(E) for all finite extension C1 ⊕ E of C1.
Let β be a branching process and ≺ be an adequate partial order on the configuration of β. An
event e is a cut-off event (with respect to ≺) if β contains a local configuration [e′] such that:
• Mark([e]) = Mark([e′]);
• [e′] ≺ [e].
7.2.1.7 McMillan’s Unfolding Algorithm
In [118] McMillan introduced an unfolding algorithm as follows:
1. For each of the initial tokens, make a copy of the place on which it resides in the occur-
rence net (label the copies appropriately).
1f is a mapping from the finite extensions of C1 onto the finite extensions of C2; the image of C1 ⊕ E under
this mapping is C2 ⊕ f(E).
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FIGURE 7.2: A Petri net system Σ1
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FIGURE 7.3: The unfolding of Σ1
2. Choose a transition from the Petri net and call it t.
3. For each place in the preset of t, find a copy in the occurrence net and mark it with a
token (if one cannot find a copy, go back to step 2). For a given t, do not choose the same
subset of places in the occurrence net twice.
4. If any of the places you marked are not concurrent, go to step 2.
5. Make a copy of t in the occurrence net and call it t′. Draw an arrow from every place
you marked in the occurrence net to t′. Erase the tokens.
6. For each place in the postset of t, make a copy in the occurrence net (label the copies
appropriately) and draw an arrow from t′ to it.
An example of applying McMillan’s unfolding algorithm is shown in Figure 7.2 and Fig-
ure 7.3. Figure 7.2 is a Petri net system Σ and Figure 7.3 is the initial part of the unfolding of
Σ, which is infinite. Because conditions b3 and b4 are not concurrent, i.e., conflict, the input of
the event e3 should be conditions b1 and b4 instead of conditions b3 and b4 according to step 4.
However, the process of unfolding a Petri net with the algorithm presented above could be
infinite. McMillan thus adds one more step between steps 4 and 5 to generate truncated un-
folding of the Petri net later on:
4.5. Make a copy of t in the occurrence net and call it t′. If t′ is a cut-off event, go to step 2.
It is easy to observe that events e3 and e4 are cut-off events in Figure 7.3.
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FIGURE 7.4: A Petri net system Σ2
A more complicate example of unfolding a Petri net system is shown in Figure 7.4 and Fig-
ure 7.5. In Figure 7.5, set {e1, e3, e4, e6} is a configuration, while set {e1, e4} (not causally
closed) and {e1, e2} (not conflict-free) are not. Let C = {e1, e3, e4, e6}, then Cut(C) = {b10, b7}
and Mark(C) = h(Cut(C)) = {p1, p7}. A configuration of an unfolding could have multi-
ple linearisations , and each linearisation is a firing sequence of the occurrence net (from the
default initial marking) containing each event from the configuration exactly once, and no
further events. All linearisations of a configuration lead to the same reachable marking. The
configuration {e1, e3, e4, e6} has two linearisations e1 e3 e4 e6 and e3 e1 e4 e6. All these two lin-
earisations lead to the reachable marking {p1, p7}. Since Mark([e16]) = Mark([e4]) = {p6, p7}
and [e4] ≺ [e16], e16 is a cut-off event, and so do e17, e18, e19.
McMillan’s algorithm of constructing a truncated unfolding, a finite fragment of the unfold-
ing which is sufficient to represent all the reachable markings. In [119], based on the fact
that the truncated unfolding, called finite complete prefix here, generated from McMillan’s
algorithm may be much larger than necessary (exponentially larger in the worst case), the
authors provide a refinement of McMillan’s algorithm which generates a minimal complete
prefix. This prefix is always smaller than or as large as the prefix generated with McMillan’s
algorithm. The refinement of McMillan’s algorithm is based on the semantics of adequate total
order while McMillan’s algorithm belongs to adequate partial order [119]. Nevertheless, we use
McMillan’s algorithm in this thesis for convenience sake, so the details of the refinement of
McMillan’s algorithm will not be discussed here.
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FIGURE 7.5: The unfolding of Σ2
7.2.2 Unfoldings of Coloured Petri Nets
This thesis suggests to modularise large-scale systems with the hierarchical structuring mech-
anism of CP-nets, which are high-level Petri nets. Therefore, unfolding high-level Petri nets
with hierarchical structure is a realistic issue for investigating the behavioural properties of
high-level Petri net models. In [74], the authors proposed an approach to build a finite com-
plete prefix directly from a high-level Petri net, avoiding potentially expensive translation
into a low-level one. As the high-level Petri net model, the M-nets [72] is adopted by the
authors. The approach is conservative in the sense that all the verification tools employing
the traditional unfolding can be reused with prefixes derived directly from high-level Petri
nets. Besides, In [39], the author has defined branching processes of CP-nets based on the
definition of branching processes and unfolding of high-level Petri nets presented in [74] and
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[138]. In addition, he discusses the two ways of unfolding CP-nets: unfolding per transfor-
mation and direct unfolding using McMillan’s unfolding algorithm [118]. However, one of
the restrictions he raised in his approach is that it is restricted to non-hierarchical CP-nets. To
unfold a high-level Petri net with hierarchical structure, a extension of [39] is achieved in the
following by unfolding a hierarchical CP-net.
7.2.2.1 Unfoldings of Non-hierarchical CP-nets
Based on the unfolding theory of low-level Petri nets as discussed above, it is easy to get the
idea of unfolding CP-nets as the following: first transform the CP-nets into low-level Petri
nets; and then unfold the transformed low-level Petri nets, which could be done by employ-
ing e.g. McMillan’s algorithm (see [118]) or the improved algorithm in [119]. The rules for
transforming CP-nets into low-level Petri nets are presented in [39]. However, there are some
drawbacks to unfold a CP-net by transforming into a low-level Petri net according to the
mentioned rules. On the one hand, it is impossible to transform a CP-net with infinite sets
of colours. On the other hand, the transformation may generate a large number of low-level
Petri net places and transitions, that will never get marked and never get enabled. This leads
to a huge intermediate low-level Petri net. Considering these issues, Januzaj [39] proposed an
approach of unfolding a non-hierarchical CP-net Ω = (P, T,A,Σ, V, C,G,E, I) directly with-
out transforming into intermediate low-level Petri nets using McMillan’s unfolding algorithm
as following:
1. Transform each token element (p, c) 2 of the current marking into a condition b and label
it with (p, c);
2. Choose a transition t;
3. For each place p ∈• t, find all possible copies of p in the occurrence net, i.e., all conditions
b labelled by (p, c), and mark them with c. If no such copy can be found, go to step 2.
Note that for a chosen t, do not choose the same subset of places in the occurrence net
twice.
4. For each possible binding bp of B(t) 3, regarding the current marking, create a binding
element (t, tp) and apply the following:
4.1. transform (t, tp) into an event e and label it with t;
2A token element is a pair (p, c), where p is a place and c ∈ C(p) is a colour which may reside on p [15].
3B(t) represents the set of all bindings of t.
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4.2. for each M(p), p ∈ t•, generated after the occurrence of the actual binding element
(t, bp), apply step 1;
4.3. connect e to its preset and postset accordingly 4.
5. Go to step 2.
Additionally, the definition of branching processes of CP-nets is also presented in [39] as
follows.
A homomorphism from a occurrence netON = (B,E, F ) to a CP-net Ω is a mapping h : B∪E →
TE ∪BE such that:
• h(B) ⊆ TE and h(E) ⊆ BE, i.e., conditions are mapped to token elements and events
are mapped to binding elements;
• ∀e ∈ E, h(•e)MS = •h(e) and h(e•)MS = h(e)•, i.e., the environments of binding elements
are preserved;
• h(Min(ON))MS = M0, i.e., minimal conditions are mapped to the initial marking;
• ∀e1, e2 ∈ E, if •e1 = •e2 and h(e1) = h(e2), then e1 = e2, i.e., there is no redundancy.
A branching process of a CP-net Ω is a pair β = (ON, h) such that ON is an occurrence net and
h is a homomorphism from ON to Ω.
Besides, the possible extensions of branching process of CP-nets is defined in [39]:
A possible extension of a branching process β = (ON, h) of a CP-net Ω is a pair ((t, b), X), where
X is a co-set in β and (t, b) ∈ BE(t) is an enabled binding element such that:
• h(XMS) = •t;
• ((t, b), X) is not a part of β.
7.2.2.2 Unfoldings of Hierarchical CP-nets
Januzaj’s approach is restricted to non-hierarchical CP-nets. To extend his approach to hier-
archical CP-nets, some basic concepts required are presented in the following based on [15]:
4It is very important to note that each binding element (t, b) must satisfy the guard G(t), and the preset of
each event e must be a co-set, otherwise e should not be generated.
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The concept of modules in CP-nets is based on a hierarchical structuring mechanism. A mod-
ule exchanges tokens with its environment (i.e., the other modules) through interfaces, which
are places that represent input ports, output ports or input/output ports. the module will import
tokens via the input port and export tokens via the output port. An input/output port is a
port through which a module can both import and export tokens.
In CP-nets, a module is usually represented by a substitution transition in its superior hierar-
chical level. A substitution transition has a rectangular substitution tag positioned next to
it. The substitution tag contains the name of a submodule which is related to the substitution
transition.The input places of substitution transitions are called input sockets, and the out-
put places are called output sockets. The socket places of a substitution transition constitute
the interface of the substitution transition. To obtain a complete hierarchical model, it must
be specified how the interface of each submodule is related to the interface of its substitu-
tion transition. This is done by means of a port-relation, which relates the port places of the
submodule to the socket places of the substitution transition. Input ports are related to in-
put sockets, output ports to output sockets, and input/output ports to input/output sockets.
When a port and a socket are related, the two places constitute two different views of a single
place. This means that related port and socket places always share the same marking and
hence conceptually become a single compound place. If a port place does not have an initial
marking expression, then it obtains its initial marking from the related socket place.
It has been shown in previous paragraph how modules can exchange tokens via port and
socket places. It is also possible for modules to exchange tokens via fusion sets. Fusion sets
allow places in different modules to be glued together into one compound place across the
hierarchical structure of the model. The places that are members of a fusion set are called
fusion places and represent a single compound place, in a way similar to that for a related port
and socket place. This means that all instances of all places in a fusion set always share the
same marking and that they must have identical colour sets and initial markings.
Unfolding via Transformation. Since it is valid to substitute a substitution transition with its
related submodule, a hierarchical CP-net can always be transformed 5 into an equivalent non-
hierarchical CP-net with the same behaviour using a process presented in [15]. This process
consists of three following steps:
1. Replace each substitution transition with the content of its associated submodule such
that related port and socket places are merged into a single place;
5In [15] the word “unfold” is used. Anyway, “unfold” has another specific meaning in this paper, so here we
use “transform” instead.
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2. Collect the content of all resulting prime modules into a single module. Note that prime
modules are the roots of the module hierarchy;
3. Merge the places in each fusion set into a single place.
After transforming the hierarchical CP-nets into non-hierarchical ones, Januzaj’s approach
of unfolding CP-nets, either unfold via intermediate low-level Petri nets or direct unfolding,
can be adopted. Nevertheless, this method would lead to a large non-hierarchical CP-net,
which is the exact model we are trying to avoid by constructing hierarchical CP-net. And
an even larger intermediate low-level Petri net model could be yielded if one transforms the
transformed non-hierarchical CP-net into low-level Petri nets. Thus obtaining the unfolding
of a hierarchical CP-net directly from hierarchical CP-nets is desirable.
Direct Unfolding. On the basis of the approach of unfolding non-hierarchical CP-nets di-
rectly from their high-level state presented in [39], an extended approach that unfold a hi-
erarchical CP-net ΩH = (S, SM,PS, FS) 6 directly from its hierarchical state is proposed as
following:
1. Transform each token element (p, c) of the current marking of the current module s ∈ S
(normally begin with the top abstraction level of the CP-net) into a condition b and label
it with (p, c);
2. Choose an ordinary transition t in current module. If there is no such transition t in the
current module that can be chosen regarding that for a chosen t, do not choose the same
subset of places in the occurrence net twice, then choose a substitution transition tsub,
and go to step 6, otherwise end;
3. For each place p ∈ •t, find all possible copies of p in the occurrence net, i.e., all conditions
b labelled by (p, c). If no such copy can be found, go to step 2. Notice that for a chosen
t, do not choose the same subset of places in the occurrence net twice.
4. For each possible binding bp of B(t) , regarding the current marking, create a binding
element (t, tp) and apply the following:
4.1. transform (t, tp) into an event e and label it with t;
4.2. for each M(p), p ∈ t•, generated after the occurrence of the actual binding element
(t, bp), apply step 1;
6This formal definition is defined in [15] where S is a finite set of modules; SM : Tsub → S is a submodule
function that assigns a submodule to each substitution transition; PS is a port-socket relation function that
assigns a port-socket relation PS(t) ⊆ Psock(t) × PSM(t)port to each substitution transition t; FS ⊆ 2P is set of
non-empty fusion sets. More details can be found in [15].
7.2 Reachability Analysis Based on Net Unfoldings 111
4.3. connect e to its preset and postset accordingly ;
5. Go to step 2;
6. Unfold a submodule ssub ∈ S assigned to the substitution transition tsub:
6.1. For each input socket pinSock of the submodule ssub, find all possible conditions
b labelled by (pinSock, c) in the occurrence net; for each fusion place pfs, find the
condition b labelled by (pfs′ , c) in the occurrence net, where pfs′ is a member of the
fusion set fs ∈ FS that pfs belongs to (similar to step 1);
6.2. Choose an ordinary transition t in submodule ssub. If there is no such transition t
in the current module can be chosen regarding that for a chosen t, do not choose
the same subset of places in the occurrence net twice, go to step 7;
6.3. For each place p ∈ •t, find all possible copies of p in the occurrence net, i.e., all
conditions b labelled by (p, c). If no such copy can be found, go to step 6.2. Notice
that for a chosen t, do not choose the same subset of places in the occurrence net
twice;
6.4. For each possible binding bp of B(t), regarding the current marking, create a bind-
ing element (t, tp) and apply the following:
6.4.1. transform (t, tp) into an event e and label it with t;
6.4.2. for each M(p), p ∈ t•, generated after the occurrence of the actual binding ele-
ment (t, bp), apply step 1;
6.4.3. connect e to its preset and postset accordingly;
6.5. Go to step 6.2;
7. For each output socket poutSock of the submodule ssub, find all possible conditions b la-
belled by (poutSock, c) in the occurrence net; for each fusion place pfs, find the condition
b labelled by (pfs′ , c) in the occurrence net, where pfs′ is a member of the fusion set
fs ∈ FS that pfs belongs to;
8. Go to step 2.
Remark 7.1. The unfolding approach described above assumes that the hierarchical CP-net has
only two abstraction levels. Anyway, a hierarchical CP-net with more than two abstraction
levels could be unfolded easily by adapting this approach. In addition, the process from step
1 to step 5 is an approach of unfolding non-hierarchical CP-nets.
To exemplify the described approach, a hierarchical CP-net, whose top page is depicted in
Figure 7.6 and its submodule assigned to the substitution transition Tsub is shown in Fig-
ure 7.7, is unfolded. Declaration for the type of the places could limit the reachable markings
to finite. This is also could be done by adding guards to corresponding transitions.
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FIGURE 7.8: Unfolding of the hierarchical CP-net
Figure 7.8 illustrates the unfolding of the hierarchical CP-net showing in Figure 7.6 and Fig-
ure 7.7. Firstly, the initial part of the unfolding from condition b1 to b5 could be generated
according to step 1 to step 5; secondly, the part of the unfolding from condition b3 to b13,
which is related to the substitution transition Tsub, is constructed based on step 6 and step 7;
thirdly, the remaining part could be finished according to step 8 which leads to step 2. So it
is a cyclic process of unfolding a hierarchical CP-net no matter how many abstraction level
the CP-net has (In this case, there are only two abstraction levels.). Figure 7.8 just shows a
initial part (finite prefix) of the unfolding due to saving space, even though the unfolding of
the given CP-net is finite.
In fact, this is a up-down-up approach with respect to the order of unfolding the abstraction
levels of the hierarchical CP-nets. Our approach adopts McMillan’s unfolding algorithm as it
is based on Januzaj’s approach, which uses McMillan’s unfolding algorithm.
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7.2.3 Reachability Analysis for 1-safe Petri Nets
7.2.3.1 Reachability Problems
A markingM of a 1-safe Petri net is a mapping P → {0, 1}, i.e., ∀p ∈ P,M(p) = 0 orM(p) = 1.
To describe a marking that is about to be checked, the concept of partial marking is introduced
for 1-safe Petri nets in [132].
Definition 7.2 (Partial Marking). A partial marking Mpar of a 1-safe net system is a mapping
Mpar : (P
1
par ∪ P 0par) 7→ {0, 1}, where P 1par, P 0par ⊆ P and ∀p ∈ P 1par : Mpar(p) = 1 and ∀p ∈ P 0par :
Mpar(p) = 0. A partial marking is identified with the tuple P ′par = (P 1par, P 0par).
On the basis of the concept of partial marking, the authors of [132] gave a description for the
reachability problem for 1-safe Petri nets (called REACHABILITY PROBLEM II in this work) as
follows.
Definition 7.3 (REACHABILITY PROBLEM II). Given a 1-safe Petri net system Σ = (P, T, F,M0)
and a partial marking P ′par = (P 1par, P 0par), determine whether there is a marking M reachable
from M0 (i.e. ∃σ : M0 σ−→M ) such that ∀p ∈ (P 1par ∪ P 0par) : M(p) = Mpar(p).
When we determine whether there is a marking reachable from the initial marking such that
a set of places are marked without considering places that should not carry a token, then
REACHABILITY PROBLEM II can be simplified as REACHABILITY PROBLEM I.
Definition 7.4 (REACHABILITY PROBLEM I). Given a 1-safe Petri net system Σ = (P, T, F,M0)
and a partial marking P ′par = (P 1par, ∅), determine whether there is a marking M reachable
from M0 (i.e. ∃σ : M0 σ−→M ) such that ∀p ∈ P 1par : M(p) = Mpar(p).
In [139], REACHABILITY PROBLEM I is also expressed without using the concept of partial
marking as follows.
Definition 7.5 (REACHABILITY PROBLEM I). Given a 1-safe Petri net system Σ = (P, T, F,M0)
and a subset P ′ ⊆ P , determine whether there is a marking M reachable from M0 (i.e. ∃σ :
M0
σ−→M ) such that ∀p ∈ P ′,M(p) = 1.
As discussed previously, a configuration C of the complete prefix βΣ of the unfolding of a 1-
safe Petri net system Σ is associated with a unique reachable marking, denoted by Mark(C),
which define a set of places such that ∀p ∈Mark(C),M(p) = 1 and ∀p 6∈Mark(C),M(p) = 0.
Thus the analysis for REACHABILITY PROBLEM II can be reduced to solve REACHABILITY
PROBLEM I based on [139] as follows.
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Proposition 7.6. Let βΣ be a complete prefix of the unfolding of a Petri net system Σ = (P, T, F,M0).
A marking M is reachable in Σ iff βΣ contains a configuration C such that Mark(C) = M .
Proof. Suppose that βΣ = (ON, h) contains a configuration C, then Mark(C) = h(Cut(C)) =
h((Min(ON)∪C•) \• C) is a reachable marking (according to the definitions of configuration
and cut). If Mark(C) = M , then the marking M is reachable in Σ. If a marking M is reachable
in Σ, then there exists a firing sequence that leads the marking from M0 to M . The mapping
of this firing sequence to the complete prefix of the unfolding of the Petri net system βΣ is a
configuration C such that Mark(C) = M (according to the construction process of βΣ and the
definition of configuration).
Corollary 7.7. Let Σ = (P, T, F,M0) be a 1-safe Petri net system, P ′par = (P 1par, ∅) a partial marking,
and βΣ a complete prefix of the unfolding of Σ. Then the partial marking P ′par is reachable in Σ iff βΣ
contains a configuration C such that Mark(C) = P ′par, and each linearisation of the configuration C
is a solution.
Proof. This corollary directly follows Proposition 7.6 and the definition of linearisation of
configurations.
7.2.3.2 On-the-fly Verification
To solve the reachability problems, On-the-fly verification was first suggested by McMillan
[117] and further discussed e.g., in [132] and [139]. A new transition tR is added to the orig-
inal Petri net, whose preset is the set of places that are (or are not) wished to be marked
simultaneously, i.e. •tR = {p1, · · · , pn}, and then construct the complete prefix of the unfold-
ing of the new net. If the complete prefix contains any instance of this new transition, i.e.
h(e) = tR, the given marking is reachable, otherwise not.
Proposition 7.8 (On-the-fly Verification). Given a 1-safe Petri net system Σ = (P, T, F,M0), and
a partial marking P ′par = (P 1par, ∅). Let ΣR = (P, T ∪ tR, F
⋃
p∈P ′par(p, tR) ∪ (tR, p),M0), then:
• P ′par is reachable in Σ;
• ⇔ there exists an event e in the complete prefix of the unfolding of ΣR such that h(e) = tR.
Proof. If there exists an event e in the complete prefix of the unfolding of ΣR such that h(e) =
tR, then there exists a marking M reachable from M0 in the Petri net system Σ such that
tR is enabled. So the set of places •tR = P 1par are able to be marked simultaneously which
means P ′par is reachable in Σ. Suppose that P ′par is reachable in Σ, then the transition tR such
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that •tR = P 1par is enabled under this marking. According to the construction process of the
complete prefix of the unfolding of a Petri net system, an event corresponding to a transition
that is enabled under a reachable marking can always be found in the the complete prefix of
the unfolding. Therefore, there exists an event e in the complete prefix of the unfolding of ΣR
such that h(e) = tR.
7.2.4 Reachability Analysis for Coloured Petri Nets
7.2.4.1 Reachability Problems
Based on the presented knowledges of unfoldings of CP-nets, it is possible to extend the
theory of reachability analysis for 1-safe Petri nets to Coloured Petri Nets. For this purpose,
the concept of partial marking and reachability problem for CP-nets are defined.
For CP-nets, a marking is a function M that maps each place p ∈ P into a multiset of tokens
M(p) ∈ C(p)MS . M(p)(c) denotes the number of appearance of colour c in the multiset M(p),
i.e. the number of c-tokens on the place p.
Definition 7.9 (Partial Marking). A partial marking MΩpar of a non-hierarchical CP-net Ω =
(P, T,A,Σ, V, C,G,E, I) is a mapping MΩpar : (P 1par ∪ P 0par) 7→ {M(p) ∈ C(p)MS, ∅MS}, where
P 1par, P
0
par ⊆ P and ∀p ∈ P 1par : MΩpar(p) = M(p) ∈ C(p)MS and ∀p ∈ P 0par : MΩpar(p) = ∅MS . A
partial marking is identified with the tuple P ′par = (P 1par, P 0par).
Definition 7.10 (REACHABILITY PROBLEM II). Given a non-hierarchical CP-net Ω = (P, T,A,Σ,
V, C,G,E, I) and a partial marking P ′par = (P 1par, P 0par), determine whether there is a marking
M reachable from M07 (i.e. ∃σ : M0 σ−→M ) such that ∀p ∈ (P 1par ∪ P 0par) : M(p) = MΩpar(p).
Using the unfolding based techniques to solve reachability problems, as discussed, REACH-
ABILITY PROBLEM II can be simplified as REACHABILITY PROBLEM I.
Definition 7.11 (REACHABILITY PROBLEM I). Given a non-hierarchical CP-net Ω = (P, T,A,Σ,
V, C,G,E, I) and a partial marking P ′par = (P 1par, ∅), determine whether there is a marking M
reachable from M0 (i.e. ∃σ : M0 σ−→M ) such that ∀p ∈ P 1par : M(p) = MΩpar(p).
The marking of a place of a CP-net is a multiset of tokens M(p) and each token element (p, c)
is mapped to a condition in the occurrence net, the number of conditions in the occurrence
net that labelled with (p, c) is equal to M(p)(c). Therefore the following conclusion can be
drawn.
7The initial marking M0 is defined by M0(p) = I(p)〈〉 for all p ∈ P .
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Proposition 7.12. Let Ω = (P, T,A,Σ, V, C,G,E, I) be a non-hierarchical CP-net, P ′par = (P 1par, ∅)
a partial marking, and βΩ = ((B,E, F ), h) a complete prefix of the unfolding of Ω. Then the partial
marking P ′par is reachable in Ω iff ∀p ∈ P ′par,M(p)(c) = n where c ∈ C(p)MS , βΩ contains a config-
uration Con such that b1, · · · bn ∈ B, h(b1) = · · · = h(bn) ∈ Mark(Con)8, and each linearisation of
the configuration Con is a solution.
Proof. See the proof of Corollary 7.7.
7.2.4.2 On-the-fly Verification
Proposition 7.13 (On-the-fly Verification). Given a non-hierarchical CP-net Ω = (P, T,A,Σ, V, C,
G,E, I), and a partial marking P ′par = (P 1par, ∅). Let ΩR = (P, T∪tR, A
⋃
p∈P ′par(p, tR)∪(tR, p),Σ, V ∪
V ar(tR), C,G ∪G(tR), E
⋃
p∈P ′par E(p, tR) ∪ E(tR, p), I), then:
• P ′par is reachable in Ω;
• ⇔ there exists an event e in the complete prefix of the unfolding of ΩR such that h(e) = tR.
Proof. See the proof of Proposition 7.8.
Remark 7.14. The reachability analysis for hierarchical CP-nets is similar to the analysis for the
non-hierarchical ones except that whether a hierarchical or non-hierarchical CP-net is needed
to be unfolded.
7.3 Application Example
There are two main subsystems in the SatZB: on-board subsystem and traffic control cen-
tre. Both CPN models of these two subsystems are hierarchically modelled. For reachability
properties, analysing the entire system of SatZB model is too complicate because of the mas-
sive concurrent events in both subsystems. Besides, as a distributed system, the interactions
between different subsystems of SatZB are of interest on the viewpoint of train control oper-
ation. Hence the reachability analysis for the entire system can be done by investigating the
reachability properties of each subsystem model with respect to the standard interfaces.
In this section, we present examples how to verify the following verification tasks identified
in chapter 4 by reachability analysis based on net unfoldings: (1)the on-board module can switch
8Con is used here to represent a configuration instead of C, since C represent the colour set of a CP-net in
this section.
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its activated scenario net to the net OB SN Emergency Stop from any other nets (except for the
nets OB SN Initialisation, OB SN Registration and OB SN Logout); (2)the on-board
module can not activate two or more than two scenario nets at the same time.
7.3.1 Initialisation for the On-board Module
Recall the on-board module developed in chapter 3 (Figure 3.13). Places LOCATION and
OB REV MSG are input channels and the markings (tokens) of these places represent messages
that can be received by the on-board module but not yet received. Places OB SEND MSG,
LOC POWER and BRAKE ACT are output channels and the markings of these places represent
messages or signals that are about to be sent out by the on-board module but not yet sent out.
Places OB MAP and MMI DATA are input/output channels that can both receive and send data.
Nevertheless, place OB MAP in this case is used as a resource and whose marking will never
be changed, and place MMI DATA is used only to deliver display data to the driver without
considering getting input data from the driver through it.
The reachability properties of a system depends on its initial state and a component of a sys-
tem is initialised by putting data on its input channels, therefore the input channels (places)
of the on-board module should be initialised (marked). The input of the on-board mod-
ule comes from the modules LOCALISATION UNIT and CENTRE in the SatZB model. For
the purpose of generating input data for the on-board module, a module represented by
the substitution transition LOCALISATION OUT and a module represented by the substitu-
tion transition TCC OUT are added to the input channels (see Figure 7.9. The submodule
LOCALISATION OUT, shown in Figure 7.10, generates the possible location data for the on-
board module. The submodule TCC OUT, shown in Figure 7.11, produces all possible com-
mands (messages) that are sent to the on-board module. Place OB MAP is marked with a
multiset representing the route map.
To verify the first verification task (e.g., the on-board module can switch its activated scenario
net to the net OB SN Emergency Stop from the net OB SN Running), we can assume that
1. only one location data ((“29, UP”)) and one command ({TRAINID = 123,MSGID =
“mt4”, TSTAMP = 3, DATA = “EMERGENCY STOP”}) are possible for the on-
board module and
2. the currently activated scenario net of the on-board module is OB SN Running.
In order to represent the assumption 2, the place Run Flag in Figure 3.13 is initialised
by the multiset 1′true, which implies that the scenario net OB SN Running is activated at
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ON_BOARD
ONBOARDL2
LOC_POWER
LOCPOWER
OB_REV_MSG
TELEGRAM
OB_SEND_MSG
SEQTEL
MMI_DATA
MMIDATA
BRAKE_ACT
BRAKEACT
OB_MAP
1`{sequence = 1, ID1=1,LAT1="3599679.5513",LONG1="5797738.8174",HEIGHT1="78.4",LAT2="3599702.1687",LONG2="5797719.8690",HEIGHT2="78.4",MILEAGE1="0",LENGTH12="29"}++
1`{sequence = 2, ID1=0,LAT1="3599702.1687",LONG1="5797719.8690",HEIGHT1="78.4",LAT2="3599734.9683",LONG2="5797687.2684",HEIGHT2="77.5",MILEAGE1="29",LENGTH12="46"}++
1`{sequence = 3, ID1=0,LAT1="3599734.9683",LONG1="5797687.2684",HEIGHT1="77.5",LAT2="3599766.9168",LONG2="5797659.6596",HEIGHT2="76.7",MILEAGE1="75",LENGTH12="42"}++
1`{sequence = 4, ID1=2,LAT1="3599766.9168",LONG1="5797659.6596",HEIGHT1="76.7",LAT2="3599797.6459",LONG2="5797634.4381",HEIGHT2="76.5",MILEAGE1="117",LENGTH12="39"}++
1`{sequence = 5, ID1=0,LAT1="3599797.6459",LONG1="5797634.4381",HEIGHT1="76.5",LAT2="3599824.5652",LONG2="5797610.9022",HEIGHT2="76.4",MILEAGE1="157",LENGTH12="35"}++
1`{sequence = 6, ID1=3,LAT1="3599824.5652",LONG1="5797610.9022",HEIGHT1="76.4",LAT2="3599858.0133",LONG2="5797582.3040",HEIGHT2="76.5",MILEAGE1="193",LENGTH12="44"}++
1`{sequence = 7, ID1=0,LAT1="3599858.0133",LONG1="5797582.3040",HEIGHT1="76.5",LAT2="3599887.8692",LONG2="5797555.8781",HEIGHT2="76.7",MILEAGE1="237",LENGTH12="39"}++
1`{sequence = 8, ID1=4,LAT1="3599887.8692",LONG1="5797555.8781",HEIGHT1="76.7",LAT2="3599920.0571",LONG2="5797530.5756",HEIGHT2="76.7",MILEAGE1="277",LENGTH12="40"}++
1`{sequence = 9, ID1=0,LAT1="3599920.0571",LONG1="5797530.5756",HEIGHT1="76.7",LAT2="3599946.0076",LONG2="5797507.7627",HEIGHT2="77.2",MILEAGE1="318",LENGTH12="34"}++
1`{sequence = 10, ID1=5,LAT1="3599946.0076",LONG1="5797507.7627",HEIGHT1="77.2",LAT2="3599946.0076",LONG2="5797507.7627",HEIGHT2="77.2",MILEAGE1="352",LENGTH12="0"}
MAPDATA
LOCATION
LOCATION
LOCALISATION_OUT
LOCALISATION_OUT
TCC_OUT
TCC_OUT
FIGURE 7.9: The on-board module with input modules
LOCATIONLOCATION
1`("29",UP)
loc loc
Send LOCATION
Out
Location
Data
FIGURE 7.10: Submodule LOCALISATION OUT
Send
TELEGRAM
1`{TRAINID=123,MSGID="mt4",
TSTAMP=3,DATA="EMERGENCY STOP"}
Commands OB_REV_MSG
Out
msgmsg
TELEGRAM
FIGURE 7.11: Submodule TCC OUT
present. This means that data processing in the scenario nets OB SN Initialisation and
OB SN Registration has been accomplished. Therefore, fusion places Section Points,
MA Points and Logout Points in Figure 3.17 are marked with multisets that produced
during the initialisation process on the net OB SN Initialisation. Places MA Request
and Logout Request are initialised by constant multisets that are used to generate MA
request and logout request, respectively.
7.3.2 Unfold the On-board Module
Apart from establishing CPN models, CPN Tools is also adequate for manually drawing the
unfolding of a CPN model. Places represent conditions and transitions represent events of
the unfolding. For convenience, a pair of a place’s name and its marking indicates a token
element. The name of a transition implies the net that it belongs to.
According to the procedures of direct unfolding for hierarchical CP-nets presented in this
chapter, the unfolding of the on-board module with the given assumption is illustrated in
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Figure 7.12. There are five token elements in the initial marking corresponding to condi-
tions b1, b2, b3, b4 and b5. Event e4 is a cut-off event. Note that for saving space, (1) the mark-
ings of places Section Points, MA Points, Logout Points, MA Request and Logout
Request are omitted because they are connected to the transition with double directed (test)
arcs, which means these markings are invariant.(2) the transition Add SeqNum in Figure 3.13
is also omitted. (3) assuming that once a message is put on the output channels it will be
sent out immediately, then at most one token could be existed on places OB SEND MSG and
MMI DATA.
Note that the transition Add SeqNum in Figure 3.13 is omitted for the reason of saving space
for the unfolding. Since the markings of places Section Points, MA Points, Logout
Points, MA Request and Logout Request are constant, these places can be omitted
while investigate the reachability properties. Assuming that once a message is put on the
output channels it will be sent out immediately, then at most one token could appear on
places OB SEND MSG and MMI DATA.
e1
e2
e3
e4
b5b2b1 b3 b4
b7
b9
b10 b11 b12 b13 b14
b6
b8
OB_REV_MSG
1`{TRAINID=123,MSGID="mt4",
TSTAMP=3,DATA="EMERGENCY STOP"}
RevMsg
1`{TRAINID=123,MSGID="mt4",
TSTAMP=3,DATA="EMERGENCY STOP"}
ES
Flag
1`true
EBrake
1`true
Run
Flag
1`true
Run
Flag
1`true
Cancellation
Ack
1`true
ES 
Cancellation
Request
1`{TRAINID=123,MSGID="mb5",
TSTAMP=2,DATA="REQ_CANCELLATION"}
Cancellation
Ack
1`true
ES 
Cancellation
Request
1`{TRAINID=123,MSGID="mb5",
TSTAMP=2,DATA="REQ_CANCELLATION"}
OB_SEND_MSG
1`{TRAINID=123,MSGID="mb5",
TSTAMP=2,DATA="REQ_CANCELLATION"}
MMI_DATA
1`"train is stopped and ES 
cancellation request has benn sent"
ES
Flag
1`true
OB_SN_Running'
State
Check
Scenario Determination'
ES
Activation
OB_SN_Emergency_Stop'
Send 
Telegram
OB_SN_Emergency_Stop'
Send 
Telegram
LOCATION
1`("29",UP)
FIGURE 7.12: Finite complete prefix of the unfolding of the on-board module
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7.3.3 Reachability Analysis for the On-board Module
The unfolding of a Petri net model encodes all reachable markings, so all reachable markings
of the on-board module under the given initial marking can be investigated with Figure 7.12.
A marking that can be reached from the initial marking of the on-board module is a mapping
of the cut of a configuration.
Verification task: whether the on-board module can switch its activated scenario net to the
net OB SN Emergency Stop from the net OB SN Running.
Expected partial marking: P ′par = ((ES Flag, 1‘true), (EBrake, 1‘true), (OB SEND MSG,
{TRAINID = 123,MSGID = “mb5”, TSTAMP = 2, DATA = “REQ CANCELLATION”}),
(MMI DATA, 1‘train is stopped and ES cancellation request has been sent)). It means that
the activated scenario net has switched from OB SN Running to OB SN Emergency Stop.
Analysis: this is a problem of REACHABILITY PROBLEM I. According to Proposition 7.12, it
is easy to identify a configuration of the prefix Con = {e1, e2, e3} such that Mark(Con) =
P ′par. Therefore, the partial marking P ′par is reachable from the given initial marking, which is
expected. The linearisation e1 e2 e3 is the solution for the reachability problem.
Analysis result: the on-board module can switch its activated scenario net to the net OB SN
Emergency Stop from the net OB SN Running.
Discussion: the verification of the on-board module that whether it can switch its activated
scenario net to the net OB SN Emergency Stop from other nets can be conducted similarly.
7.3.3.1 On-the-fly Verification of the On-board Module
The algorithm used in this thesis for constructing the (finite) complete prefix of the unfolding
is proposed by McMillan [118]. Besides, there is an improved algorithm presented in [119]
based on the total order semantics of Petri nets either than the partial order semantics of Petri
nets that McMillan exploited. Whichever algorithm to be adopted, the generated complete
prefix of the unfolding is much larger than necessary from time to time. Unfolding process
could be stopped when the marking to be checked has already contain in the prefix of the
unfolding. Therefore, the approach of on-the-fly verification is desirable.
Verification task: whether the on-board module can activate two scenario nets at the same
time, for example, whether the activated scenario net(s) of the the on-board module can be
OB SN Running and OB SN Conditional Running simultaneously. For this purpose, the
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initial marking on the place Command in Figure 7.11 needs to be replaced by 1‘{TRAINID =
123,MSGID = “mt3”, TSTAMP = 3, DATA = “CONDITIONAL RUNNING”}.
Unexpected partial marking: P ′′par = (((Run Flag, 1‘true), (CondRun F lag, 1‘true)), ∅). It
represents that scenario nets OB SN Running and OB SN Conditional Running of the on-
baord module are activated simultaneously.
Analysis: according to the theory of on-the-fly verification presented in section 7.2.4.2, the
transition New is added to the scenario net OB SN Running shown in Figure 7.13. The preset
of the transition New are the places Run Flag and CondRun Flag. The unfolding of the
modified on-board module could be shown as in Figure 7.14. Event e4 is a cut-off event. It is
observed that no event in the prefix is mapped to the transition New in the modified on-board
module. Thus, the partial marking P ′′par is not reachable from the given initial marking.
Analysis result: the on-board module can not activate the scenario nets OB SN Running and
OB SN Conditional Running at the same time.
Discussion: other situations (i.e., two or more than two other scenario nets are activated si-
multaneously) can be verified similarly. We can see that if there is no error in the original
Petri net, then a complete prefix of the unfolding of the Petri net is required. In this case, the
on-the-fly verification method is just as efficient as the verification with normal unfolding-
based approach. However, if there are errors in the original Petri net, then verification using
on-the-fly method could be much more efficient in some cases. For example, if the arc from
the place Run Flag to the transition CondRun Activation of the submodule Scenario
Determination in Figure 3.19 is specified with a double directed (test) arc as shown in
Figure 7.15 by mistake, then a (incomplete) prefix of the unfolding of the on-board module
depicted in Figure 7.16 is sufficient to check the partial marking P ′′par. The event e3 in the
prefix is mapped to the transition New in the original module, so the partial marking P ′′par is
reachable. It is observed that the prefix in Figure 7.16 is smaller than the prefix in Figure 7.14.
This kind of size difference of prefixes could be considerable in some extreme cases. There-
fore, the on-the-fly verification approach is especially suitable for checking a marking that is
likely to be reachable.
The state space of the modified on-board module with respect to Figure 7.15 and Figure 7.13
is infinite, because once the place CondRun Flag is marked, the transition Output Data
in the scenario net OB SN Conditional Running (see Figure 3.22) can fire infinitely. In this
circumstance, only a partial sate space can be generated as shown in Figure 7.17, and it took
hours to generate this report. It is thus infeasible to investigate reachability properties by
using state space based techniques in this case.
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if #DATA(msg)="REQ_LOGOUT"
then "logout request has been sent"
else "movement request for section"^ #DATA(msg) ^"has been sent"
(p,d)
(p,d)
(num,str)
sList2
sList2
sList1
sList1
b (p,d)
(p,d)
msg
b
msg
(p,d)
(p',d')b
b
msg
msg msg
msg
msg'
msgSenario 
Determination
Scenario Determination
Location
Report
Location Report
Location
Report 
Generation
not(check(p,sList1)) andalso not(check(p,sList2))
Logout request
Generation
check(p,sList1)
State
Check
MA request
Generation
check(p,sList2)
andalso p=str
input (p,d,b,num,str,sList2,msg);
output (msg',p',d');
action
let
val msg'={TRAINID=(#TRAINID(msg)),
                 MSGID=(#MSGID(msg)),
                 TSTAMP=(#TSTAMP(msg)),
                 DATA=
                           if (d=UP)
                           then (Int.toString(num+1))
                           else if (d=DOWN)
                           then (Int.toString(num-1))
                           else
                           Int.toString(0)
                }
val p'=p
val d'=d
in
(msg',p',d')
end;
Send 
Telegram
ES
Flag
Out
BOOL
BoE
Flag
Out
BOOL
CondRun
Flag
Out
BOOL
Logout
Flag
Out
BOOL
Section
Points
Fusion Section
1`(0,"0")++
1`(1,"29")++
1`(2,"75")++
1`(3,"117")++
1`(4,"157")++
1`(5,"193")++
1`(6,"237")++
1`(7,"277")++
1`(8,"318")
BLOCKPOINT
MA Points
Fusion MA
1`["237","117","75","277","157","29","193","0","318"]
STRINGLIST
Logout
Points
Fusion Logout
1`["352"]
STRINGLIST
Logout
Request
1`{TRAINID=123,MSGID="mb9",
TSTAMP=2,DATA="REQ_LOGOUT"}
TELEGRAM
LocReport
LOCATION
LOCATION
In
LOCATION
Run
Flag
In
BOOL
RevMsg
TELEGRAM
OB_REV_MSG
In
TELEGRAM
Generated
Telegram
TELEGRAM
MA 
Request
1`{TRAINID=123,MSGID="mb1",
TSTAMP=2,DATA=""}
TELEGRAM
OB_SEND_MSG
Out TELEGRAM
MMI_DATA
Out
MMIDATA
b
b
New
P_HIGH
FIGURE 7.13: New scenario net OB SN Running
e1
e2
e3
b3b1 b2
b5b4
b6
b7 b8
e4
OB_REV_MSG
1`{TRAINID=123,MSGID="mt3",
TSTAMP=3,DATA="CONDITIONAL RUNNING"}
RevMsg
1`{TRAINID=123,MSGID="mt3",
TSTAMP=3,DATA="CONDITIONAL RUNNING"}
CondRun
Flag
1`true
Run
Flag
1`true
Run
Flag
1`true
MMI_DATA
1`"conditional running"
CondRun
Flag
1`true
LOCATION
1`("29",UP)
OB_SN_Running'
State
Check
Scenario Determination'
CondRun
Activation
OB_SN_Conditional_Running'
Output
Data
OB_SN_Conditional_Running'
Output
Data
FIGURE 7.14: Finite complete prefix of the unfolding of the modified on-board module with
respect to Figure 7.13
124 7 Reachability Analysis Based on Net Unfoldings
b
b
b
b
b
true
#DATA(msg)
true
true
true
true
true
true
msg
msg
msg
msg
msg
msgmsg
Running
Activation
[#MSGID(msg)="mt1"]
ES
Activation
[#MSGID(msg)="mt4"]
BoE
Activation
[#MSGID(msg)="mt2"]
CondRun
Activation
[#MSGID(msg)="mt3"]
Logout
Activation
[#MSGID(msg)="mt9"]
Error
#MSGID(msg)<>"mt1" andalso
#MSGID(msg)<>"mt2" andalso
#MSGID(msg)<>"mt3" andalso
#MSGID(msg)<>"mt4" andalso
#MSGID(msg)<>"mt9"
Movement
Authority
Fusion mt1
BOOL
EBrake
Fusion EBrake
BOOL
ES
Flag
Out
BOOL
NBrake
Fusion NBrake
BOOL
BoE
Flag
Out
BOOL
Current
Section
Fusion CS
STRING
CondRun
Flag
Out
BOOL
Logout
Flag
Out
BOOL
Error
Record
Fusion Error
TELEGRAM
RevMsg
In
TELEGRAM
Run
Flag
In
BOOL
FIGURE 7.15: Unexpected change for Figure 3.19
b1 b2 b3
b4 b5
e1
e2
e3
b6 b7
OB_REV_MSG
1`{TRAINID=123,MSGID="mt3",
TSTAMP=3,DATA="CONDITIONAL RUNNING"}
RevMsg
1`{TRAINID=123,MSGID="mt3",
TSTAMP=3,DATA="CONDITIONAL RUNNING"}
CondRun
Flag
1`true
Run
Flag
1`true
Run
Flag
1`true
LOCATION
1`("29",UP)
OB_SN_Running'
State
Check
Scenario Determination'
CondRun
Activation
OB_SN_Running'
New
Run
Flag
1`true
FIGURE 7.16: Prefix of the unfolding of the modified on-board module with respect to Fig-
ure 7.15 and Figure 7.13
7.3.4 Complexity of the Unfolding-based Approach
To investigate the reachability property of a component of a distributed system, the inputs of
the component are considered as the initialisations of the component. If the input consists of
more than one port and each port may be filled with different values, then a possible combi-
nation of the filled value of each port is an initialisation. The number of the finite complete
prefix of the unfolding is equal to the number of possible initialisations of the component.
Assume that the number of input port of a component is n and the number of possible value
for each port ism1,m2, · · · ,mn, then the number of the required finite complete prefixes of the
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FIGURE 7.17: Partial state space
unfolding is m1 ·m2 · · ·mn. In the case of the on-board module of SatZB model, there are two
input ports (places LOCATION and OB REV MSG). For the place LOCATION, there are 4 possi-
ble values (i.e., MA point, not MA point, point of entering, point of leaving). For the place
OB REV MSG, 9 values (i.e., mt1,mt2,· · · ,mt9) are possible. So the number of the required
finite complete prefixes of the unfolding is 36.
7.4 Summary
This chapter first gives a general introduction of the existing techniques for investigating
reachability properties of Petri nets. And then we focus on the techniques based on Petri net
unfoldings. After providing the notations and basic definitions of net unfoldings, the formal-
isation of unfolding hierarchical CP-nets based on the approach for non-hierarchical CP-nets
proposed in [39] is presented. To describe a marking that is going to be checked in reachabil-
ity analysis, the concept of partial marking is introduced. In general, reachability problems
could be identified as REACHABILITY PROBLEM I or REACHABILITY PROBLEM II. However,
REACHABILITY PROBLEM II can be substituted by REACHABILITY PROBLEM I when it comes
to solving reachability problems by unfolding-based techniques. In particular, the on-the-
fly verification approach is highlighted for checking a marking that is likely to be reachable.
Otherwise, the complete prefix of the unfolding is required. The unfolding-based approach
of investigating the reachability properties of 1-safe Petri nets are extended to CP-nets in this
chapter. At last, some verification tasks identified in chapter 4 are verified by reachability
analysis based on Petri net unfoldings.
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Personal Contribution. In this chapter, unfolding hierarchical CP-nets based on the approach
for non-hierarchical CP-nets proposed in [39] is introduced and the procedure of directly
unfolding hierarchical CP-nets is formalised. Reachability problems [132], [139] for Petri
nets are extended from 1-safe Petri nets to CP-nets, and distinguished between REACHABIL-
ITY PROBLEM I and REACHABILITY PROBLEM II although REACHABILITY PROBLEM II can
be substituted by REACHABILITY PROBLEM I when one solves reachability problems with
net unfoldings. The formal definitions of partial marking, REACHABILITY PROBLEM II and
REACHABILITY PROBLEM I of non-hierarchical CP-nets as well as the propositions of reacha-
bility analysis for non-hierarchical CP-nets are presented. Reachability analysis based on net
unfoldings is applied to the on-board module of a satellite-based train control system.
Chapter 8
Testing Based on Petri Nets
In this chapter, model-based testing are exploited for testing the the on-board module of
SatZB model established in chapter 3 focusing on verifying the functionality. First, the termi-
nology of testing is introduced. Second, the methodology applied in this chapter is presented.
Third, two test generation techniques based on CPNs and SPENAT (Safe Place Transition
Nets with Attributes) respectively are proposed to generate the test suite. Finally, a compari-
son of the two techniques and a test evaluation are carried out.
8.1 Testing
Testing denotes a set of activities that aim either at showing that actual and intended be-
haviours of a system differ, or at increasing confidence that they do not differ [140]. Testing
plays an important role during the system development, as there should be a specific level
of testing corresponds to each phase of the life-cycle of the system. This is known as the “V”
model of testing, which is depicted in Figure 8.1. Generally, unit testing, integration testing,
system testing and acceptance testing are performed by the programmer on the unit, the de-
velopment team on the integrated system, the test group to verify system requirements, and
a dedicated group (with customers) to verify the user requirements, respectively.
In the European standard EN50126 [22], the objectives of verification and validation are de-
scribed as following: the objective of verification is to demonstrate that, for the specific inputs,
the deliverables of each phase meet in all respects the requirements of that phase; the objec-
tive of validation is to demonstrate that the system under consideration, at any step of its
development and after its installation, meets its requirements in all respects. In other words,
validation is answering the question of “are we building the right thing?” and verification is
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FIGURE 8.1: The “V” model of testing
answering the question of “are we building it right?” In this sense, testing is a verification as
well as a validation technique.
8.1.1 Terminology
The term “test” has a very general meaning covering from unsystematic, not quantifiable
and not reproducible implementations to automatic and systematic testing. Depending on
the complexity of the system under test, the significance of the test terminology is variant.
For example, to test a door whether it can open and close as normal, the requirements and
the expected output are quite clear and simple, so we may implement the test without con-
sidering the terminology. However, if the system under test is a complex system such as a
train control system whose requirements specification is usually relatively abstract (usually
in informal texts), further analysis of the specification down to the quantification of the test
purpose is needed. Besides, testing a complex system normally involves many persons or
teams, e.g., system design and development team on one side and test team on the other side.
Moreover, the persons involved may have different education or training background, which
makes an consistent and error-free communication between these persons vital for the test-
ing. Therefore, defining the terminology of testing has a significant importance to the testing
work. In this section, the terms related to this work are defined.
Test process: a test process consists of the activities which are needed for testing a test object.
On the basis of [41] and [141], a test process can include the sequential activities of test plan-
ning, test specification, test construction, test execution and test evaluation. Each of these activities
is called a test phase.
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Test planning: the activity of establishing or updating a test plan, which is a document de-
scribing the scope, approach, resources and schedule of intended test activities [142]. In par-
ticular, the test strategy and test purpose are defined under the consideration of realising the
test process with affordable cost.
Test strategy: the test strategy specifies the abstraction levels where tests will be executed and
the different systems under test, e.g. units or the complete system [143]. In other words, it
specifies the test object and test level.
Test object: a test object is an object which is under test. This object can be a system or an
implementation, and is called system under test (SUT) and implementation under test (IUT),
respectively. Note that the IUT is usually distinguished from the SUT. An IUT is the imple-
mentation that one wants to test. An SUT is the IUT together with its test context, elements
one does not want to test, but are needed to access the IUT [144]. In this chapter, the on-board
module of SatZB model is considered as the test object (i.e., the IUT).
Test context: a test context consists of things that one does not want to test, but are “in the
way” between the tester and the thing that one wants to test [144]. In this chapter, the module
of localisation unit together with the TCC module is the test context of the on-board module.
Test level: the test level is with correspond to the abstraction level of the testing [141], e.g.,
unit testing, integration testing, system testing and acceptance testing in the “V” model of
testing shown in Figure 8.1. In this chapter, testing for the on-board module could be seen as
a unit testing.
Test purpose: a test purpose is a property one wants to test [144]. For example, “conformance”,
“statement coverage”, “an expected coverage degree of specification” [144], [41]. These prop-
erties can be expressed informally or formally, but in general, they can not be used for testing
a system directly because they specify possibly infinite runs of a system or it is not clear how
to derive test cases. In [145], demonstration, detection, and prevention are identified as three
important test purposes. Demonstration shows the confidence in system functioning. De-
tection finds the defects, errors and system deficiencies of a system. Prevention as a means
of quality management has a magnificent meaning in system development. It can prevent or
reduce the likelihood of errors being made from the very beginning of a system development.
In this chapter, the test purpose of testing the on-board module is to fully cover the functional
requirements specification so as to ensure the quality of the module and show the confidence
in system functioning.
Test specification: the activity of specifying the test selection criterion and test case specification
[141].
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Test selection/coverage criteria: a test selection/coverage criterion defines a method for the se-
lection of test cases (path coverage, state coverage, function coverage, etc.) and a measure
for the definition of the size of the test [146]. In this chapter, the test selection criterion is “all
state sequences” criterion (see chapter 5) relates to the behaviour model of the SUT.
Test case specification: the test case specifications formalise the notion of test selection criteria
and render them operational [147]. For instance, a test selection criterion “state coverage”
would be translated into a test case specification in the form of “reach θ” for all states θ of
the finite state space, concerning possibly further constrains on the length and the number
of the test cases. In [144], a test case specification formally represents a test suite. It must
be well-defined how to derive a test suite from a test case specification. Hence, it requires
knowledge of the intended behaviour (specification or behaviour model) of the SUT. If an
explicit behaviour model (called test model in model-based testing) exists, then the test case
specification can be understood as a selection criterion on the set of model traces. In this
chapter, the test case specification translates the “all state sequences” criterion into “all paths
of the reachability tree” (see chapter 5) with respect to the the behaviour model of the SUT.
Test oracle/reference: the term test oracle is usually used in software testing and software
engineering to determine whether a test has passed or failed. According to [148], a test oracle
is a mechanism using to generate expected results for each test case in order to check the test
results. In [149], a complete oracle have three capabilities and carry them out perfectly:
• a generator, to provide predicted or expected results for each test.
• a comparator, to compare expected and obtained results.
• an evaluator, to determine whether the comparison results are sufficiently close to be a
pass.
In [141], the term test reference used to derive test input before test execution and comparing
test results with the expected results, and therefore has a similar character as test oracle. Test
reference or test oracle could be in the form of concept in mind, specification, model and so
on [141]. In correlation with model-based testing, the term test model is also used, although it
is restricted to model-based testing. In this chapter, the test oracle/reference refers to the test
model.
Test case: a test case is a specification which consists of input and expected output. On the
basis of test reference and test specification, test cases can be derived. The input part of a test
case is call test data [144]. In general, test cases will also include additional information such
as descriptions of execution conditions or applicable configurations. Besides, the term test
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suite is used widely in testing techniques. A test suite is a finite set of test cases [147]. In this
chapter, a test case is a pair consisting of an initial state and a finite firing sequence (message
sequence).
Test construction: the activity of integrating the test object, test context, and test adaptor.
Test adaptor: a test adaptor is a program using to code the test data of a test case for the
SUT, and decode the test output of a test execution. The term test driver also used as test
adaptor in [41]. In this chapter, the adaptation work such as transforming the message “mt1”
into “{TRAINID=123,MSGID=‘mt1’,TSTAMP=3,DATA=‘PERMIT RUNNING’}” is done by
hand.
Test execution: the activity of applying test data to the SUT, monitoring the behaviour of the
SUT, and comparing expected and actual behaviours in order to yield a verdict.
Verdict: a verdict is the result of the comparison of the (actual) output of the SUT with the
expected provided by the test case [144]. In general, a verdict could be pass (the actual output
conforms to the expected output), fail (the actual output does not conform to the expected
output) or inconclusive (the conclusion of conformance cannot be driven).
Test evaluation: the activity of evaluating the tests for requirements coverage and test com-
pleteness [150]. The evaluation of the requirements coverage could be done by assessing the
extent of the SUT exercised, while the test completeness is able to implemented by determin-
ing whether the set of inputs used during the test are a fair representative sample from the
set of all possible inputs to the SUT.
In order to have a overview of the process of testing and related terms presented above,
Figure 8.2 is provided.
8.1.2 Model-based Testing
Normally, testing is to verify the actual behaviour in conformance with the intended be-
haviour of the SUT. The intended behaviour of a system usually relies on the requirements
specification documents, from which a test model for generating test case automatically can
be derived. The idea of model-based testing is to use explicit behaviour models to encode
the intended behaviour [140]. Traces are generated from the model according to the test case
specifications. The traces of these models are interpreted as test cases for the SUT.
Model-based testing is using a model to generate test cases, and then running the test cases
on the SUT. Note that in model-based system development, the SUT is valid to be substituted
by models. The process of model-based testing can be depicted in Figure 8.3.
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8.2 Methodology
Aiming at developing a satellite-based train control system with the model-based and tool-
supported automated code generation approach, we propose two model-based test genera-
tion techniques for verifying the on-board module of SatZB model (test object). By applying
two or even more (model-based) test generation techniques, systematic errors of test genera-
tion could be avoided. If the test cases generated by two different test generation techniques
are essentially the same, then we have the confidence saying that the test models are cor-
rect and the test cases are adequate. Figure 8.4 illustrates the methodology employed in this
chapter. The gray blocks “Model-based Test Generation” in Figure 8.4 is the main task. Based
on the system requirements specification, two test models, i.e., a CPN model and a SPE-
NAT model, respectively are developed in the first place. For the CPN model a reachability
graph is generated by state space analysis, while for the SPENAT model the complete prefix
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of the SPENAT unfolding is constructed with net unfolding techniques. Test cases are then
derived either from the reachability graph using the RT-based method (see chapter 5) or from
the complete prefix of the SPENAT unfolding applying the unfolding-based method (see chap-
ter 5) with the “all state sequences” test coverage criterion. These test cases are occurrence
sequences which can be represented by messages sequences. When they are applied to the
system model as stimuli, the verification and/or validation of the system model by testing
could be implemented.
8.3 Test Generation Based on CPNs
Petri nets are well-known as adequate means of descriptions for distributed systems and the
system behaviour of concurrency. The environment of the on-board subsystem of SatZB, i.e.,
the traffic control centre, is characterised by a concurrency of delivering different commands
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to the on-board subsystem while taking the on-board subsystem as the test object. Thus
(Coloured) Petri nets are feasible to be used for developing the test model.
8.3.1 Test Model
The CPN modelling language supports the specification of hierarchically structured models,
which makes it possible to work with different levels of detail and abstraction.
For system development, the design model is dedicated to the structure and construction of
the system. On the contrary, the test model concentrates the behaviours that are of interest.
The test model is more abstract or “simpler” than the design model since the test model is
usually focus on a specific aspect of the system, by doing which fewer test cases are required.
In this work, the behaviour of scenario net transitions of the on-board module of SatZB model
is under consideration. This is because covering all sequences of scenario net transitions in-
dicates that all scenarios (e.g. Figure 3.6) and possible scenario sequences specified in the
functional requirements specification are covered according to the model construction mech-
anism applied in chapter 3. The transitions of scenario nets of the on-board module has been
illustrated in Figure 3.14. The modules of the test model that represent the operating environ-
ment of the on-board subsystem model encode the behaviours of the modules CENTRE and
LOCALISATION UNIT in Figure 3.12.
8.3.1.1 Top Level
The top level of the test model is shown in Figure 8.5. Modules LocUnit and TCC model
the environment of the test object. Places Location Data, Output Message and Input
Message represent the communication channels between different modules. These com-
munication channels are simplified as one-way channels under the condition that the train
control system is a real-time system, and only one message would be transmitted on a com-
munication channel at the same time. Moreover, we suppose that the communication system
between the on-board subsystem and the traffic control centre is fully reliable.
TCC
TCC
Onboard
Onboard
Input
Message
MSG
Output
Message
MSG
Location
Data
LOCATION
LocUnit
LocUnit
FIGURE 8.5: Top level of the test model
136 8 Testing Based on Petri Nets
8.3.1.2 Second Level
In this level, the behaviour of scenario net transitions illustrated in Figure 3.14 are described.
Submodule Onboard. The main idea of this page is to reflect the interactions between the
on-board subsystem model and its environment illustrated in the sequence diagrams. From
the given interpretation of the sequence diagram in Figure 3.6, we conclude that sending
movement requests and switchovers of scenario nets of the on-board subsystem model are
determined by the received location data from the model of the localisation unit and the mes-
sages from the model of traffic control centre. This is depicted in Figure 8.6. When a location
data is received from the place Location Data, it is compared to the on-board map (tokens
on the place OB Map MA Points), and a specific message (either mb1 or mb5, see Table 3.2)
might be sent out via the place Output Message under the consideration of the marking on
the place Onboard Scenario. The currently activated scenario net of the on-board subsys-
tem model, indicated by the marking on the place Onboard Scenario, is varied depending
on the messages received from the place Input Message. Place Serial Number is used
to synchronise the submodules Onboard and LocUnit, which will be introduced in the fol-
lowing subsections.
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Submodule LocUnit. The location data are the stimuli that trigger the operation of the
designed system model, so the submodule LocUnit focus on putting out location data to
the place Location Data in a desired order and the time interval between two consecutive
data. The order of the output data is controlled by adding an additional indicator (integer
number) on each token. The time interval between two consecutive data is controlled by
using the fusion place Serial Number. According to Figure 8.6 and Figure 8.7, we can see
that only the received message from the module TCC has been processed, the integer number
on the place Serial Number can be increased by one. Then the next location data can be
put out.
n
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GPS Data
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FIGURE 8.7: Page of the submodule LocUnit
Submodule TCC. The task of the submodule TCC is to send commands (e.g., movement au-
thorities) to the submodule Onboard as the model of the traffic control centre does in the
designed system model, but only considering all possible commands in a simple way. In Fig-
ure 8.8, when a movement request mb1 is received by the place Output Message, one of
the following four commands mt1, mt2, mt3, or mt4 (see Table 3.3) could be sent out as
a response via the place Input Message, and which one to be sent is random; if the can-
cellation of emergency stop request mb5 is received, then either mt4 or mt5 will be sent out.
It describes a situation that if more than one command could be sent out (to the on-board
subsystem), then all the possible commands have the same probability to be delivered.
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8.3.2 Test Suite Generation
Test Data. For testing the on-board module of SatZB model, the input data of a test case could
be the location data generated by the submodule LocUnit and/or the commands generated
by the submodule TCC according to Figure 8.6. However, in SatZB model, the generation
of commands in the model of the traffic control centre is triggered by the received requests
that were generated in accordance with the location data. Hence, the commands are seen as
the responses to the reception of location data from the localisation unit. Assuming that the
model of the traffic control centre is fully reliable (in fact, this is easy to be ensured in the test
model, see Figure 8.8), then the input data of a test case for testing the on-board module takes
only the location data into account. The location data represent the location of the train on
the rail track, which is divided into block sections. The operational activities of a train control
system depend on the current location of the train and the current state of the related block
sections. Figure 8.9 shows a sketch of a rail track including three block sections S a,S b and
S c, and there exists a MA point in each block section represented by the sign of triangle.
MA points
Block section borders
...... S_a S_b S_c
FIGURE 8.9: Sketch of a rail track
In this context, the black-box testing techniques Equivalence Partitioning (EP) and Boundary
Value Analysis (BVA) [151] [152] are adopted to generate test data. Equivalence Partitioning is
a testing technique that divides the input data of the SUT into partitions of data from which
test cases can be derived. In principle, test cases are designed to cover each partition at least
once. Equivalence Partitioning is based on the premise that the inputs and outputs of a SUT
can be partitioned into classes that, according to the specification of the SUT, will be treated
similarly by the SUT. Thus the result of testing a single value from an equivalence partition
is considered representative of the complete partition and reducing the total number of test
cases that must be developed. To make sure that the generated test cases are effective enough
for the SUT, the testing technique Boundary Value Analysis is usually used combined with
Equivalence Partitioning to generate test data. Boundary Value Analysis is a testing design
technique in which tests are designed to include representatives of boundary values. Based
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on the premise that developers are prone to making errors in their treatment of the boundaries
of partitions, values on the edge of an equivalence partition or at the smallest value on either
side of an edge should be considered. As a first model of SatZB, we assume that the MA point
of each block section is identical to the border of each block section which is shown in Fig-
ure 8.10. There are five partitions (p1, p2, p3, p4, p5) and four boundaries (b1, b2, b3, b4), which
means nine test data should be derived from these partitions and boundaries. However, for
functional testing of the train control system model, the location data could be sorted into
two categories: location data Pt (e.g., b1, b2, b3, b4) and notPt (e.g., p1, p2, p3, p4, p5), mean-
ing the train is in the position of a MA point and not a MA point, respectively. Therefore, two
test data (i.e., one notPt and one Pt) are sufficient to test the system model. Nevertheless,
considering OB SN Standby as the initially activated scenario net of the on-board module, at
least three location data are needed (e.g., in a sequence of notPt, Pt, notPt) to achieve
the probability of activating all transitions in the test model.
...... S_a S_b S_c
p1(notPt)
b1(Pt)
p2(notPt) p3(notPt) p4(notPt) p5(notPt)
b2(Pt) b3(Pt) b4(Pt)
FIGURE 8.10: Partitions and boundaries of the rail track in Figure 8.9
Expected Outputs. To cover all scenario nets and possible scenario net transitions, the RT-
based method introduced in chapter 5 could be used to generate the expected outputs accord-
ing to the construction principles of the test model. As in this case, the state space is small
and the reachability graph drawn by the CPN Tools [35] is relatively concise, we derive the
expected outputs directly from the reachability graph without building another reachability
tree. All possible paths of reachable states could be identified from the reachability graph.
Each of such paths corresponds to a possible sequence diagrams or a possible combination
of sequence diagrams. Accordingly, the expected output of a test case (i.e., tokens on specific
places) can be extracted from a possible path. For the given example, the test data is obtained
by initialising the place GPS Data in submodule LocUnit with a multiset 1 1’(1,“notPt”)
++1’(2,“Pt”)++1’(3,“notPt”), and 24 paths are identified from the reachability graph shown in
Figure 8.12. In other words, 24 expected outputs (e.g. tokens on places Output Message
and Input Message) are derived for testing the on-board subsystem model. The state space
1A multisetm over a non-empty set S can be viewed as a function from S into the set of non-negative numbers
N. The function maps each element s into the number of appearances, m(s), of the element s in the multiset m.
The non-negative integer m(s) is also called the coefficient of s in m[15].
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report for the test model is shown in Figure 8.11, from which we can see that the reachabil-
ity graph has 66 nodes and 84 arcs. Figure 8.13 shows the test case derived from the path
shown in Figure 8.12, namely, node 1–node 2–node 3–node 4–node 8–node 12–node 16–node
21–node 35–node 40–node 45–node 52–node 65.
FIGURE 8.11: State space report: statistics
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FIGURE 8.12: Reachability graph of the CPN model
8.4 Test Generation Based on SPENAT
Test generation by state space analysis has the potential of encountering the state explosion
problem, especially for a complex system with concurrency. However, using SPENAT to
generate test cases can void the state explosion problem but preserve the essence that the test
cases cover the whole state space.
8.4.1 SPENAT
The SPENAT (Safe Place Transition Nets with Attributes [41], [116]) notation is built upon
safe place transition nets (P/T nets) [153] and concepts of high-level Petri nets [15], [73], [154].
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FIGURE 8.13: The test case extracted from the path shown in Figure 8.12
Places of SPENAT can only be marked with one (coloured) token at the same time and the arcs
are not inscribed. Hierarchies are not allowed within SPENAT. Using SPENAT it is possible
to use external and parameterised signal/events or ports as transition triggers (in contrast
to STG [138], SIPN [153], IOPT [155]). Thanks to this feature it is much easier to model the
required behaviour of an open and reactive system with a Petri net. Also, the mapping of
existing models onto Petri nets is possible in an easy and intuitive way. For a SPENAT, it is
able to use attributes with arbitrary data type for handling internal data states. With these
features, one can model a system and/or component behaviour with a SPENAT like a well
established input/output box. An example of the declaration of a SPENAT as a Petri net
reacting on externally parameterised signals is presented in Figure 8.14. This SPENAT has
two transitions where transition t2 can only fire after transition t1 has fired and the guard of
t2 depends implicitly on the value of the parameter x of the trigger event of t1. If transition
t2 fires, then the parameter x of the external event ev1(int x) must be 1. This value is a result
of the guard of t1 (msg.x < 2), the effect of t1 (y = msg.x), and the guard of t2 (y > 0). The
keyword msg is a reference to the respective trigger event of the transition. In this case the
value 1 is the only valid value for parameter x of the trigger event ev1(int x) that t2 can fire.
8.4.2 Test Generation Based on Net Unfoldings
There are methods for verification and test generation based on SPENAT models. These
methods use well-known Petri net techniques, especially the construction of the (complete)
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FIGURE 8.14: SPENAT with externally parameterized signals/events [41]
prefix of the Petri net unfolding [138]. The method of test generation based on SPENAT mod-
els uses the (complete) prefixes of the SPENAT unfoldings (unfolding-based test generation
methods in general has been introduced in chapter 5). First a (maybe complete) prefix is con-
structed based on the specified test coverage criteria. It is not strictly necessary to construct
the complete prefix of the unfolding of SPENAT. For instance, if it requires all transitions
(or places) are covered by at least one test case, then the resulting prefix is in general much
smaller than the complete prefix. After the prefix construction, the test cases are identified.
The prefix of the unfolded SPENAT is an acyclic Petri net in which all possible processes of
SPENAT are contained within the prefix. Each possible process can be identified by an event
or rather by the local configuration of an event [119]. The local configurations of the events
of the prefix that have no successor events represent maximum processes. Therefore, it is a
good strategy to associate each identified maximum process with a test case. Here a process
corresponds to a linearisation of a local configuration introduced in chapter 7.
The values of the external events as the stimuli of the test object are constrained by the inscrip-
tion of the prefix events. When instantiating a process and assigning it to a test case, a value
within the specified value range needs to be selected. This can be carried out in a random
way but in general it is a widely accepted strategy to select a bound (upper and/or lower)
within the specified value range. The identified test cases specify a (concurrent) message
exchange between the test object and the tester or test system. This is an abstract sequence-
based description of the stimuli and the expected responses of the test object. This abstract
representation of the test cases must be transformed in an understandable and executable for-
mat for the test system. Furthermore, the realised level of abstraction during the modelling of
the required test object behaviour must be respected in order to get automatically executable
test specifications as a result of the test generation process. Data types, events, and/or sig-
nals, modelled within the profile model at an abstract level, have to be mapped to usable
structures of the target test notation of the used test tool. Therefore, rules are necessary in
order to automate this test formatting. For the formatting, in the standardised test notation
TTCN-3 [156], suitable rules were developed and prototypical implemented.
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8.4.3 Test Model
In [41] (see also [116]), it is shown that a UML state machine [157] can be mapped onto a
SPENAT. Thus the use of a UML state machine as a specification model for generating test
cases is also possible with SPENAT, whereby the UML state machine has to be mapped onto
a semantic equivalent SPENAT. In this case, the state digram in Figure 3.14 is the specification
model.
To develop a SPENAT model for test generation, a simple SPENAT modeller [41] can be used.
With this tool, it is easy to declare SPENAT properties such as signals with parameters, ports,
attributes, data types as text with a simple textual declaration notation. For the SPENAT
model for testing the on-board module of SatZB model, 4 enum types, 3 input signals with
parameters, 2 ports and 1 attribute for handling the scenario nets of the on-board module are
textually declared (see Figure 8.15). Parameter mt of the event mov auth(MovAuth,mt) is a
variable with the type of enumerable. Ports pTCC and pLoc, representing the interfaces of the
on-board module that interact with the model of the traffic control centre and the localisa-
tion unit respectively, are used to trigger the transitions in the SPENAT. Attribute scenario
indicates the currently activated scenario net of the on-board module. For the behaviour
modelling, a simple graphical notation is used (see Figure 8.16). With this graphical notation,
a normal Petri net is able to be modelled. Beside this, there are some simple extensions with
respect to normal Petri net representations for convenience reasons. Transitions between two
places with one pre- and one post- place are represented by a simple arc. Junctions for a better
representations of possible branches are also used. They have the same syntax and semantics
like junctions of a UML state machine.
8.4.4 Test Suite Generation
With the SPENAT modeller, the complete prefix of the SPENAT model of the on-board sub-
system model can be computed. It has 64 conditions, 32 prefix events and 19 alternating
processes. Therefore, 19 test cases were created for testing the on-board subsystem model.
The calculation time for the complete prefix construction took 0.094s or 94 ms. In Figure 8.17,
one generated test case is illustrated as a sequence diagram, in which one lifeline was inserted
for each port.
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FIGURE 8.15: The declarations of the SPENAT model
FIGURE 8.16: Screenshot of the SPENAT model for testing the on-board subsystem model
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FIGURE 8.17: A generated test case with the on-board subsystem model as the SUT
8.4.5 Comparison of the Two Test Generation Techniques
Aiming at automatic test generation and test coverage control, two model-based approaches
using CPNs and SPENAT respectively are proposed to test the on-board module of SatZB
model. The test model developed with CPNs is a closed system including the environment
that interacts with the on-board module, while the test model developed with SPENAT is an
open system whose transitions are triggered by external events with attributes. As depicted
in Figure 8.4, for the CPN-based approach, test cases are derived from the reachability graph
that generated with the CPN Tools. As to the SPENAT-based approach, test cases are gener-
ated in a similar manner but with the use of the (complete) prefix of the SPENAT unfolding
instead of the reachability graph. Table 8.1 presents some statistic data of the CPN model and
the SPENAT model.
We can see that testing with CPNs may face the challenge of state space explosion problem.
For example, when we shift the considering scenarios from the set STANDBY, RUNNING, and
EMERGENCY STOP to the set STANDBY, BAN OF ENTRY, CONDITIONAL RUNNING, RUN-
NING, and EMERGENCY STOP, the nodes of the reachability graph will grow from 39 to 66,
and the paths of the reachability graph from 8 to 24. Testing with SPENAT could establish a
model with less places and transitions. When the test object is simple enough, in this case few
scenarios are under consideration, the number of test cases generated by both approaches are
closed. However, if the test object is much more sophisticated, e.g., more scenarios are de-
fined in this case, then huge number of test cases will generated by the CPN-based approach
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TABLE 8.1: Statistic data of the CPN and SPENAT models
Test model CPN model SPENAT model
Scenarios STANDBY,
RUNNING,
EMER-
GENCY STOP
STANDBY,
BAN OF ENTRY,
CONDI-
TIONAL RUNNING,
RUNNING, EMER-
GENCY STOP
STANDBY,
RUNNING,
EMER-
GENCY STOP
STANDBY,
BAN OF ENTRY,
CONDI-
TIONAL RUNNING,
RUNNING, EMER-
GENCY STOP
Places 16 16 3 3
Transitions 14 18 11 13
Test cases 8 24 7 19
Reachability
graph
Nodes 39 66 - -
Paths 8 24 - -
while the number of test cases generated with SPENAT approach is in a reasonable scope.
Nevertheless, the CPN-based approach has the advantage of saving the effort of constructing
the test context.
In conclusion, both CPNs and SPENAT are high-level Petri nets, and their state spaces are
represented by reachability graph and (complete) prefix of the Petri net unfolding, respec-
tively. The reachability graph and (complete) prefix of the Petri net unfolding are used to
generated test cases in CPN-based and SPENAT-based generation techniques, so these two
techniques are essentially similar. However, if the number of states of the system is large and
many of the states are concurrent, then the SPENAT-based approach is preferred.
8.5 Test Evaluation
As the generated test cases have the same abstract level as the test model (CPN model and
SPENAT model), an adaptation of the test cases for test execution on the on-board subsys-
tem model is necessary. For example, the message “mt1” in a test case has to be trans-
formed into “{TRAINID=123,MSGID=‘mt1’,TSTAMP=3,DATA=‘PERMIT RUNNING’}” for
test execution. For test execution, the environment model (the CPN models of Figure 8.7
and Figure 8.8) could adopted as the environment of the on-board subsystem model. Ac-
cording to the observation of the test execution, tests with the both test suites (generated
by CPN-based and SPENAT-based approaches, respectively) have passed. So no faults are
detected by testing. Since the test cases cover all scenario nets and sequences of scenario
net transitions, all requirements in the functional requirements specification are covered.
Therefore, the following verification tasks identified in chapter 4 have been verified: (1)
8.6 Summary 147
the on-board module contains no algorithm errors; (2) The on-board module can switch its acti-
vated scenario net to the net OB SN Emergency Stop from any other nets (except for the nets
OB SN Initialisation, OB SN Registration and OB SN Logout); (3) The on-board mod-
ule can switch its activated scenario net to the net OB SN Ban Of Entry from other nets (i.e.,
OB SN Running and OB SN Conditional Running); (4) The on-board module can switch its
activated scenario net to the net OB SN Conditional Running from other nets (i.e., OB SN Run-
ning); (5) The on-board module has the possibility to activate every scenario net at least one time; (6)
The on-board module switches its activated scenario net from one to another as Figure 3.7 depicted; As
a matter of fact, the task (6) has covered the tasks (2), (3), (4) and (5), so testing is one of the
most efficient verification techniques.
8.6 Summary
This chapter first introduces the concept of testing and the test terminology, based on which
model-based testing and its process are discussed, and then concentrates on two test gener-
ation techniques, i.e., CPN-based and SPENAT-based test generation techniques for testing
the on-board module of SatZB model presented in chapter 3. The test cases generated by the
CPN-based technique are derived from the reachability graph whereas the SPENAT-based
technique generates test cases by the (complete) prefix of the SPENAT unfolding. Besides,
the test model developed with CPNs is a closed system and the SPENAT model for testing
is an open system whose transitions are possible to be triggered by the external and param-
eterised signal/events. A comparison of these two test generation techniques is carried out
to show the advantages and disadvantages of both techniques, and a test evaluation is con-
ducted in the end.

Chapter 9
Conclusions and Outlook
In this chapter, first a summary of the methods proposed in this thesis is provided. And
then a verification table is suggested to guide the verification by Petri net techniques. After
that approaches for the development and verification of the whole system (including the traf-
fic control centre, the localisation unit and the mobile communication system) is discussed.
Finally, the thesis conclude by outlining the future work.
9.1 Conclusions
Summary. System development is shifting from informal textual specifications and manual
coding techniques to a model-based and tool-supported automated code generation process.
In the model-based system development process, formal methods can be applied. This is, in
particular, beneficial for safety-critical systems such as train control systems. Formal meth-
ods provide a means of developing a description of a system at some stage in the phases of
requirements specification, design or coding. The resulting description takes a mathematical
form and can be subjected to mathematical analysis to detect various classes of inconsistency
or incorrectness. A formal method will generally offer a notation (formal language), a tech-
nique for deriving a description in that notation, and various forms of analysis for checking
a description for different correctness properties. A modelling language is considered as for-
mal if its syntax and semantics are expressed mathematically. It is easy to observe that the
modelling language is the foundation of the formal methods. In this thesis, Petri nets (see
chapter 2) are chosen as the modelling language for developing a satellite-based train control
system, for their capability of describing concurrent and distributed systems, and their suc-
cessful application on the railway domain. The hierarchical CPN model of the satellite-based
train control system (see chapter 3) is established by following the BASYSNET method.
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Before verifying the established system model of the train control system, the verification
tasks have to be specified (see chapter 4). These tasks are identified based on the hazard
analysis for the train control system and the system model, the identification of functions of
the train control system for safety and normal operation as well as the allocation of these
functions on the system model.
With the BASYSNET method for developing the train control system, it is possible to verify
the system model by simulation, testing and formal analysis. This is called quality assurance
in the approach. The quality assurance by Petri net analysing techniques (i.e., behavioural
analysis, structural analysis, coverage-based test generation techniques) in generation is dis-
cussed in chapter 5.
In the conceptual model, a system has four representing properties: state, function, structure
and behaviour. Each of these properties portrays a specific aspect of the system, so in order to
fully verify a system (or system model), all the four properties of the system (model) should
be verified. Different measures are required for the purpose of verifying different proper-
ties. For instance, the structural properties of the system model which are depend on the
topological structure of the model can be analysed by structural analysis (see chapter 6); the
system behaviour, in which states are involved, can be investigate by reachability analysis
(see chapter 7); the functions of the system can be checked by functional testing (see chapter
8). Based on the characteristics of Petri nets and the modelling paradigms, specific techniques
are proposed to verify the system model.
For the structural analysis of the system model, the concept of open nets is used to describe
the scenario nets because of the modular structure of the system model. Open nets extend
the normal Petri nets with open places (input/output boundary places) which serve as inter-
faces to their environments. The tokens on the open places represent messages that can be
received but not yet received, or messages that are about to be sent out but not yet be sent
out. Therefore, open places are given in terms of communication channels. Taking the envi-
ronments of the open nets in into consideration, three application contexts are defined, i.e.,
normal-environment context, 1-configured-environment context and out-environment con-
text. Based on the theory of structural properties of Petri nets introduced in chapter 5 and the
verification tasks identified in chapter 4, the reproducibility of empty marking of open nets
in different environmental contexts is discussed. In order to investigate the consistency of the
scenario nets of the on-board subsystem model, a generic scenario net is constructed for ap-
plying the presented theory. For verifying the property of controllability of the scenario nets,
the generic scenario net is adapted and the verification is performed by checking that whether
the open nets in out-environment context will always end up with an empty marking.
9.1 Conclusions 151
For the behavioural analysis, unfolding-based techniques are employed to analyse the reach-
ability property of the system model avoiding the state explosion problem. First the formal-
isation of unfolding hierarchical CP-nets based on the existing approach for non-hierarchical
CP-nets is presented. And then the reachability property of the CPN model is analysed based
on concept of linearisation and configuration. A configuration of an unfolding could have
multiple linearisations, and each linearisation is a firing sequence of the occurrence net (from
the default initial marking) containing each event from the configuration exactly once, and
no further events. All linearisations lead to the same reachable marking. To describe a mark-
ing that is going to be checked in reachability analysis, the concept of partial marking is
introduced. In particular, the on-the-fly verification approach is highlighted for checking a
marking that is likely to be reachable. Otherwise, the complete prefix of the unfolding is re-
quired. The investigation of the reachability property of the on-board subsystem model is
explored by giving examples verifying the verification tasks identified in chapter 4.
For the functional testing, two test generation techniques, CPN-based and SPENAT-based
test generation techniques, are proposed. The test cases generated by the CPN-based tech-
nique are derived from the reachability graph whereas the SPENAT-based technique gener-
ates test cases with the (complete) prefix of the SPENAT unfolding. Besides, the test model
developed with CPNs is a closed system and the SPENAT model for testing is an open sys-
tem whose transitions are possible to be triggered by the external and parameterised sig-
nal/events. These techniques are exemplified by testing the on-board subsystem model with
respect to the verification tasks identified in chapter 4.
In summary, all the verification tasks identified in chapter 4 are verified by either structural
verification, reachability analysis or testing. According to the verification results, no errors
were found in the on-board module of SatZB model.
Verification Table. Based on the introduction of S-invariants and T-invariants in chapter
2, behavioural and structural properties in chapter 5, and the structural analysis in chap-
ter 6, a compact verification table, providing an overview of system verification by Petri net
analysing techniques, can be given as in Table 9.1. In practice, system analysis can be per-
formed by filling out this table. In this table, the second column (split by ‖) shows the Petri
nets under consideration and the Petri net properties in general. The transitions of a Petri net
can be classified into three groups: input boundary transitions (indicated by the letter “I”),
output boundary transitions (indicated by the letter “O”) and normal (internal) transitions
(indicated by the letter “N”). Similarly, the places of the net can be assigned into three cate-
gory: input boundary places (indicated by the letter “I”), output boundary places (indicated
by the letter “O”) and normal (internal) places (indicated by the letter “N”). The first column
of the table lists the T-invariants of the Petri nets. These T-invariants can be used to verify
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the structural properties of consistency and controllability (see chapter 6) of the Petri nets.
The third column presents the S-invariants of the Petri nets, which can be used to verify the
structural property of conservativeness. The last column defines scenarios for behavioural
analysis. The word “scenarios” in this table has a general meaning. It is not restricted to im-
plying the scenarios of train control systems. A scenario is a process that has an initial state
(indicated by “Init”) and a end state (indicated by “End”) if there is one. The expected states
and unexpected states that might be appeared in a scenario are indicated by “Exp” and “Un-
exp”, respectively. With these scenarios, the behavioural properties of boundedness, liveness,
reversibility and reachability can be verified.
TABLE 9.1: Petri net verification table
Structural 
analysis 
Petri nets Structural 
analysis  
Behavioural analysis 
T-
invariants 
Transi-
tion 
Place S-
invariants 
Scenarios 
3 2 1   1 2 3 1 2 3 
Init Exp Unexp End Init Exp Unexp End Init Exp Unexp End 
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
 Consistency  - - - - 
 Controllability - - - - 
- Conservativeness  - - - 
- Boundedness -    
- Liveness -    
- Reversibility -    
- Reachability -    
 
  
  
  
N↓  O↑ 
I↑  O↓ 
N↓  O↑ 
  I↑  O↓ 
Discussion. In this thesis, a verifiable design of a satellite-based train control system (SatZB)
with Petri nets is proposed. Following the BASYSNET method, simulation, testing, formal
analysis (including structural analysis and reachability analysis) are implemented to verify
and validate the designed model by exploring corresponding methods. Although this thesis
focus on the on-board module of the system model, the proposed verification methods are
also valid to the other main module of the system model, the model of the traffic control cen-
tre. This is because it is also hierarchically constructed based on the exact scenarios that have
been defined for constructing the on-board module (see chapter 3). Nevertheless, the struc-
tural verification for the model of the traffic control centre may be also interested in other
structural properties such as boundedness, since the traffic control centre has to manage all
the trains that have registered in it. Thus whether there are no overflows in the model of the
traffic control centre is interested for the verification. The localisation unit and the commu-
nication system of SatZB system are developed by my colleagues who have rich knowledge
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of GNSS-based localisation and mobile communication respectively, so the modelling and
verification of these modules are carried out separately, e.g. in [158] and [159].
Recalling the introduction of the design and development of some existing train control sys-
tems in chapter 1, a comparison of the design and development processes of SatZB with other
train control systems is shown in Table 9.2. It is easy to observe that the development process
of SatZB is essentially similar to the development process of openETCS. Theses processes
have the major advantages of formal verification and automatic code generation.
TABLE 9.2: Comparison of the design and development of different train control systems
ETCS openETCS
Satellite-based Train Control System
RZL SATLOC SatZB
Method Object-
oriented
(Modu-
larised and
layered)
Open proof UML-based UML-based BASYSNET
Means of de-
scription
Petri nets SysML/
SCADE
UML UML Petri nets
Verification
& validation
Test Simulation,
formal analy-
sis, test
Test Test Simulation,
formal analy-
sis, test
Code genera-
tion
Manually Automatically Manually Manually Automatically
(out of the
scope of this
thesis)
9.2 Outlook
For future work, the time constrains of the system could be taken into consideration. In other
words, the time constrains could be added to the existing model, which results in a timed
Petri net model. Given a timed Petri net model, its performances (e.g., time delay) are able to
be analysed. Beside adding time constrains to the existing model, further refinement for the
model should be done for the purpose of transforming the system model into programming
codes directly. As a consequence, the identification of verification tasks could be further
refined accordingly.
The discussion of the structural analysis in this thesis is based on the low-level Petri nets. The
SatZB model established in chapter 3, however, is a high-level Petri net model. Therefore, a
mapping from the high-level Petri nets to the low-level Petri nets is required before applying
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the proposed methods. It needs to be aware that the mapped low-level Petri nets should
preserve the structural properties of the corresponding high-level Petri nets.
For reachability analysis using net unfoldings, it is desirable to use computer-aided tools for
automatically unfolding a (coloured) Petri net model and checking the reachability properties
since unfolding the (coloured) Petri net model by hand is a time-consuming and error-prone
process. Existing tools like Cunf [83] carries out unfolding-based verification of Petri nets
extended with read arcs, also known as contextual nets (or c-nets) [160] which are low-level
Petri nets. Moreover, the Cunf tool requires that the input c-nets is 1-safe. However, there
are tools, e.g., CPN-AMI [80] and Snoopy [161], [162], that can unfold coloured Petri nets into
low-level Petri nets (P/T nets).
Functional verification by testing with the approach presented in this thesis could be adapted
to test the model of the traffic control centre and the whole system model. After adding time
constrains to the system model, performance testing also could be one of the testing tasks.
With the Petri net model of the system, test scenarios can be derived from the reachability
graph of the system model. These test scenarios then applied to the real/realised system for
system validation. From the perspective of testing, the design model can be taken as a test
model for testing the realised system that might has been developed separately.
Apart from qualitative analysis, quantitative analysis of the risk and availability of the system
can be performed with the PROFUND (PROcess FUNctional and Dependability) approach
[163] by means of stochastic Petri nets.
Recently, a report on the Model Checking Contest at Petri Nets 2013 [164] was released. This
report presents the results of the Model Checking Contest held at Petri Nets 2013 in Milano,
Italy. The contest aimed at a fair and experimental evaluation of the performances of model
checking techniques applied to Petri nets. Twelve tools were involved in several examina-
tions (state space generation and evaluation of several types of formulae - reachability, LTL
( Linear-time Temporal Logic) [165], [166], CTL (Computation Tree Logic) [167] for various
classes of atomic propositions) run on a set of common models (Place/Transition and Sym-
metric Petri nets). The results presented on the report shows that no tool (among the twelve
selected tools) could process the verified formulas of CTL and LTL for CPN models. How-
ever, the report suggests that a solution should be proposed to have high-level Petri nets.
This should be possible when we first represent high-level Petri nets with PNML (Petri Net
Markup Language) (e.g., CPN Tools 4.0 [35] supports for export to PNML), and then compile
the PNML of the high-level Petri nets with certain tools such as Neco [168]. Neco is a suite
of Unix tools to compile high-level Petri nets into libraries for explicit model-checking. These
libraries can be used to build state spaces. In addition, a LTL model-check Neco-spot is
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available. Although no tool provided can process the formulas of CTL and LTL for CPN mod-
els, the Design/CPN (has been replaced by CPN Tools [169]) is facilitated with the capability
of analysing state space by means of a CTL-like temporal logic called ASK-CTL [170], [171],
[172], which is an extension of CTL. It is not only possible to formulate queries about states,
but also queries about state changes (e.g., the occurrence of certain transitions) [173]. There-
fore, LTL, CTL or ASK-CTL model checking for the established CPN model of the satellite-
based train control system could also be a future work.
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